[MD] Static latching & faith

[Ant McWatt]

Scott, DMB, SA,

Ant McWatt quoted F.S.C. Northrop (the widely published Sterling Professor 
of philosophy & law at Yale University for over forty years) April 27th:

“The Concept of the Indefinite or Undifferentiated Aesthetic Continuum [is
the] most difficult of these concepts for the Westerner to appreciate.
because of the influence of Berkeley and Hume.  They insisted that all
concepts are concepts by intuition but tended to regard the continuum as
nothing but an aggregation of secondary and tertiary qualities. That this is
false, an examination of what one immediately apprehends will indicate. We
directly inspect not merely the white and the noise but also these in a
field. The field is as immediately given as any specific quality, whether
secondary or tertiary, within it.”

“Moreover, most of the directly experienced field is vague and indefinite.
Only at what William James termed its center is there specificity and
definiteness. Thus it is evident that the indefinite, indeterminate,
aesthetic continuum is as immediately apprehended as are the specific
differentiations within it. Hence, the concept of the indefinite or
undifferentiated continuum, gained by abstraction from the differentiated
aesthetic continuum, is a concept by intuition, not a concept by postulation
[or non-empirical assumption]. (Northrop, “Logic of the Sciences &
Humanities”, 1947, p.97)

Scott stated April 27th:
It is hardly a scientific theory to note that if I turn my head I stop
focusing on one thing and start focusing on another, that if I note
something vague in my peripheral vision I can turn my head to focus on it,
making it less vague.

Ant commented April 27th:

Agreed, the above is a hardly a scientific theory but _it is still a theory_
and therefore a concept by postulation.  Again, it is a concept by
postulation which would not have been thought of in the first place if the
indeterminate component of the aesthetic continuum hadn’t been observed in
the first place.  You keep missing this important logical point (Don’t worry
you’re in good company with most Western philosophers such as Dennett).

Scott asked April 28th:
I fail to see why the field isn’t also a concept by postulation.

Ant comments:

There are _immediately apprehended_ boundaries to “sense impressions” and 
this is what I _think_ Northrop means by “field”.  Maybe if this field was 
rectangular like a TV screen (rather than a largely vague oval with a 
determinate centre) it would be more obvious.  This ontological space 
(“Being”) allowing “sense impressions” (plus the subsequent static patterns) 
is discussed in more depth by Professor David E. Cooper “The Measure Of 
Things” (2002) and Heidegger.   Anyway, a concept by postulation is purely 
theoretical while a concept by intuition _partly_ depends on being 
immediately apprehended.  Northrop’s field is therefore a concept by 
intuition.  (A concept by intuition – such as the orange in a sunset - is 
partly theoretical because though verified by immediately apprehension, 
language is required to point it out to someone else.  (As Northrop notes, a 
pure fact – untainted by theory - is one you have to keep to yourself!)

Scott continued April 28th:

The difference between Northrop and Dennett is that Northrop says there is 
this
unobserved field in addition to the variety of aesthetic experiences, while
Dennett does not say there is such a field.

Ant commented April 27th:

Well, I wouldn’t listen much to Dennett in the context of immediate 
experience or mysticism.  He’ll just confuse you.  As I note above 
Northrop’s field is immediately apprehended and, in any case, Dennett does 
mention the field (at least, in its visual context) in chapter 3 of 
“Consciousness Explained”.

Scott continued April 28th:

How do we choose between these options? Not empirically, as far as I can 
see. Northrop says “Moreover, most of the directly experienced field is 
vague and indefinite.  Only at what William James termed its center is there 
specificity and definiteness.”  Fine, there are more and less vague 
aesthetic experiences.

Ant comments:

OK, looks like we’re finally getting some agreement regarding the existence 
of the indeterminate and aesthetic components of Northrop’s “indeterminate 
aesthetic continuum”.

Scott continued April 28th:

But [Northrop] then infers from this: “Thus it is evident that the 
indefinite,
indeterminate, aesthetic continuum is as immediately apprehended as are the
specific differentiations within it.” But this does not logically follow, no 
more
than the existence of the “best” follows from the existence of the better or
worse. Thus his claim is not empirical. There is no empirical means for
testing the difference between Northrop’s view and Dennett’s.

Ant comments:

Northrop is just noting that the vague “sense impressions” in immediate 
experience are just as noticeable as the determinate “sense impressions” in 
immediate experience. Again, Dennett confirms this observation in chapter 3, 
p.53-54, of “Consciousness Explained”.

