[MD] Static latching & faith

[Platt Holden]

Ant,

Great post, Ant!  A real keeper. Thanks.

Platt

> Scott, DMB, SA,
> 
> Ant McWatt quoted F.S.C. Northrop (the widely published Sterling
> Professor of philosophy & law at Yale University for over forty years)
> April 27th:
> 
> “The Concept of the Indefinite or Undifferentiated Aesthetic Continuum
> [is the] most difficult of these concepts for the Westerner to
> appreciate. because of the influence of Berkeley and Hume.  They
> insisted that all concepts are concepts by intuition but tended to
> regard the continuum as nothing but an aggregation of secondary and
> tertiary qualities. That this is false, an examination of what one
> immediately apprehends will indicate. We directly inspect not merely the
> white and the noise but also these in a field. The field is as
> immediately given as any specific quality, whether secondary or
> tertiary, within it.”
> 
> “Moreover, most of the directly experienced field is vague and
> indefinite. Only at what William James termed its center is there
> specificity and definiteness. Thus it is evident that the indefinite,
> indeterminate, aesthetic continuum is as immediately apprehended as are
> the specific differentiations within it. Hence, the concept of the
> indefinite or undifferentiated continuum, gained by abstraction from the
> differentiated aesthetic continuum, is a concept by intuition, not a
> concept by postulation [or non-empirical assumption]. (Northrop, “Logic
> of the Sciences & Humanities”, 1947, p.97)
> 
> Scott stated April 27th:
> It is hardly a scientific theory to note that if I turn my head I stop
> focusing on one thing and start focusing on another, that if I note
> something vague in my peripheral vision I can turn my head to focus on
> it, making it less vague.
> 
> Ant commented April 27th:
> 
> Agreed, the above is a hardly a scientific theory but _it is still a
> theory_ and therefore a concept by postulation.  Again, it is a concept
> by postulation which would not have been thought of in the first place
> if the indeterminate component of the aesthetic continuum hadn’t been
> observed in the first place.  You keep missing this important logical
> point (Don’t worry you’re in good company with most Western philosophers
> such as Dennett).
> 
> Scott asked April 28th:
> I fail to see why the field isn’t also a concept by postulation.
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> There are _immediately apprehended_ boundaries to “sense impressions”
> and this is what I _think_ Northrop means by “field”.  Maybe if this
> field was rectangular like a TV screen (rather than a largely vague oval
> with a determinate centre) it would be more obvious.  This ontological
> space (“Being”) allowing “sense impressions” (plus the subsequent static
> patterns) is discussed in more depth by Professor David E. Cooper “The
> Measure Of Things” (2002) and Heidegger.   Anyway, a concept by
> postulation is purely theoretical while a concept by intuition _partly_
> depends on being immediately apprehended.  Northrop’s field is therefore
> a concept by intuition.  (A concept by intuition – such as the orange in
> a sunset - is partly theoretical because though verified by immediately
> apprehension, language is required to point it out to someone else.  (As
> Northrop notes, a pure fact – untainted by theory - is one you have to
> keep to yourself!)
> 
> Scott continued April 28th:
> 
> The difference between Northrop and Dennett is that Northrop says there
> is this unobserved field in addition to the variety of aesthetic
> experiences, while Dennett does not say there is such a field.
> 
> Ant commented April 27th:
> 
> Well, I wouldn’t listen much to Dennett in the context of immediate
> experience or mysticism.  He’ll just confuse you.  As I note above
> Northrop’s field is immediately apprehended and, in any case, Dennett
> does mention the field (at least, in its visual context) in chapter 3 of
> “Consciousness Explained”.
> 
> Scott continued April 28th:
> 
> How do we choose between these options? Not empirically, as far as I can
> see. Northrop says “Moreover, most of the directly experienced field is
> vague and indefinite.  Only at what William James termed its center is
> there specificity and definiteness.”  Fine, there are more and less
> vague aesthetic experiences.
