[MD] Objectivism and the MOQ

[Ham Priday]

Hello again, Laramie --



> Yes, amazing how well your "Value Connection" essay
> related to my question.

I'm not happy with this essay, primarly because I don't feel I've adequately
substantiated the premise.  This Valuism theory continues to be a work in
progress, but it's the moral core of my philosophy.  In order to be
meaningful to the reader, a philosophy must show how the individual
"relates" to reality -- metaphysically and epistemologically.  That's why
I'm determined to take Individualism to its cosmological roots.  I believe
Ayn Rand was an Idealist foremost (despite her avoidance of the term.)  I
don't understand why she feels that Plato was an "extreme realist", and she
seems to side with Aristotle (a true realist), whom she characterizes as a
"moderate realist".

> As for Objectivism and the MoQ, the subject of this thread,
> as I said - I don't consider myself an orthodox objectivist,
> or an authority on her metaphysics.  However, it does seem
> that Essentialism endorses the primacy of Existence, broadly
> conceived, as the nothing is a negate of the prior and ultimate
> Essence.  Without Essence, no nothing and no purpose.

But the ultimate Essence is NOT Existence.  Existence is a cognitive
"representation" of Essence-Value -- two steps removed from Essence.  Rand's
attempt to explain objects as "concepts" is the equivalent of Pirsig
explaining them as "patterns".  "Constructs" is a better term for
existential reality; but objects have to be grounded in something other than
intellect, which is a cerebral function.  This was Plato's problem: he was
unable to relate his "idealized universals" to the undifferentiated Absolute
Source.  Then Aristotle came along and dropped the Source, ascribing
"essences" to the phyla of things and creatures.  It was Plotinus who
realized that existents emanate from a holistic essence and that the mind
shapes and orders them in space/time.  His epistemology is the basis for
both the MoQ and Essentialism, and Pirsig has acknowledged his closeness to
Plotinus.

> Mostly I admire Rand's ethics and especially aesthetics.
> The "Romantic Manifesto" is one of my favorite books.
> I see her ethics as a systematic articulation of how to pursue
> DQ.  And in order to pursue DQ, you need a system that
> honors individual freedom - Capitalism.  Otherwise, anyone
> who embodies DQ becomes a target for genocide, which is
> how it's always been.

Yes, I agree that, pragmatically and sociologically, individual freedom is
the conclusion we are striving for.  What I'm trying to do is define the
metaphysical principle underlying this conclusion.  I see no "moral"
implication in Pirsig's Quality thesis, and would have been happier had he
based the MoQ on Value as such.  But neither Quality nor Value can exist
without cognitive sensibility.  And sensibility or awareness cannot create
itself from organic evolution.  Despite Pirsig's disdain for spirituality
and "religious baggage", there must be a primary source for this
subject/object dichotomy.

> Continue on, if you like, with your comparative analysis.
> I'll be happy to read it.

Okay.  I've cheated a bit and gone to the Q&A appendix of Rand's
"Objectivist Epistemology".  Here two professors raise some interesting
questions regarding two of my favorite concepts: Potentiality and Actuality.
(Quoting from p. 286):

"Prof. F: All I can say is that I have memory or a mismemberance of someone
saying that Objectivism does not accept the Aristotelian concept of
"potentiality".

AR:  Specifically, that wasn't me.  Un;less it was in some context of what
Aristotle makes of it, as in regard to his form-matter dichotomy.

Prof. E: Or if :potentiality" becomes the bare possibility of being
something -- as in his views on ultimate "prime matter."  Most of
Aristotle's usage of the concept of "potentiality," so far as I understand,
is quite rational.

Prof. F: He defines "motion" entirely in terms of potentiality, as the
passage from potentiality to actuality.  Would you agree with him there?

AR:  No.  But that's not disagreeing with the concept of potentiality, but
only with its application to this particular instance. ...

Prof F: In Galt's speech you say. "A thing cannot act in contradiction to
its nature."  But that does not mean, of course, that every action which is
possible to thew entity is now beingf realized.

AR:  Oh, no.  I only mean that it cannot take an action which is not
possible to it by its constituent nature.  For instance, if you dropped that
glass, it couldn't suddenly float.  If it did -- what would you do as a
scientist? ...Your would look for other forces operating here.  ...You would
look for new causes -- namely, new phenomena, entities previously unknown to
you which caused the different behavior of that glass. ...

Prof. F: I noticed that Galt does not say, "A thing must act in accordance
with its nature"; he says it "cannot act in contradiction to its nature."  I
wonder if you had some particular reason for stating it in the negative.

AR:  Oh, no, only to make it stronger, actually.  You could have said "must
act in accordance with its nature."  But I wanted to stress that one cannot
claim causeless actions, or actions contrary to the nature of the
interacting entities.  I wanted to stress that actions cannot be
inexplicable and causeless.  If the cause lies in the nature of an entity,
then it cannot do something other than what its nature makes possible."

Close, but no cigar.  Rand's explanation is straight down the Naturalist
path.  Existence (Nature) is primary to intellection (consciousness).  Yet,
in the next section on "The Philosophy of Science", she makes this curious
statement:

"Philosophy by its nature has to be based only on that which is available to
the knowledge of any man with a normal mental equipment [sic].  Philosophy
is not dependent on the discoveries of science; the reverse is true."

In other words, the discoveries of science are dependent on philosophy!
There appears to be a contradiction here which I may be better prepared to
deal with later.

Any comments?

Thanks & Cheers,
Ham