“The visual field seems to naïve reflection [i.e. Scott’s initial position] 
to be uniformly detailed and focused from the center out to the boundaries, 
but a simple experiment [i.e. moving a playing card from the edge to the 
centre of the visual field] shows that this is not so.”

--------cut---------


Ant quoted Northrop:

“Concepts by intuition are especially and continuously important in the
traditional Orient. This happens because the Far Easterners have tended to
be pure empiricists restricting reality to the immediately apprehended.  In
fact, they identify the Divine with the timeless undifferentiated aesthetic
continuum.  Consequently, Far Eastern religion is a positivistic, empirical
and, hence, scientifically veridical religion.” (Northrop, “Logic of the
Sciences & Humanities”, 1947, p.100)

Scott said:
As I thought: the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is Divine, which is
to say, it is not part of the experience of everyday, non-mystically
Awakened people.

Ant commented April 27th:

I think it would be better to say that _for Northrop_ the Divine is
associated with the undifferentiated component of the aesthetic continuum
(from a static everyday perspective) and _is_ a logical move made by him
because as the Divine is meant to be indeterminate, it can’t reside in the
determinate components of experience/the aesthetic continuum.

However, in correspondence, Pirsig has reservations about locating the
Divine (if equated with Dynamic Quality) with the indeterminate aesthetic
continuum.  If nothing else, I think this is because it starts sounding like
a definition for DQ.  I think Pirsig would relate the Dynamic more to the
aesthetic nature of the immediately apprehended.

“From an everyday world Dynamic Quality is like an undefined perfume which
attaches in different ways to the objects of the world.”  (Pirsig to McWatt,
December 1994)

Scott:
This raises two possibilities. One is that this undefined perfume is being
hypostasized, which is to say it is being postulated.  The other is that it 
is just a fact that we value the objects of the world. This second is also a 
postulation.  How, empirically, do we choose between them?

Ant comments:

Pirsig’s analogy of Dynamic Quality with an undefined perfume raises no such 
possibilities.  If anything, Pirsig is just noting that the aesthetic (from 
the MOQ’s static point of view) is a significant immediately apprehended 
factor.  The only concepts by postulation in the above context are the 
(logically subsequent) justifications of _why_ some things seem beautiful 
and some things seem ugly.

Ant continued April 27th:

Everyone can get “turned on” by the beauty of a sunset if they only become
mindful of their immediate surroundings (which is where the aesthetic
resides in both the determinate and indeterminate).

Scott:
One gets turned on by the beauty of a sunset. Full stop. What, where, how,
is this “resid[ing] in both the determinate and indeterminate”? Looks like
more postulating to me.

Ant comments:

I refer you to your comment of April 28th:  “Fine, there are more and less 
vague aesthetic experiences” which appears to contradict the above assertion 
about the determinate and indeterminate.

Ant quoted Pirsig:
“Some people know that they know it, and other people, particularly Freshman
rhetoric students, don’t know that they know it.  This is in accord with the
Soto Zen Buddhist doctrine that everyone is enlightened.  What occurs at
“enlightenment” is the falling away of the illusion that one is not
enlightened.  But the enlightenment has been there all along.”  (Pirsig to
McWatt, August 1997)

Scott:
For the non-mystic this is more postulating.

Scott to SA May 2nd 2006:

[Moreover] Pirsig showed that value is a common experience, so I have no 
argument with saying that our common experience is a differentiated 
aesthetic continuum. However, Pirsig’s concept of DQ is modelled [loosely] 
after Northrop’s *undifferentiated* aesthetic continuum, and I am saying 
that that is not a feature of common experience. It is a feature of mystical 
experience: what is called satori, moksha, etc. It happens rarely and only 
to a few. I see nothing in your post
that sounds anything remotely like an undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.

Ant comments:

I’m not sure I’d agree that “[satori] happens rarely and only to a few” 
because in a Zen monastery it is very common.  As Pirsig explained to me 
last Summer, a Zen Monastery is like a “production line” for inducing satori 
in young monks!  As I mentioned previously, I think you are making the 
mystic (as well as the indeterminate aesthetic continuum) too mysterious, 
too esoteric.  Some of the wisdom of ZMM and many Taoist and Buddhist texts 
is the emphasis that the Dynamic is not to be found on some mountain top 
with a cave dwelling hermit but in normal everyday life (what you could term 
the “Tao of screaming kids, walking the dog and the 9 to 5 job”).