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> OK, looks like we’re finally getting some agreement regarding the
> existence of the indeterminate and aesthetic components of Northrop’s
> “indeterminate aesthetic continuum”.
> 
> Scott continued April 28th:
> 
> But [Northrop] then infers from this: “Thus it is evident that the
> indefinite, indeterminate, aesthetic continuum is as immediately
> apprehended as are the specific differentiations within it.” But this
> does not logically follow, no more than the existence of the “best”
> follows from the existence of the better or worse. Thus his claim is not
> empirical. There is no empirical means for testing the difference
> between Northrop’s view and Dennett’s.
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> Northrop is just noting that the vague “sense impressions” in immediate
> experience are just as noticeable as the determinate “sense impressions”
> in immediate experience. Again, Dennett confirms this observation in
> chapter 3, p.53-54, of “Consciousness Explained”.
> 
> “The visual field seems to naïve reflection [i.e. Scott’s initial
> position] to be uniformly detailed and focused from the center out to
> the boundaries, but a simple experiment [i.e. moving a playing card from
> the edge to the centre of the visual field] shows that this is not so.”
> 
> --------cut---------
> 
> 
> Ant quoted Northrop:
> 
> “Concepts by intuition are especially and continuously important in the
> traditional Orient. This happens because the Far Easterners have tended
> to be pure empiricists restricting reality to the immediately
> apprehended.  In fact, they identify the Divine with the timeless
> undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.  Consequently, Far Eastern
> religion is a positivistic, empirical and, hence, scientifically
> veridical religion.” (Northrop, “Logic of the Sciences & Humanities”,
> 1947, p.100)
> 
> Scott said:
> As I thought: the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is Divine, which
> is to say, it is not part of the experience of everyday, non-mystically
> Awakened people.
> 
> Ant commented April 27th:
> 
> I think it would be better to say that _for Northrop_ the Divine is
> associated with the undifferentiated component of the aesthetic
> continuum (from a static everyday perspective) and _is_ a logical move
> made by him because as the Divine is meant to be indeterminate, it can’t
> reside in the determinate components of experience/the aesthetic
> continuum.
> 
> However, in correspondence, Pirsig has reservations about locating the
> Divine (if equated with Dynamic Quality) with the indeterminate
> aesthetic continuum.  If nothing else, I think this is because it starts
> sounding like a definition for DQ.  I think Pirsig would relate the
> Dynamic more to the aesthetic nature of the immediately apprehended.
> 
> “From an everyday world Dynamic Quality is like an undefined perfume
> which attaches in different ways to the objects of the world.”  (Pirsig
> to McWatt, December 1994)
> 
> Scott:
> This raises two possibilities. One is that this undefined perfume is
> being hypostasized, which is to say it is being postulated.  The other
> is that it is just a fact that we value the objects of the world. This
> second is also a postulation.  How, empirically, do we choose between
> them?
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> Pirsig’s analogy of Dynamic Quality with an undefined perfume raises no
> such possibilities.  If anything, Pirsig is just noting that the
> aesthetic (from the MOQ’s static point of view) is a significant
> immediately apprehended factor.  The only concepts by postulation in the
> above context are the (logically subsequent) justifications of _why_
> some things seem beautiful and some things seem ugly.
> 
> Ant continued April 27th:
> 
> Everyone can get “turned on” by the beauty of a sunset if they only
> become mindful of their immediate surroundings (which is where the
> aesthetic resides in both the determinate and indeterminate).
> 
> Scott:
> One gets turned on by the beauty of a sunset. Full stop. What, where,
> how, is this “resid[ing] in both the determinate and indeterminate”?
> Looks like more postulating to me.
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> I refer you to your comment of April 28th:  “Fine, there are more and
> less vague aesthetic experiences” which appears to contradict the above
> assertion about the determinate and indeterminate.
