[MD] Static latching & faith

[David M]

Hi Ant/Scott

When we discuss 'indeterminate component of the aesthetic continuum'
are we saying any more than that we are 'open' to experience, that
we rely on this openness, the capacity to experience, and this obviously
underlies the fact that we can experience different qualities/patterns at
all? This is just Heidegger's 'clearing' or the 'sphere' of our experience.
It is nothing, it is what makes experience dynamic, it is implied by the
coming and going of all SQ, their failure to endure, the waiting for
their re-appearance.

David M



----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Ant McWatt" <antmcwatt at hotmail.co.uk>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Friday, April 28, 2006 3:49 PM
Subject: [MD] Static latching & faith


> Scott had said:
>
> Since I corrected myself in the next and all succeeding posts, I thought 
> it
> was obvious that when I said "undivided" I meant to be saying
> "undifferentiated". Frankly, I don't see much of a difference between the
> two terms, but if there is one, let me know.
>
> Ant commented April 24th:
>
> The difficulty with Scott being initially careless with the terminology is
> that it was unclear whether he was referring to Northrop's "aesthetic
> continuum" (more or less, Dynamic Quality from the Dynamic "world of
> Buddhas" perspective of the MOQ) or the "indeterminate aesthetic 
> continuum"
> (more or less, Dynamic Quality from the static "everyday world" 
> perspective
> of the MOQ).
>
> Scott replied April 24th:
> Well, I thought I was referring to what Pirsig referred to in ZAMM:
> "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum". I can't perceive any practical
> difference between "undivided aesthetic continuum", "undifferentiated
> aesthetic continuum", and "indeterminate aesthetic continuum". Is there 
> any?
> Now here you mention the plain "aesthetic continuum". Since that
> appears to be something that only Buddhas know about it, I think we can
> safely leave it aside in any discussion of what is empirical. That is, if 
> we
> include the experience of mystics in the empirical, the word loses all
> useful meaning.
>
> Ant comments:
>
> Scott,
>
> The aesthetic continuum is _everything_ that is immediately apprehended. 
> To
> remind ourselves: "All other concepts by intuition derive from it by
> abstraction. By 'abstraction' we mean. the consideration of certain
> immediately apprehended factors apart from their immediately apprehended
> context."
>
> "There is:
>
> (a) the field or continuum apart from the differentiations within it or 
> the
> definite properties which characterize it, and there are
>
> (b) the differentiations or definite properties apart from the continuum
> which runs through them and embraces them.
>
> The former, (a), we shall call the indefinite or undifferentiated 
> aesthetic
> continuum,
> the latter, (b), since they are many in number, the differentiations."
>
> (Northrop, "Logic of the Sciences & Humanities", 1947, p.96)
>
> Northrop then provided an answer to Scott's query for why "the
> undifferentiated aesthetic continuum" isn't taken on faith (or at least as 
> a
> non-empirical assumption):
>
> "The Concept of the Indefinite or Undifferentiated Aesthetic Continuum [is
> the] most difficult of these. concepts for the Westerner to appreciate.
> because of the influence of Berkeley and Hume.  They insisted that all
> concepts are concepts by intuition but tended to regard the continuum as
> nothing but an aggregation of secondary and tertiary qualities. That this 
> is
> false, an examination of what one immediately apprehends will indicate. We
> directly inspect not merely the white and the noise but also these in a
> field. The field is as immediately given as any specific quality, whether
> secondary or tertiary, within it."
>
> "Moreover, most of the directly experienced field is vague and indefinite.
> Only at what William James termed its center is there specificity and
> definiteness. Thus it is evident that the indefinite, indeterminate,
> aesthetic continuum is as immediately apprehended as are the specific
> differentiations within it. Hence, the concept of the indefinite or
> undifferentiated continuum, gained by abstraction from the differentiated
> aesthetic continuum, is a concept by intuition, not a concept by 
> postulation
> [or non-empirical assumption]. (Northrop, "Logic of the Sciences &
> Humanities", 1947, p.97)
>
> Scott noted April 23rd:
>
> That which is vague is so just because one isn't focused on it.