“The Buddha, the Godhead, resides quite as comfortably in the circuits of a 
digital computer or the gears of a cycle transmission as he does at the top 
of a mountain or in the petals of a flower. To think otherwise is to demean 
the Buddha...which is to demean oneself.”   (ZMM, end of chapter 1)

Scott said:

So to base a philosophy on it is to base a philosophy on faith (faith that
the mystics who report such experience are reporting authentically),

Ant comments:

Just to nail down this myth about faith and the MOQ.  If Pirsig’s comments 
about “pure empiricism” and “faith” are looked at in context in the 
Copleston annotations, it is seen that the MOQ is _not_ derived via faith 
but derived by firstly noting what is observed by immediate apprehension and 
then constructing the remainder through logical inference and reasoning 
(such as the use of cosmological evolution to order the static patterns).  I 
think it’s far more positivistic and hard headed system than most 
philosophologists realise.  Moreover, just because a belief might be a 
concept by postulation (such as the belief in three-dimensional chairs and 
tables), it does not follow it is understood through faith.  If anything, 
concepts by postulation are usually verified by scientific hypothesis and 
experimentation.

Another point is that satori can be achieved by _anyone_ (in reasonable 
health) via meditation practices, vision quests and psychedelics.  You don’t 
need to take the word of anyone else to verify what such experiences reveal. 
  On the other hand, the problem with theistic religions is that you often 
have one or two individuals (such as prophets) who make certain assertions 
that can’t be observed by others nor verified through experiment.  And 
_this_ is where the issue of faith is introduced in the context of concepts 
by postulation.  For example, the Christian idea of God the Father.  
(Possibly such non-rational beliefs arose to fill in explanatory gaps in how 
the universe operates.  Either way, these gaps can now be explained 
rationally by scientific ideas such as the theory of evolution and theory of 
relativity.)

Ant commented April 27th:

No, the beauty of a sunset isn’t anything to do with faith; it’s just the
way it is (as Elvis would say).  Moreover, you’re making mysticism sound too
esoteric and mysticism.  Nirvana is the here and now.

Scott:
Of course the beauty of a sunset has nothing to do with faith. It just is.
It is getting from that beauty to the notion of an “undifferentiated
aesthetic continuum” and to the proposition that the beauty of the sunset is
not subjective that has to do with faith. Or at least one gets to these
postulations non-empirically.

Ant comments:

You have things backwards here, Scott.  The “undifferentiated aesthetic 
continuum” is observed directly and (when abstracted from the aesthetic 
continuum) becomes a concept by intuition i.e. it must be directly perceived 
to be known.   On the other hand, subjects and objects (in public space) are 
purely theoretical entities which are related to concept by intuitions via 
hypothesis and postulation.  As such, Northrop terms theoretical constructs 
such as metaphysical subjects and objects “concepts by postulations”.

It is worth noting therefore that neither the “undifferentiated aesthetic 
continuum” or the subjects and objects in the above illustration are derived 
via faith.

Ant said:
Scott had then noted (despite stating later in the same post: “I have no
experience of an undifferentiated continuum”!!!):

>It seems to me that [indeterminate aesthetic continuum] can be replaced by
>the word ‘subject’ in its intentional sense (not in its Cartesian sense) -- 
>that which is aware of all objects, including mental objects.

Scott said:
No contradiction here. I have no experience *of* the intentional subject. It
cannot be an object of experience. It is postulated (by me) and Realized by
some mystics (e.g., Merrell-Wolff, who calls it Pure Subject, and also calls
that state of consciousness Nirvana), and in his description it sounds just
like a Realization of the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum
(“Consciousness of absence of objects is Nirvana”, as he puts it in his
aphorisms).

Ant commented April 27th:

The intentional subject (in the above context) sounds like a re-introduction
of the traditional theistic Christian God through the back door while the
undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is noted by immediate apprehension.

Scott:
No, it has nothing to do with theism. This is a red herring if I ever saw
one. The intentional subject is just a postulated “that which is aware” of
all the objects, notions, feelings, thoughts, beauty of which there is
awareness.

Ant commented April 27th:

Again, I would avoid the SOM terminology of the “intentional subject” 
because it is (as with any SOM term) an ambiguous term.  For instance, for 
the person unfamiliar with the (metaphysical) theory from which “intentional 
subject” is derived it is unclear whether you are referring to objects in 
public space (which are concepts by postulation) and/or the differentiations 
(such as immediately apprehended colour) found in the aesthetic continuum 
(which are concepts by intuition).