> 
> Ant quoted Pirsig:
> “Some people know that they know it, and other people, particularly
> Freshman rhetoric students, don’t know that they know it.  This is in
> accord with the Soto Zen Buddhist doctrine that everyone is enlightened.
>  What occurs at “enlightenment” is the falling away of the illusion that
> one is not enlightened.  But the enlightenment has been there all
> along.”  (Pirsig to McWatt, August 1997)
> 
> Scott:
> For the non-mystic this is more postulating.
> 
> Scott to SA May 2nd 2006:
> 
> [Moreover] Pirsig showed that value is a common experience, so I have no
> argument with saying that our common experience is a differentiated
> aesthetic continuum. However, Pirsig’s concept of DQ is modelled
> [loosely] after Northrop’s *undifferentiated* aesthetic continuum, and I
> am saying that that is not a feature of common experience. It is a
> feature of mystical experience: what is called satori, moksha, etc. It
> happens rarely and only to a few. I see nothing in your post that sounds
> anything remotely like an undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> I’m not sure I’d agree that “[satori] happens rarely and only to a few”
> because in a Zen monastery it is very common.  As Pirsig explained to me
> last Summer, a Zen Monastery is like a “production line” for inducing
> satori in young monks!  As I mentioned previously, I think you are
> making the mystic (as well as the indeterminate aesthetic continuum) too
> mysterious, too esoteric.  Some of the wisdom of ZMM and many Taoist and
> Buddhist texts is the emphasis that the Dynamic is not to be found on
> some mountain top with a cave dwelling hermit but in normal everyday
> life (what you could term the “Tao of screaming kids, walking the dog
> and the 9 to 5 job”).
> 
> “The Buddha, the Godhead, resides quite as comfortably in the circuits
> of a digital computer or the gears of a cycle transmission as he does at
> the top of a mountain or in the petals of a flower. To think otherwise
> is to demean the Buddha...which is to demean oneself.”   (ZMM, end of
> chapter 1)
> 
> Scott said:
> 
> So to base a philosophy on it is to base a philosophy on faith (faith
> that the mystics who report such experience are reporting
> authentically),
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> Just to nail down this myth about faith and the MOQ.  If Pirsig’s
> comments about “pure empiricism” and “faith” are looked at in context in
> the Copleston annotations, it is seen that the MOQ is _not_ derived via
> faith but derived by firstly noting what is observed by immediate
> apprehension and then constructing the remainder through logical
> inference and reasoning (such as the use of cosmological evolution to
> order the static patterns).  I think it’s far more positivistic and hard
> headed system than most philosophologists realise.  Moreover, just
> because a belief might be a concept by postulation (such as the belief
> in three-dimensional chairs and tables), it does not follow it is
> understood through faith.  If anything, concepts by postulation are
> usually verified by scientific hypothesis and experimentation.
> 
> Another point is that satori can be achieved by _anyone_ (in reasonable
> health) via meditation practices, vision quests and psychedelics.  You
> don’t need to take the word of anyone else to verify what such
> experiences reveal. 
>   On the other hand, the problem with theistic religions is that you
>   often 
> have one or two individuals (such as prophets) who make certain
> assertions that can’t be observed by others nor verified through
> experiment.  And _this_ is where the issue of faith is introduced in the
> context of concepts by postulation.  For example, the Christian idea of
> God the Father.  (Possibly such non-rational beliefs arose to fill in
> explanatory gaps in how the universe operates.  Either way, these gaps
> can now be explained rationally by scientific ideas such as the theory
> of evolution and theory of relativity.)
> 
> Ant commented April 27th:
> 
> No, the beauty of a sunset isn’t anything to do with faith; it’s just
> the way it is (as Elvis would say).  Moreover, you’re making mysticism
> sound too esoteric and mysticism.  Nirvana is the here and now.
> 
> Scott:
> Of course the beauty of a sunset has nothing to do with faith. It just
> is. It is getting from that beauty to the notion of an “undifferentiated
> aesthetic continuum” and to the proposition that the beauty of the
> sunset is not subjective that has to do with faith. Or at least one gets
> to these postulations non-empirically.