>
> Ant commented April 24th:
>
> Again, just like the scientific theory you previously mentioned that seeks
> to explain the indeterminate nature of the visual field (i.e. "more 
> photons
> are processed by the central fovea area of the retinal field") the 
> focusing
> of the eye is just another theoretical concept by postulation (if a high
> quality one) that would _not_ have arisen if the indeterminate aesthetic
> continuum hadn't been observed in the first place.
>
> Scott:
> It is hardly a scientific theory to note that if I turn my head I stop
> focusing on one thing and start focusing on another, that if I note
> something vague in my peripheral vision I can turn my head to focus on it,
> making it less vague.
>
> Ant comments:
>
> Agreed, the above is a hardly a scientific theory but _it is still a 
> theory_
> and therefore a concept by postulation.  Again, it is a concept by
> postulation which would not have been thought of in the first place if the
> indeterminate component of the aesthetic continuum hadn't been observed in
> the first place.  You keep missing this important logical point (Don't 
> worry
> you're in good company with most Western philosophers such as Dennett).
>
> Ant said:
> And, as I mentioned before, even Daniel Dennett ("Consciousness 
> Explained",
> 1991, pp.53-55) confirms Northrop's and William James' observation, at 
> least
> as far as the visual field is concerned:
>
> "The visual field seems to naïve reflection to be uniformly detailed and
> focused from the center out to the boundaries, but a simple experiment
> [moving a playing card from the center to the boundary of the visual 
> field]
> shows that this is not so."
>
> Scott also noted April 23rd:
>
> Again, this just indicates that some things are experienced in more detail
> than others.
>
> Ant commented April 24th:
>
> Exactly.  However, Northrop is making the case that before us Westerners
> rush off into Dennett's SOM-land (which is just like Lapland - cold and
> largely colourless - but without the joie de vivre, reindeers or Santa's
> grotto) we should also be aware that many East Asian philosophies give 
> more
> significance to the "indeterminate aesthetic continuum" - possibly with 
> good
> reason - than Westerners typically do.
>
> Scott:
> But is this indeterminate aesthetic continuum just vague peripheral vision
> or is it completely indeterminate: no form whatsoever? It has to be the
> latter, or there is no point in even mentioning it as a philosophical big
> deal. So I am assuming that what the East Asian philosophies are referring
> to is something mystical -- a state of consciousness of complete absence 
> of
> form.
>
> Ant comments:
>
>>From what I can gather the indeterminate aesthetic continuum composes not
> just vague peripheral vision, but also vague touch (is that pipe really 
> very
> hot or very cold), indeterminate sounds whether just very quiet or in the
> distance, vague taste (the few seconds to decide you are drinking a high
> quality French wine rather than a table wine) and smell (for instance,
> deciding between a synthetic lavender or the real plant).
>
> Ant quoted Northrop:
>
> "Concepts by intuition are especially and continuously important in the
> traditional Orient. This happens because the Far Easterners have tended to
> be pure empiricists restricting reality to the immediately apprehended. 
> In
> fact, they identify the Divine with the timeless undifferentiated 
> aesthetic
> continuum.  Consequently, Far Eastern religion is a positivistic, 
> empirical
> and, hence, scientifically veridical religion." (Northrop, "Logic of the
> Sciences & Humanities", 1947, p.100)
>
> Scott:
> As I thought: the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is Divine, which is
> to say, it is not part of the experience of everyday, non-mystically
> Awakened people.
>
> Ant comments:
>
> I think it would be better to say that _for Northrop_ the Divine is
> associated with the undifferentiated component of the aesthetic continuum
> (from a static everyday perspective) and _is_ a logical move made by him
> because as the Divine is meant to be indeterminate, it can't reside in the
> determinate components of experience/the aesthetic continuum.
>
> However, in correspondence, Pirsig has reservations about locating the
> Divine (if equated with Dynamic Quality) with the indeterminate aesthetic
> continuum.  If nothing else, I think this is because it starts sounding 
> like
> a definition for DQ.  I think Pirsig would relate the Dynamic more to the
> aesthetic nature of the immediately apprehended.