The intentional subject is just a postulated “that which is aware” of all 
the objects, notions, feelings, thoughts, beauty of which there is 
awareness.  It is not immediately apprehended. However, the undifferentiated 
aesthetic continuum is _not_ another postulated notion (because it requires 
immediate apprehension for verification).

>From what you have said so far, Scott, the “intentional subject” (as with 
the traditional theistic Christian God, atoms, tables, chairs etc) sounds 
like a concept by postulation.

Ant said previously:
Northrop might have put more emphasis on its indeterminacy and Pirsig on its
aesthetic nature but it’s a concept by intuition (part of which needs to be
directly apprehended as in noticing the orange colour in a sunset) not a
concept by postulation (i.e. a theory which is related to concepts by
intuition via hypothesis [e.g. the sun - a three-dimensional sphere in 
public space 93 million miles away from the Earth - which is a theoretical 
concept by postulation related to the immediately apprehended sunset via 
scientific hypothesis and experiment].

Scott:
I notice the orange color. I don’t notice an undifferentiated aesthetic
continuum. Can’t you understand the difference? You (or rather Northrop)
admitted above that the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is an
inference. Thus it is theoretical, like the theoretical three-dimensional
sphere, rather than like the orange color.

Ant comments:

OK, I think I can see the confusion here.  A concept by intuition is 
_indeed_ partly theoretical because it is an abstraction derived from the 
totality of immediate experience/the aesthetic continuum.  However, it _can_ 
be directly verified.  On the other hand, a concept by postulation is 
_purely_ theoretical.  It is verified by testing the hypothesis or 
postulation that constructs it either with concepts by intuition or already 
established concepts by postulation.

Scott said:

What I mean is that I can say “there is a somewhat (called an intentional 
subject) which is aware of all objects”, in the same way that I can 
postulate that “since there is a continual awareness of changing objects, I 
can postulate that there is an undifferentiated aesthetic continuum”.

What I am getting at is that both of these -- for me and I assume for any 
non-mystic -- are just postulations. They are not intuitive experiences, 
except for the mystic.  Hence neither is empirical, except for the mystic.

Ant comments:

As I mentioned before, the term “intentional subject” has so many
traditional SOM connotations there’s absolutely no way I would use it in the
context of the Divine.

Scott:
Those “traditional SOM connotations” are a problem only because one is not
distinguishing between the intentional subject and the Cartesian subject.
Merrell-Wolff had no problems with it, but then M-W was a much more careful
thinker than Pirsig.

Ant comments:

Merrell-Wolff might possibly have “no problems” with SOM terminology but his 
readers might not fare so well when reading his SOM saturated work.  For 
instance, in LILA, it is seen that the notions of ‘subjectivity’ and 
‘objectivity’ can be assigned in SOM as either metaphysical terms (referring 
to types of reality such as mind and matter) or assigned as epistemological 
terms (referring to ways of knowing; as in the ‘spectatorial’ accounts of 
knowing criticised by Heidegger).  Though it is considered problematic to 
treat people like objects but unproblematic (in most contexts) to treat them 
‘objectively’ (i.e. without prejudice), it is only by subjectively 
identifying and empathising with their subjects that anthropologists, for 
instance, can arrive at fair-minded, informed and more ‘objective’ accounts. 
  This is a typical ambiguity in SOM where we observe ‘subjective’ knowledge 
(gained through empathy and identification) mysteriously becoming 
‘objective’.  Considering the ambiguities surrounding subject-object 
terminology, it comes as no surprise that an original high quality 
philosopher such as Pirsig used new terminology when constructing his 
metaphysical system.  As such, Merrell-Wolff certainly wasn’t as careful as 
Pirsig in at least this regard (whatever the former’s other supposed merits 
are).

----------cut----------

Scott continued April 22nd:

It is a pity that Pirsig did not distinguish between the intentional subject
and the Cartesian subject. Only the latter is capable of being
conceptualized. The former bears a strong resemblance to DQ.

Ant McWatt commented:

Well, remember that Pirsig was primarily concerned with understanding the
essential nature of Quality rather than addressing the number of forms that
SOM can take.  (I presume he centred on Cartesian SOM as it just happens to
be the most common and well known form in philosophology).  Moreover, if
Pirsig had used SOM terminology it would have made it more difficult to
understand the differences between the MOQ and SOM.  I don’t think awareness
is a great word to use as a central term in a metaphysics either due to the
numerous connotations it has e.g. it can imply that things such as rocks and
atoms have self-consciousness.

