[MD] Intellectual activity

[Ham Priday]

Platt --

> I just can't seem to get over the hurdle of "negating nothingness"
> which to me, no matter how I look at it, amounts to something
> -- though I haven't the slightest idea what.

This has been a major hurdle for me also, Platt.  Believe me, I understand
and appreciate your frustration.  I wanted to address your enigma at some
length, since it is a central issue in my ontology.  In order to try to shed
some light on this subject, I've done some searching on the Internet under
the key words "nothingness", "negated nothingness", and "negating
nothingness".

First let me set forth in summary the logic which led me to this
proposition.

Cusa's theory of coincidence suggests that the first principle is the
noncontradictory identity of Essence.  Two negatives make a positive; but
while a positive may define "beingness", it lacks the negative complement of
Essence.  "Negating nothingness" does indeed amount to "something".  What it
creates is precisely what you experience as existence -- a composite of
positive and negative, being and nothingness, in a differentiated but
orderly system.

In order that Essence be made-aware to an other, that other must be
separated from the Oneness of Essence.  The other is negated by Essence to
become the subject of an objective reality.  Neither the subject nor the
object of that reality is Essence itself.  Rather, each represents Essence
as an other -- Essence divided by nothingness.  But Cusa has made this a
logical proposition: he asserts that no other can be other to the divine One
[Essence].  Essence is, as he put it, the Not-other.

You are a negation of Essence.  Without the content of experience, you are a
nothingness-aware-of-nothing -- a "negate" -- that is to say, a potential
subject in search of an object.  As soon as you become aware of something,
you identify with it, and it becomes a "being" in your reality.  But by
incorporating this thing into the nothingness that is your self you are
placing it into a field of nothingness.  In other words, you are "negating"
it from Essence.  You are in fact a negate negating.  This is the double
negation that has you so confused.

Now here are some random statements which I don't expect you to fully
comprehend at first reading.  They're meant only to demonstrate that I'm not
the only one "possessed" with this extraordinary concept.  But if you will
compare them with some of the things I've said in my thesis, I think you'll
see their revelance.  (Note: Heidegger calls negation "nihilation".)
____________________________________________________________________

"For in fact what is man in nature?  A Nothing in comparison with the
Infinite, an All in comparison with the Nothing, a mean between nothing and
everything.  Since he is infinitely removed from comprehending the extremes,
the end of things and their beginning are hopelessly hidden from him in an
impenetrable secret; he is equally incapable of seeing the Nothing from
which he was made, and the Infinite in which he is swallowed
     -- [Pascal: "Pensees" sect. II, 72]
_____________________________________________________________________

"From the time of Melissus, there have been arguments against the
possibility of a void existing in the manner that an object exists: 'Nor is
there any void, for void is nothing, and nothing cannot be.' (Guthrie 1965,
104)  If you say there is a vacuum in the flask, then you are affirming the
existence of something in the flask - the vacuum.  But since 'vacuum' means
an absence of something, you are also denying that there is something in the
flask.  Therefore, 'There is a vacuum in the flask' is a contradiction.

"Some react to Melissus's argument by analyzing vacuums as properties of
things rather than things in their own right.  According to C. J. F.
Williams (1984, 383), 'There is a vacuum in the flask' should be rendered as
'The flask noths'.  He does this in the same spirit that he renders 'There
is fog in Winchester' as 'Winchester is foggy' and 'There is a smell in the
basement' as 'The basement smells'.

"If this paraphrase strategy works for vacuums, it ought to work for the
more prosaic case of holes.  Can a materialist believe that there are holes
in his cheese?  The holes are where the matter is not.  So to admit the
existence of holes is to admit the existence of immaterial objects. One
response is to paraphrase 'There is a hole in the cheese' as 'The cheese
holes' or, to be a bit easier on the ear, as 'The cheese is perforated'.
What appeared to be an existential claim is turned into a comment on the
shape of the cheese.

"Heidegger does think freedom is rooted in nothingness.  He also says we
derive our concept of logical negation from this experience of nothing.
Since Heidegger does not think that dogs have such experiences, he is
committed to skepticism about animal reasoning involving negation.  Consider
the Stoic example of a dog that is following a trail.  The dog reaches a
fork in the road, sniffs at one road and then, without a further sniff,
proceeds down the only remaining road.  The Stoics took this as evidence
that the dog has performed a disjunctive syllogism: "Either my quarry went
down this road or that road. Sniff - he did not go down that road.
Therefore, he went down this road."  Heidegger must discount this as
anthropomorphism.

"Heidegger is sensitive to the hazards of saying that nothing exists and
instead says 'The nothing nihilates' (Das Nichts selbst nichtet).  Rudolph
Carnap made this remark famous by exhibiting it as a paradigm of
metaphysical nonsense."
-- [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Nothingness, 10 "Existential
Aspects"]
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Canute09-05-03, 10:22 AM

Most Western philosophers who study consciousness get interested in Eastern
philosophy, and many reach the same kind of conclusions.

Sartre's thesis is that every act of consciousness involves 'intentionality'
(awareness OF something).  Therefore its essence is to be directed to what
it is not.  He asserts "it is what it is not".

He contends that the essence of consciousness must be nothingness, since
there is nothing left over when you subtract intentional objects from
consciousness.  Consciousness therefore has no inner nature of its own, no
intrinsic essence.  It must be emptiness.

We are thus the free play of consciousnes on the world, and therein lies our
freedom.  This leads to the existentialist claim "existence preceeds
essence".

This is not far from Buddhist philosophy.

It is a difficult conclusion to avoid, although there are ways of getting
around it.  For instance Nagel argues that consciousness cannot be reduced
to the physical and makes a strong case. This is equivalent to Sartre in
that both support the immateriality of consciousness.

Another way to sidestep the problem is Colin McGinn's, who espouses
'mysterianism'.  This says that there is a rational/physical explanation but
we're not allowed to work it out because of our 'epistemic limits'.  This is
also true in Buddhist philosophy, except that they say the truth can be
known, just not rationally proved.

These common conclusions are not due to the influences of, or a general
interest in Eastern philosophy.  They are just what the facts suggest is the
truth in the opinion of these thinkers.
-- [A post on sciforums.com]
_____________________________________________________________________

Perhaps, after reviewing these three statements, you may gain some
confidence that I haven't been talking nonsense, and that there may be some
metaphysical truth in the concept of primary and secondary negation.
Anyway, I hope it helps you understand me.

Incidentally, you may also be interested in reading the op-ed block of my
Values Page essay that runs next week.  Starting tomorrow (Sunday) at
www.essentialism.net/balance.htm.  This 4-paragraph message addresses the
issue of Divine Providence in a simple way that I think effectively refutes
the notion of certain people here concerning a "moral universe".  (Of
course, you may disagree ;-)

Thanks for your interest, and have a great week.

Best regards,
Ham