>
> "From an everyday world Dynamic Quality is like an undefined perfume which
> attaches in different ways to the objects of the world."  (Pirsig to 
> McWatt,
> December 1994)
>
> Everyone can get "turned on" by the beauty of a sunset if they only become
> mindful of their immediate surroundings (which is where the aesthetic
> resides in both the determinate and indeterminate).
>
> "Some people know that they know it, and other people, particularly 
> Freshman
> rhetoric students, don't know that they know it.  This is in accord with 
> the
> Soto Zen Buddhist doctrine that everyone is enlightened.  What occurs at
> "enlightenment" is the falling away of the illusion that one is not
> enlightened.  But the enlightenment has been there all along."  (Pirsig to
> McWatt, August 1997)
>
> Scott:
>
> So to base a philosophy on it is to base a philosophy on faith (faith that
> the mystics who report such experience are reporting authentically),
>
> Ant comments:
>
> No, the beauty of a sunset isn't anything to do with faith; it's just the
> way it is (as Elvis would say).  Moreover, you're making mysticism sound 
> too
> esoteric and mysticism.  Nirvana is the here and now.
>
> ------ cut the part about bad philosophology------
>
> Ant said:
> Scott had then noted (despite stating later in the same post: "I have no
> experience of an undifferentiated continuum"!!!):
>
>>It seems to me that [indeterminate aesthetic continuum] can be replaced by
>>the word 'subject' in its intentional sense (not in its Cartesian 
>>sense) -- 
>>that which is aware of all objects, including mental objects.
>
> Scott:
> No contradiction here. I have no experience *of* the intentional subject. 
> It
> cannot be an object of experience. It is postulated (by me) and Realized 
> by
> some mystics (e.g., Merrell-Wolff, who calls it Pure Subject, and also 
> calls
> that state of consciousness Nirvana), and in his description it sounds 
> just
> like a Realization of the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum
> ("Consciousness of absence of objects is Nirvana", as he puts it in his
> aphorisms).
>
> Ant comments:
>
> The intentional subject (in the above context) sounds like a 
> re-introduction
> of the traditional theistic Christian God through the back door while the
> undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is noted by immediate apprehension.
> Northrop might have put more emphasis on its indeterminacy and Pirsig on 
> its
> aesthetic nature but it's a concept by intuition (part of which needs to 
> be
> directly apprehended as in noticing the orange colour in a sunset) not a
> concept by postulation (i.e. a theory which is related to concepts by
> intuition via hypothesis e.g. the immediately apprehended sunset relates 
> to
> a theoretical three-dimensional sphere in public space so many miles away
> from the Earth - which, of course, is another theoretical concept by
> postulation).
>
> Ant had stated April 22nd:
>
> A "subject" [such as Scott's "the intentional subject"] is a concept by
> postulation (i.e. purely theoretical) and is logically derived at a later
> point in Northrop's
> conceptual "train of thought".
>
> Scott replied April 22nd:
>
> How can one conceptually postulate that which has no form? By intentional
> subject I mean that which is aware of all objects, including the
> objectivized self.
>
> Ant McWatt commented:
>
> Again, this just strikes me as another form of SOM (a subject being aware 
> of
> an object).
>
> Scott:
> It looks like I've contradicted myself (since above I said I postulate the
> intentional subject). So I retract what I said April 22.
>
> Ant comments:
>
> Scott, you're not just confusing David Buchanan now but yourself!  As I
> mentioned before, this is why it's probably better (for the sake of 
> clarity
> if nothing else) to dispense with SOM terminology and the term awareness 
> in
> this context.
>
> Scott:
>
> What I mean is that I can say "there is a somewhat (called an intentional
> subject) which is aware of all objects", in the same way that I can
> postulate that "since
> there is a continual awareness of changing objects, I can postulate that
> there is an undifferentiated aesthetic continuum".
>
> What I am getting at is that both of these -- for me and I assume for any
> non-mystic -- are just postulations. They are not intuitive experiences,
> except for the mystic.
> Hence neither is empirical, except for the mystic.
