[MD] Radical empiricism and the anti-empiricism of postmodern radicals
david buchanan
dmbuchanan at hotmail.com
Sat Nov 4 10:18:57 PST 2006
Howdy MOQers:
This exchange has been moved from the "Blink" thread. I have a little
project going here, so forgive me for changing the subject back to
pragmatism. All I can do is hope you find it interesting.
Case said to dmb:
Maybe you are not really saying that at-one-ment means identity with or
one-to-one correspondence with the world.
dmb replies:
Right. I'm saying at-one-ment obviates the whole idea of correspondence. Its
not like one retains the distinction between self and world and then claims
they are the same. Instead, the distinction between them is seen as a
concept rather than a natural feature of a pre-existing reality. This is not
to say that it is unreal, exactly, but the status is lowered from
metaphysical starting point to a secondary, conceptual reality. You know,
experience (Quality) creates subjects and objects instead of the other way
around.
Case said:
I do think it is a mistake to think that we can gain a greater understanding
of our self or the world by simply playing tinker toys with logical
constructs or focusing exclusively on our private experiences. I surely
don't think that's what James did for example. He combined the best of
philosophy and science and showed that when the two approaches are combined
extraordinary things result.
dmb replies:
Well, I think one of the central advantages of radical empiricism is that it
puts experience over theory. Pirsig reports that he was not very impressed
with those positivists who were trying to get at the world through the
logical analysis of language and aims his attack at their metaphysical
assumptions. Don't get me wrong. None of this is supposed to be
anti-scientific and I suppose we'd agree that any philosophy that fails to
agree with scientific data is a steaming pile of shit. The idea here is to
overcome the limits of empiricism as its traditionally concieved within a
subject/object metaphysics. Within that framework, we are limited to what
can be known through the senses and their extentions. (Microscopes,
telescopes, etc..) It expands the notion of what counts as valid empirical
data so as to expose the tinker-toy nature of the logical constructs used by
that narrower version of empiricims. This is part of the reason for pointing
out that the whole SOM premise is a metaphysical assumption, a secondary
conceptual interpretation of experience rather than the basis of experience.
This is from chapter 5 of LILA...
"Positivism is a philosophy that emphasizes science as the only source of
knowledge. It sharply distinguishes between fact and value, and is hostile
to religion and traditional metaphysics. It is an outgrowth of empiricism,
the idea that all knowledge must come from experience, and is suspicious of
any thought, even a scientific statement, that is incapable of being reduced
to direct observation. Philosophy, as far as postivism is concerned, is
limited to the analysis of scientific language.
Phaedrus had taken a course in symbolic logic from a member of logical
positivism's famed Vienna circle, Herbert Feigl, and he remembered being
fascinated by the possibility of a logic that could extend mathematical
precision to solve problems of philosophy and other areas. But even then the
assertion that metaphysics is meaningless sounded false to him. As long as
you're inside a logical, coherent universe of thought you can't escape
metaphysics. Logical positivism's criteria for 'meaningfulness' were pure
metaphysics, he thought.
But it didn't matter. The MOQ not only passes the logical postivists' tests
for meaningfulness, it passes them with the highest marks. The MOQ restates
the empirical basis of logical positivism with more precision, more
inclusiveness, more explanatory power than it has previously had. It says
that values are not outside of the experience that logical positivism limits
itself to. They are the essence of that experience. Values are more
empirical, in fact, than subjects and objects. ...
What the MOQ would do is take this separate category, Quality, and show how
it contains within itself both subjects and objects. The MOQ would show how
things become enormously more coherent - fabulously more coherent - when you
start with an assumption that Quality is the primary empirical reality of
the world... ...but showing that, of course, would be a very big job..."
The quotes on radical empiricism that I posted last time come from chapter
29. They appear after three hundred pages of explaining and demonstrating
this post-positivist epistemological starting point.
At the risk of insulting your intelligence, I think the basic idea here is
that the positivist project was aimed at getting rid of religious and
metaphysical beliefs and thought they could do so by eliminating all
statements and assertions that could not be verified by "objective" reality.
They wanted to get rid of all beliefs that were merely subjective. This is
the epitome of SOM. As I understand it, this is the background info on where
we find ourselves today. This is where the intellectual paralysis comes
from. This is where Rorty's language-centered relativism comes from.
The main reason for this is that SOM still "dominates present social
thought". As a result we have a postmodern situation wherein the Modern
perceptual model is recognized as having failed and yet the assumptions
remain in place. The postmodern, poststructualist situation leads almost
every serious thinker to believe that they are subjects living in a
phenomenal world, but that there is no way to get at it objectively. They
retain the assumption that there is an epistemological gap between self and
the world, but have concluded there's no way to bridge that gap. We can't
escape language, they say, and empirical verification is not possible so
let's abandon epistemology altogether and just focus on our ways of talking.
By contrast, the MOQ points out that the gap has been created by those very
assumptions and so rejects the assumptions. It does not abandon empiricism
or the notion that our beliefs must be based in experience, but rather
reformulates its epistemology. It overlaps with postmodernity, not least of
all because they both reject the notion of objectivity, but they have two
entirely different starting points. That's my little thesis these days. This
is what leads me to draw a distinction between Pirsig's pragmatism and
Rorty's neopragmatism. But its not really about Dick. He's just the most
famous American postmodern figure. He just happens to be the one I
encountered in any serious way. He just happens to be the one Matt
introduced into this forum. But he also happens to be an appropriate target
here, I think. His work looms large enough and he is typical enough that it
makes a certain amount of sense for him to represent the kind of paralysis
Pirsig was talking about.
Let me give you an example. Keith Jenkins' "Re-thinking History" was among
the readings assigned last week. He tells us that, in the light of what
Rorty and Foucault say, history "is anything you want it to be" (13).
Following his neopragmatic pal Rorty, he says, "we are incapable of
accessing the phenomenal world" and that there is "a similar separation
between the phenomenal past and discursive history" (36). The past and
history, "float free of each other"(7). Jenkins says we can escape this
"hapless relativism" (30) by using history to deconstruct the power
structures of society until we get down to a "general recognition of how
things seem to work" (31). But this is just an example and it seems that the
general thrust of postmodernity is an application of this relativistic
anti-epistemology to the Humanities in general. The paralysis that dominates
social thought today, I think, can be traced back to this post-positivist,
anti-epistemological starting point. Jenkins' use of it with respect to the
theory of history is just one specific example of what the larger movement
is doing.
Later,
dmb
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