Scott said:
Perhaps. The problem with the MOQ (one of them) is that Pirsig doesn’t say
anything about (choose a word: consciousness, awareness, self-awareness, 
etc.).

Ant commented April 27th:

Yes, he does though these comments about awareness, consciousness, etc.,
aren’t necessarily found in ZMM or LILA.

Scott said:

That is, he offers nothing with which to discuss philosophical
problems which use these terms.

Ant commented April 27th:

Most of these philosophical problems found in the traditional Anglo-American
philosophy department which use these terms are SOM problems.  It’s nearly
always an incorrect fundamental SOM assumption (such as confusing concepts 
by
intuition with concepts by postulation) which leads to metaphysical problems
further up the logical track.

Scott:
But closer analysis shows that the MOQ does not actually dissolve these 
problems.

Ant comments:

That’s an opinion I don’t share.

Scott continued:

That, though, is an essay for another day. Here I am just
concerned with the MOQ’s claim to be “pure empiricism”.

Ant comments:

As I explained above, the MOQ is “pure empiricism” in the sense that it 
starts from immediate experience and that any subsequent concepts derived 
from this immediate experience are based on rational grounds.  No faith 
required!

Scott said:

That is how he could get away with not making the distinction…between
intentional subject and Cartesian subject. All the dissolving of the 
problems
raised by the S/O division just dissolve problems raised by the Cartesian 
division. They do not work, or do not work as well, when confronted with the 
intentional subject. The notion of DQ in the MOQ is actually very similar to 
the notion of the intentional subject.

Ant comments:

Scott, the notion of DQ in the MOQ is probably very similar to the notion of 
the intentional subject.  I wouldn’t know.  However, Dynamic Quality is a 
better term in at least one regard because, as noted above, it avoids using 
SOM terminology.

Scott said:

But as a consequence there is a good deal of confusion in trying to compare
the MOQ with other philosophies.

Ant commented April 27th:

I’ll think you’ll find “the confusion” in trying to compare the MOQ with
other philosophies is usually with these “other philosophies”!  (Hope I
don’t sound too biased!)

Scott:
You are. But this is the philosophology debate. Because the MOQ has not been
confronted in the professional philosophical arena, there are a lot of weak
arguments in the MOQ that haven’t been challenged.

Ant comments:

What do you think my PhD was all about?  Didn’t I send you a copy?

Ant had asked April 22nd:

Well, where else do you think the aesthetic resides?

Scott replied:

As far as I can tell *empirically* it might reside in the impressionist
painter, or in the biological SQ of the infant.

Ant commented:

Really?   I’ll keep this answer in mind the next time I see a sunset or
visit an art gallery. Anyway, I have this infant in front of me.  How can I
tell *empirically* whether the aesthetic is in its biological SQ or not?

Scott said:
Precisely. We can’t tell, empirically. So to claim that the aesthetic is not
“just subjective” (that is, just a property of people and higher animals
with the requisite nervous systems) is not an empirical claim.

Ant commented April 27th:

The idea that the aesthetic “is just a property of people and higher animals
with the requisite nervous systems” is a concept by postulation and would
not have arisen in the first place if the aesthetic had not been noticed in
immediate experience in the first place.

Scott:
Agree -- but it is a pretty obvious postulate to make.

Ant comments:

If it was that obvious, you wouldn’t have made the SOM-type comment that “as 
far as I can tell *empirically* [the aesthetic] might reside in the 
impressionist painter, or in the biological SQ of the infant” in the first 
place.

Scott continued:

It sure is not obvious how there can be aesthetic experiences without sense 
organs or the ability to feel or think. Yet the MOQ claims there are.

Ant comments:

No it doesn’t.  The MOQ claims that sense organs are [high quality] concepts 
by postulation (that have been derived at some point in history from 
concepts by intuition and by scientific reasoning).  The main point about 
all this continual “taking-Scott-out-of-the-SOM-prison” dialogue is that 
concepts by intuition are prior to concepts by postulations in the logical 
sequence that constructs the "ontological entities" of the human world.  
Hence, Pirsig’s comment that a science (or philosophy) that starts 
theoretically from subjects and objects (i.e. concepts by postulations) is 
not really so pure (empirically speaking).

Best wishes,

Anthony.


www.robertpirsig.org


.

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