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> You have things backwards here, Scott.  The “undifferentiated aesthetic
> continuum” is observed directly and (when abstracted from the aesthetic
> continuum) becomes a concept by intuition i.e. it must be directly
> perceived to be known.   On the other hand, subjects and objects (in
> public space) are purely theoretical entities which are related to
> concept by intuitions via hypothesis and postulation.  As such, Northrop
> terms theoretical constructs such as metaphysical subjects and objects
> “concepts by postulations”.
> 
> It is worth noting therefore that neither the “undifferentiated
> aesthetic continuum” or the subjects and objects in the above
> illustration are derived via faith.
> 
> Ant said:
> Scott had then noted (despite stating later in the same post: “I have no
> experience of an undifferentiated continuum”!!!):
> 
> >It seems to me that [indeterminate aesthetic continuum] can be replaced
> >by the word ‘subject’ in its intentional sense (not in its Cartesian
> >sense) -- that which is aware of all objects, including mental objects.
> 
> Scott said:
> No contradiction here. I have no experience *of* the intentional
> subject. It cannot be an object of experience. It is postulated (by me)
> and Realized by some mystics (e.g., Merrell-Wolff, who calls it Pure
> Subject, and also calls that state of consciousness Nirvana), and in his
> description it sounds just like a Realization of the undifferentiated
> aesthetic continuum (“Consciousness of absence of objects is Nirvana”,
> as he puts it in his aphorisms).
> 
> Ant commented April 27th:
> 
> The intentional subject (in the above context) sounds like a
> re-introduction of the traditional theistic Christian God through the
> back door while the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is noted by
> immediate apprehension.
> 
> Scott:
> No, it has nothing to do with theism. This is a red herring if I ever
> saw one. The intentional subject is just a postulated “that which is
> aware” of all the objects, notions, feelings, thoughts, beauty of which
> there is awareness.
> 
> Ant commented April 27th:
> 
> Again, I would avoid the SOM terminology of the “intentional subject”
> because it is (as with any SOM term) an ambiguous term.  For instance,
> for the person unfamiliar with the (metaphysical) theory from which
> “intentional subject” is derived it is unclear whether you are referring
> to objects in public space (which are concepts by postulation) and/or
> the differentiations (such as immediately apprehended colour) found in
> the aesthetic continuum (which are concepts by intuition).
> 
> The intentional subject is just a postulated “that which is aware” of
> all the objects, notions, feelings, thoughts, beauty of which there is
> awareness.  It is not immediately apprehended. However, the
> undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is _not_ another postulated notion
> (because it requires immediate apprehension for verification).
> 
> >From what you have said so far, Scott, the “intentional subject” (as
> >with 
> the traditional theistic Christian God, atoms, tables, chairs etc)
> sounds like a concept by postulation.
> 
> Ant said previously:
> Northrop might have put more emphasis on its indeterminacy and Pirsig on
> its aesthetic nature but it’s a concept by intuition (part of which
> needs to be directly apprehended as in noticing the orange colour in a
> sunset) not a concept by postulation (i.e. a theory which is related to
> concepts by intuition via hypothesis [e.g. the sun - a three-dimensional
> sphere in public space 93 million miles away from the Earth - which is a
> theoretical concept by postulation related to the immediately
> apprehended sunset via scientific hypothesis and experiment].
> 
> Scott:
> I notice the orange color. I don’t notice an undifferentiated aesthetic
> continuum. Can’t you understand the difference? You (or rather Northrop)
> admitted above that the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is an
> inference. Thus it is theoretical, like the theoretical
> three-dimensional sphere, rather than like the orange color.
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> OK, I think I can see the confusion here.  A concept by intuition is
> _indeed_ partly theoretical because it is an abstraction derived from
> the totality of immediate experience/the aesthetic continuum.  However,
> it _can_ be directly verified.  On the other hand, a concept by
> postulation is _purely_ theoretical.  It is verified by testing the
> hypothesis or postulation that constructs it either with concepts by
> intuition or already established concepts by postulation.