>
> Ant comments:
>
> As I mentioned before, the term "intentional subject" has so many
> traditional SOM connotations that's absolutely no way I would use it in 
> the
> context of the Divine.
>
> Regarding the issue about the indeterminate aesthetic continuum being 
> aware.
>  Again, that _is_ theorising about a component of the immediately
> apprehended and therefore a concept by postulation.  Hence, my comment 
> above
> that it sounds like your re-introducing a theistic god.
>
> Scott continued April 22nd:
>
> It is a pity that Pirsig did not distinguish between the intentional 
> subject
> and the Cartesian subject. Only the latter is capable of being
> conceptualized. The former bears a strong resemblance to DQ.
>
> Ant McWatt commented:
>
> Well, remember that Pirsig was primarily concerned with understanding the
> essential nature of Quality rather than addressing the number of forms 
> that
> SOM can take.  (I presume he centred on Cartesian SOM as it just happens 
> to
> be the most common and well known form in philosophology).  Moreover, if
> Pirsig had used SOM terminology it would have made it more difficult to
> understand the differences between the MOQ and SOM.  I don't think 
> awareness
> is a great word to use as a central term in a metaphysics either due to 
> the
> numerous connotations it has e.g. it can imply that things such as rocks 
> and
> atoms have self-consciousness.
>
> Scott:
> Perhaps. The problem with the MOQ (one of them) is that Pirsig doesn't say
> anything about (choose a word: consciousness, awareness, self-awareness,
> etc.).
>
> Ant comments:
>
> Yes, he does though these comments about awareness, consciousness, etc.,
> aren't necessarily found in ZMM or LILA.
>
> Scott:
>
> That is, he offers nothing with which to discuss philosophical
> problems which use these terms.
>
> Ant comments:
>
> Most of these philosophical problems found in the traditional 
> Anglo-American
> philosophy department which use these terms are SOM problems.  It's nearly
> always a incorrect fundamental SOM assumption (such as confusing concepts 
> by
> intuition with concepts by postulation) which leads to metaphysical 
> problems
> further up the logical track.
>
> Scott:
>
> That is how he could get away with not making the distinction,
>
> Ant comments:
>
> What distinction?
>
> Scott:
>
> but as a consequence there is a good deal of confusion in trying to 
> compare
> the MOQ with other philosophies.
>
> Ant comments:
>
> I'll think you'll find "the confusion" in trying to compare the MOQ with
> other philosophies is usually with these "other philosophies"!  (Hope I
> don't sound too biased!)
>
> Ant had asked April 22nd:
>
> Well, where else do you think the aesthetic resides?
>
> Scott replied:
>
> As far as I can tell *empirically* it might reside in the impressionist
> painter, or in the biological SQ of the infant.
>
> Ant commented:
>
> Really?   I'll keep this answer in mind the next time I see a sunset or
> visit an art gallery. Anyway, I have this infant in front of me.  How can 
> I
> tell *empirically* whether the aesthetic is in its biological SQ or not?
>
> Scott:
> Precisely. We can't tell, empirically. So to claim that the aesthetic is 
> not
> "just subjective" (that is, just a property of people and higher animals
> with the requisite nervous systems) is not an empirical claim.
>
> Ant comments:
>
> The idea that the aesthetic "is just a property of people and higher 
> animals
> with the requisite nervous systems" is a concept by postulation and would
> not have arisen in the first place if the aesthetic had not been noticed 
> in
> immediate experience in the first place.
>
> Scott:
>
> As I see it, the MOQ has adopted it either because Pirsig has had personal
> mystical experience (in which case for us to adopt it requires faith in
> Pirsig) or because Pirsig has faith in mystics. Either way, for us
> non-mystics, the MOQ is based on faith, not empirical data.
>
> Ant comments:
>
> Well, the aesthetic is immediately apprehended whether it's manifested in 
> a
> sunset, the other parts of the natural world (such as a flower or a tiger)
> or in a damn good piece of art.  It's part of experience, right here and 
> now
> that does not require faith.  I'm afraid there's too much else I can say
> about this issue other than "see for yourself".
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Anthony.
>
>
> www.robertpirsig.org
>
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