[MD] Static latching & faith

[David M]

Hi Scott

Scott> Isn't that what I'm saying? We all here (Pirsig, Wilber, you, me, and 
DMB)
> consider it a crime to ignore the transcendental. And I'm not saying that
> the transcendental is beyond experience. I'm only saying that certain 
> claims
> in the MOQ depend on the experience of amystical few, and so according to
> Pirsig's usage of 'empiricism', those claims are empirical, but according 
> to
> standard usage, they are seen as being taken on faith (in the mystics who
> produce these claims). What's more, if we try to bracket out those claims,
> the MOQ falls apart (as an 'empirical' metaphysics). Here's what I mean:
> Pirsig argues *without* appeal to mystical revelation that inorganic
> patterns are patterns of value. This claim is "justified" in the following
> paragraph (from chapter 8):
>
> "The only difference between causation and value is that the word "cause"
> implies absolute certainty whereas the implied meaning of "value" is one 
> of
> preference. In classical science it was supposed that the world always 
> works
> in terms of absolute certainty and that "cause" is the more appropriate 
> word
> to describe it. But in modern quantum physics all that is changed. 
> Particles
> "prefer" to do what they do. An individual particle is not absolutely
> committed to one predictable behavior.What appears to be an absolute cause
> is just a consistent pattern of preferences. Therefore, when you strike
> "cause" from the language and substitute "value" you are not only 
> replacing
> an empirically meaningless term with a meaningful one; you are using a 
> term
> that is more appropriate to actual observation."
>
> First (minor) point. Pirsig claims that "cause" is an empirically
> meaningless term, since we have no "direct awareness" of it -- that is, it
> is a word employed in our conceptual framework. On the other hand, one can
> note its usefulness in distinguishing certain patterns we understand in
> terms of "A causes B" from patterns of the form "We don't know why there 
> is
> B". One has found out why a bug in a computer program is occurring when 
> one
> traces its cause. Fix that cause, and the bug is fixed. To say that "the 
> bug
> caused the problem " is not empirical is ludicrous. But onward to the 
> major
> point.

DM: I think the point here is that the bug tends to create the problem,
it is not a cause in the sense that cause implies a necessity rather than a 
tendency,
I think you are over-reading what Pirsig is saying.  He is making only this 
lesser claim.


>
> The last clause in the quoted paragraph is simply not true ("[using 
> 'value']
> is more appropriate to actual observation").

DM: Again it is saying that the observed tendency can imply value as
the acting force whereas cause implies necessity and mechanical necessity
is being dropped as no longer a good metaphor for what is observed.

Pirsig just states that
> "Particles 'prefer' to do what they do", but there is no evidence for that
> claim.

DM: The tendency metaphor makes sense only in terms of agency
and not necessity.This is what is being claimed, no more. The third option
is accident.


All the evidence shows is that we do not know why (for example) a
> particle shows up in a particular place. We do know that they show up in
> consistent patterns, but we cannot predict for a particular particle where
> it will show up. To jump from this to saying that they show "preference" 
> is
> non-empirical.

DM: The point is that we have to use concepts to discuss the empirical,
and the move being spotted here is from concepts of necessity like
cause to concepts of tendency that have previously always implied agency.

 There are other possibilities: that where they show up is
> purely random, or that there are "hidden variables" that determine where
> they will show up (that is, where they show up is determined, but we don't
> know why). The only empirical thing one can say (leaving out mystical
> revelation) is that we don't know.

DM: A poor option because all science requires concepts/metaphors to
say anything, so this is just about the exploration of metaphor, Pirsig 
challanges
the old metaphors of cause, they seem to be the wrong ones for the
observations we have, it starts to look possible to ascribe agency to 
particles without
any clear falsification.

>
> Thus, if we leave out mystical revelation, there is no *empirical*
> justification for claiming that there is value in the inorganic.

DM: The point is that free-behaviour versus necessary-behaviour
is why we thought we could make a living versus non-living
distinction, this has become unclear, therefore we are perfectly
free to explore the fit of agentive concepts to all behaviour,
and claim that they look like they are a better match to what is
observed. Simply, the harder we look the more dynamic and complex
the behaviour of organic things seem to be, so we appear perfectly
justified in suggesting agentive concepts, so they fit the more extensive
observations of current science (although resisted by the 
secular/materialist concept
police).

 That means
> that there is no empirical obstacle to claiming that value is an emergent
> property in complex biological creatures, which claim of course leads us
> back into SOM.

DM: Could be emergent, but maybe we have dropped the distinctions (SOM)
that make us come up with such a suggestion.


 The two metaphysics (MOQ and SOM -- the latter patched up so
> it doesn't ignore value entirely as in logical positivism) are equally
> adequate and coherent. Thus, the only reason to accept the MOQ over SOM is
> because one has faith in mystical revelation (or, of course, if one has 
> such
> revelation of one's own).

DM: I think MOQ overcomes scientism better than SOM (that tends towards
it), so the patching does not work for me. Thinking about reality in a 
non-scientistic
space is what allows us to open ourselves to the full spectrum of experience
At its fullest we may call this mystical. But this is the openness of 
reality here
and now (at least potentially), what matters is how far each of us can take 
this,
so what mystics have to say is interesting but not essential.


>
> There is a further issue, of course, and that is which mystics one listens
> to, but that's a whole 'nother topic.
>
> - Scott
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "David M" <davidint at blueyonder.co.uk>
> To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
> Sent: Sunday, April 30, 2006 10:35 AM
> Subject: Re: [MD] Static latching & faith
>
>
> Hi Scott
>
> I wonder about this. I see your point but push it in this direction and 
> you
> have another problem.
> If the transcendental is so special, so beyond experience, what is it? how
> can we ever know anything
> of it? I think the whole point about recognising DQ in experience is that
> the doors of perception
> can be opened, that the mystical can be recognised in ordinary experience,
> that experience has
> first rights over the reductions of experience that enable science to get 
> on
> with its business.
> Let's not ignore the transcendental or forget that the reality of the
> transcendental is entirely
> apparent in experience, if you can see the movement of DQ which declares 
> the
> existence of
> borders and border crossings.
>
> regards
> David M
>
>
>> Evolution is hindered if one does that which Wilber (and most of us here)
>> considers a crime: to ignore the transcendental. Calling the
>> transcendental
>> the empirical just adds a red herring.
>>
>> - Scott
>>
>
>
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