> 
> Scott said:
> 
> What I mean is that I can say “there is a somewhat (called an
> intentional subject) which is aware of all objects”, in the same way
> that I can postulate that “since there is a continual awareness of
> changing objects, I can postulate that there is an undifferentiated
> aesthetic continuum”.
> 
> What I am getting at is that both of these -- for me and I assume for
> any non-mystic -- are just postulations. They are not intuitive
> experiences, except for the mystic.  Hence neither is empirical, except
> for the mystic.
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> As I mentioned before, the term “intentional subject” has so many
> traditional SOM connotations there’s absolutely no way I would use it in
> the context of the Divine.
> 
> Scott:
> Those “traditional SOM connotations” are a problem only because one is
> not distinguishing between the intentional subject and the Cartesian
> subject. Merrell-Wolff had no problems with it, but then M-W was a much
> more careful thinker than Pirsig.
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> Merrell-Wolff might possibly have “no problems” with SOM terminology but
> his readers might not fare so well when reading his SOM saturated work. 
> For instance, in LILA, it is seen that the notions of ‘subjectivity’ and
> ‘objectivity’ can be assigned in SOM as either metaphysical terms
> (referring to types of reality such as mind and matter) or assigned as
> epistemological terms (referring to ways of knowing; as in the
> ‘spectatorial’ accounts of knowing criticised by Heidegger).  Though it
> is considered problematic to treat people like objects but unproblematic
> (in most contexts) to treat them ‘objectively’ (i.e. without prejudice),
> it is only by subjectively identifying and empathising with their
> subjects that anthropologists, for instance, can arrive at fair-minded,
> informed and more ‘objective’ accounts. 
>   This is a typical ambiguity in SOM where we observe ‘subjective’
>   knowledge 
> (gained through empathy and identification) mysteriously becoming 
> ‘objective’.  Considering the ambiguities surrounding subject-object
> terminology, it comes as no surprise that an original high quality
> philosopher such as Pirsig used new terminology when constructing his
> metaphysical system.  As such, Merrell-Wolff certainly wasn’t as careful
> as Pirsig in at least this regard (whatever the former’s other supposed
> merits are).
> 
> ----------cut----------
> 
> Scott continued April 22nd:
> 
> It is a pity that Pirsig did not distinguish between the intentional
> subject and the Cartesian subject. Only the latter is capable of being
> conceptualized. The former bears a strong resemblance to DQ.
> 
> Ant McWatt commented:
> 
> Well, remember that Pirsig was primarily concerned with understanding
> the essential nature of Quality rather than addressing the number of
> forms that SOM can take.  (I presume he centred on Cartesian SOM as it
> just happens to be the most common and well known form in
> philosophology).  Moreover, if Pirsig had used SOM terminology it would
> have made it more difficult to understand the differences between the
> MOQ and SOM.  I don’t think awareness is a great word to use as a
> central term in a metaphysics either due to the numerous connotations it
> has e.g. it can imply that things such as rocks and atoms have
> self-consciousness.
> 
> Scott said:
> Perhaps. The problem with the MOQ (one of them) is that Pirsig doesn’t
> say anything about (choose a word: consciousness, awareness,
> self-awareness, etc.).
> 
> Ant commented April 27th:
> 
> Yes, he does though these comments about awareness, consciousness, etc.,
> aren’t necessarily found in ZMM or LILA.
> 
> Scott said:
> 
> That is, he offers nothing with which to discuss philosophical
> problems which use these terms.
> 
> Ant commented April 27th:
> 
> Most of these philosophical problems found in the traditional
> Anglo-American philosophy department which use these terms are SOM
> problems.  It’s nearly always an incorrect fundamental SOM assumption
> (such as confusing concepts by intuition with concepts by postulation)
> which leads to metaphysical problems further up the logical track.
