[MD] Objectivism and the MOQ

[Ham Priday]

Hi Micah --

I'd about given up on getting a response from you (or Laramie) on this
topic.  But better late than never.

Back on 10/19 I quoted Leonard Peikoff, supposedly an authority on Ayn
Rand's philosophy, as saying:

> "Objectivism maintains that existence exists independently of
> consciousness, and that the mind's function is to grasp the identity
> of what exists.  This position, known as realism, or the primacy of
> existence, is opposed to idealism, or the primacy of consciousness,
> which holds that the objects of knowledge are dependent in some
> way on the knower -- that reality is constituted by or relative to our
> own minds.

[Micah]:
> Ask yourself, how can anything be shown to exist independently of
> consciousness. An Objectivist will know nothing can be shown to
> exist independent of consciousness. There is a twist that Pirsig
> settled for me. Reality exists independently with the presence of man.
> This is not a good description, but I'm unable to put together a better
> one...yet. We are the reality. Rand and Pirsig (in Lila) examine how
> man functions within reality. Pirsig, in Zen, examines the nature of
reality.

Peikoff has stated a fundamental principle of the Objectivist's cosmology:
Existence exists independently of consciousness.  You have qualified this
statement by adding the phrase "shown to exist", asserting that "an
Objectivist will know nothing can be shown to exist independent of
consciousness."  While it is true that consciousness is required to
demonstrate the proof of any proposition, this is not what Peikoff is
saying.  His ontological argument is presented in the second quoted
paragraph:

> "Objectivism subscribes to the thesis of empiricism: that sense
> perception is our basic form of contact with reality, and that all
> knowledge rests on perceptual evidence. The Objectivist viewpoint
> on perception, however, is unique in a number of respects. The
> most important is its rejection of the representationalist view that
> we perceive external objects indirectly, through the medium of
> images or representations internal to consciousness.
> The representationalist view, which dominated modern philosophy
> and is still commonly accepted, arose from the fact that the
> appearance of an object is partly dependent on the nature and
> operations of our sensory systems.
>
> "Objectivism offers a radically new theory of perceptual appearances
> as forms in which we perceive objects directly."

Peikoff believes that the objects precede conscious perception, and (I
assume) he speaks for Rand in positing this as a basic tenet of her
Objectivism.

[Micah]:
> The representationalist view has a contradiction. You must use
> your senses to deny your senses.
>
> We are all Objectivists, except the guys attempting to walk through walls,
> and their failing actually makes them Objectivists also, they just won't
> admit it. We all deal with reality objectively, reality is not suspendable
> (look ma, a new word!). This can be too harsh for many, hence the
> denial of the senses.

I'm not quarreling with your logic, here, Micah.  My point is that by
defining undifferentiated reality (DQ) as "pre-intellectual" (i.e.,
pre-conscious), Pirsig has in effect made the objects of reality (existence)
secondary to consciousness.  Peikoff even defines empirical reality
(existence) as "external objects", and rejects "the representationalist view
that we perceive external objects indirectly."  What you and Pirsig claim is
that Quality is experienced directly (e.g., the hot stove allegory), while
the objects are "constructed" by the intellect.  This would seem to
contradict the Objectivist's position that existence is primary.

I also asked:
> 1. What's the difference between Rand's division of consciousness and
> physical existence and the mind/matter duality rejected by the MoQ?

[Micah]:
> What division of consciousness? And the Quality event is the playing field
> of mind and matter.

The statement "Existence exists independently of consciousness" is clearly
separating existence from consciousness.  Is this not a mind/matter
division?  (Objectivism admits to no "Quality event" that I'm aware of.)

>2. Wouldn't Rand's "realism" (i.e., direct perception of objects) rule out
> Experience as a "mediator" of Quality (or Value) which is Pirsig's
> epistemology?

[Micah]:
> I need more detail in your question to respond. Develop the contradiction
> you see more fully for me.

I think I have (above).  Peikoff maintains that we perceive objects
directly.  The MoQ regards experience or perception as the mediator of Value
or Quality.  For example, in the 3.5.Conclusion to his doctoral thesis,
Anthony McWatt says:

"As noted by Pirsig in the above quote, mind and matter are the result of
the same evolutionary process (of value patterns) and though there isn't a
direct connection between them, they are mediated by biological patterns
and - unless a highly original thought appears - usually by social
patterns."

While Pirsig appears to make biological patterns the "mediator" in this
reference, I've seen assertions by other MoQers that experience is the
mediator of reality, the implication being that the objects of experience
are "intellectual constructs".  In either case, the MoQ rejects the notion
that objects are directly perceived, whereas Value or Quality is.  Again,
this seems to refute the Randian premise that existence is primary and that
objects are non-representational but directly perceived.

I've been away for a few days, and see that you have more responses in two
other posts under the 'Flying Spaghetti Monsters' heading.  I'll try to deal
with them in a day or two.

Thanks for taking the time to consider these Objectivist principles which I
still don't believe can be squared with the MoQ (although there's no
particular reason why they should).  It will take some doing to convince me
that an Objectivist ontology is compatible with a philosophy that rejects
objective reality.  But I'm willing to hear you out.

Regards,
Ham