> 
> Scott:
> But closer analysis shows that the MOQ does not actually dissolve these
> problems.
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> That’s an opinion I don’t share.
> 
> Scott continued:
> 
> That, though, is an essay for another day. Here I am just
> concerned with the MOQ’s claim to be “pure empiricism”.
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> As I explained above, the MOQ is “pure empiricism” in the sense that it
> starts from immediate experience and that any subsequent concepts
> derived from this immediate experience are based on rational grounds. 
> No faith required!
> 
> Scott said:
> 
> That is how he could get away with not making the distinction
between
> intentional subject and Cartesian subject. All the dissolving of the
> problems raised by the S/O division just dissolve problems raised by the
> Cartesian division. They do not work, or do not work as well, when
> confronted with the intentional subject. The notion of DQ in the MOQ is
> actually very similar to the notion of the intentional subject.
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> Scott, the notion of DQ in the MOQ is probably very similar to the
> notion of the intentional subject.  I wouldn’t know.  However, Dynamic
> Quality is a better term in at least one regard because, as noted above,
> it avoids using SOM terminology.
> 
> Scott said:
> 
> But as a consequence there is a good deal of confusion in trying to
> compare the MOQ with other philosophies.
> 
> Ant commented April 27th:
> 
> I’ll think you’ll find “the confusion” in trying to compare the MOQ with
> other philosophies is usually with these “other philosophies”!  (Hope I
> don’t sound too biased!)
> 
> Scott:
> You are. But this is the philosophology debate. Because the MOQ has not
> been confronted in the professional philosophical arena, there are a lot
> of weak arguments in the MOQ that haven’t been challenged.
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> What do you think my PhD was all about?  Didn’t I send you a copy?
> 
> Ant had asked April 22nd:
> 
> Well, where else do you think the aesthetic resides?
> 
> Scott replied:
> 
> As far as I can tell *empirically* it might reside in the impressionist
> painter, or in the biological SQ of the infant.
> 
> Ant commented:
> 
> Really?   I’ll keep this answer in mind the next time I see a sunset or
> visit an art gallery. Anyway, I have this infant in front of me.  How
> can I tell *empirically* whether the aesthetic is in its biological SQ
> or not?
> 
> Scott said:
> Precisely. We can’t tell, empirically. So to claim that the aesthetic is
> not “just subjective” (that is, just a property of people and higher
> animals with the requisite nervous systems) is not an empirical claim.
> 
> Ant commented April 27th:
> 
> The idea that the aesthetic “is just a property of people and higher
> animals with the requisite nervous systems” is a concept by postulation
> and would not have arisen in the first place if the aesthetic had not
> been noticed in immediate experience in the first place.
> 
> Scott:
> Agree -- but it is a pretty obvious postulate to make.
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> If it was that obvious, you wouldn’t have made the SOM-type comment that
> “as far as I can tell *empirically* [the aesthetic] might reside in the
> impressionist painter, or in the biological SQ of the infant” in the
> first place.
> 
> Scott continued:
> 
> It sure is not obvious how there can be aesthetic experiences without
> sense organs or the ability to feel or think. Yet the MOQ claims there
> are.
> 
> Ant comments:
> 
> No it doesn’t.  The MOQ claims that sense organs are [high quality]
> concepts by postulation (that have been derived at some point in history
> from concepts by intuition and by scientific reasoning).  The main point
> about all this continual “taking-Scott-out-of-the-SOM-prison” dialogue
> is that concepts by intuition are prior to concepts by postulations in
> the logical sequence that constructs the "ontological entities" of the
> human world.  Hence, Pirsig’s comment that a science (or philosophy)
> that starts theoretically from subjects and objects (i.e. concepts by
> postulations) is not really so pure (empirically speaking).
> 
> Best wishes,
> 
> Anthony.
> 
> 
> www.robertpirsig.org
> 
> 
> .
> 
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