[MD] Essentialism and the MOQ

[PhaedrusWolff at carolina.rr.com]

Hi Ham,

The more I read what you write, the more confused I get. It appears to 
me, you are using Eastern terminology to describe Western concepts.  

You said,  “ I've said this many times. But the capacity (or 
potentiality) for awareness must be independent of the Source.”? 

This is not an Eastern or Western accepted concept I am aware of. 
Where is it stated? 

What “ . . . biologists, physicists, and cosmologists [who are the 
source of most of my factual knowledge.]” which you said further down, 
point to this concept? 

You go on to say, “It is what I referred to before as ‘pure 
awareness’ . . . ”

I’ll interrupt to say Pure Awareness would be the Dharma Mind, and you 
continue 

“ . . . which one could define as the locus of conscious awareness or, 
simply, self-awareness.” 

I’m not sure whether you mean your own personal self or Self, as in 
the Big Self. 

But then you go on to say, “It is the screen upon which the 
differentiated images of reality appear. We define ‘facts’ based on 
the interrelation of these images as perceived by the intellect.”

The intellect in Eastern spirituality would be part of the Ego. 
The “screen,” or “images” would be the false images you have built up 
by the intellect, this ego. 

TIA for any clarification,

Chin

----- Original Message -----
From: Ham Priday <hampday1 at verizon.net>
Date: Thursday, November 23, 2006 1:34 am
Subject: Re: [MD] Essentialism and the MOQ
To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org

> 
> Hi Laramie --
> 
> 
> [L]:
> > The human perspective is the only perspective there is.
> > It doesn't make sense to propose a nonhuman perspective.
> 
> So very true.  The human being -- individuated (proprietary) 
> awareness --IS
> the perspective of actualized reality.  PA is really a "valuistic"
> perspective; it's the intellect that converts value to beingness 
> and makes
> being aware.  The experience of being is "things in existence" and is
> objective.  Sensibility of value is proprietary to the individual 
> and is
> subjective.  Together they provide an extrinsic perspective of the 
> essentialSource.
> 
> [H]:
> > The question as to whether Creation is a "necessary"
> > contingency for God is also meaningless, because
> > Creation (i.e., existence) is an empirical fact, hence
> > is included in the timeless absolute.  The fact that
> > existence itself is an "actualized" contingency does
> > not make God contingent (dependent) upon it.
> 
> [L]:
> > The world is not an empirical fact without awareness of it.
> > In order for awareness, there has to be something to be
> > aware of.  Think about it.
> 
> Also true.  I've said this many times.  But the capacity (or 
> potentiality)for awareness must be independent of the Source.  It 
> is what I referred to
> before as "pure awareness" (PPA), which one could define as the 
> locus of
> conscious awareness or, simply, self-awareness.  It is the screen 
> upon which
> the differentiated images of reality appear.  We define "facts" 
> based on the
> interrelation of these images as perceived by the intellect.  
> Since the
> images have an objective foundation in physical reality, they 
> establish what
> we call universal truth.
> 
> [H]:
> > Finally, "perfect knowing" is absolute sensibility which
> > is undivided and not subject to the conditions of finitude.
> > Knowing is the incremental, finite differentiation of
> > Absolute Oneness performed by man's intellect.
> > Sensibility is indistinguishable from "knowledge" in the
> > identity of God.
> 
> [L]:
> > Static, static, stuff, Ham.  But I could be wrong.
> 
> Static is a Pirsigian construct.  Actually, our perspective of 
> reality is
> that of a system in constant transition -- definitely dynamic.  I 
> could be
> wrong too (says Platt); but if I am, my experience has deceived 
> me.  And so
> has the experience of biologists, physicists, and cosmologists who 
> are the
> source of most of my factual knowledge.
> 
> [L]:
> > In the "Guidebook to ZAMM" there is mention that
> > it might be worthwhile to compare Hartshorne and
> > Whitehead's "God" to Pirisig's Quality, and I've been
> > researching for a thesis on Aurobindo and Rand for
> > quite a while, so I was happy to find the monograph.
> > Glad you liked it too!
> 
> You might want to check out this link for excerpts from 
> Whitehead's "Process
> and Reality": www.anthonyflood.com/whiteheadgodandtheworld.htm
> 
> Here is some of what Whitehead wrote:
> 
> "The notion of God as the "unmoved mover" is derived from 
> Aristotle, at
> least so far as Western thought is concerned.  The notion of God as
> "emi-nently real" is a favourite doctrine of Christian theology.  The
> combination of the two into the doctrine of an aboriginal, 
> eminently real,
> transcendent creator, at whose fiat the world came into being, and 
> whoseimposed will it obeys, is the fallacy which has infused 
> tragedy into the
> histories of Christianity and of Maho-metanism."
> 
> "Viewed as primordial, he is the unlimited conceptual realization 
> of the
> absolute wealth of potentiality.  In this aspect, he is not before 
all
> creation, but with all creation.  But, as primordial, so far is he 
> from"eminent reality," that in this abstraction he is "deficiently 
> actual"-and
> this in two ways.  His feelings are only conceptual and so lack 
> the fulness
> of actuality.  Secondly, conceptual feelings, apart from complex 
> integrationwith physical feelings, are devoid of consciousness in 
> their subjective
> forms.  Thus, when we make a distinction of reason, and consider 
> God in the
> abstraction of a primordial actuality, we must ascribe to him neither
> fulness of feeling, nor consciousness.  He is the unconditioned 
> actuality of
> conceptual feeling at the base of things; so that, by reason of this
> primordial actuality, there is an order in the relevance of 
> eternal objects
> to the process of creation.  His unity of conceptual operations is 
> a free
> creative act, untrammelled by reference to any particular course 
> of things.
> It is deflected neither by love, nor by hatred, for what in fact 
> comes to
> pass. The particularities of the actual world presuppose it; while 
> it merely
> presupposes the general metaphysical character of creative 
> advance, of which
> it is the primordial exemplification. The primordial nature of God 
> is the
> acquirement by creativity of a primordial character.
> 
> "His conceptual actuality at once exemplifies and establishes the 
> categorealconditions.  The conceptual feelings, which compose his 
> primordial nature,
> exemplify in their subjective forms their mutual sensitivity and 
their
> subjective unity of subjective aim.  These subjective forms are 
> valuationsdetermining the relative relevance of eternal objects 
> for each occasion of
> actuality.  A quotation from Aristotle's Metaphysics expresses some
> analogies to, and some differences from, this line of thought:
> 
>       "And since that which is moved and moves is intermediate, 
> there is
> something which moves without being moved, being eternal
> substance, and actuality. And the object of desire and the object of
> thought move in this way; they move without being moved. The
> primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For the
> apparent good is the object of appetite, and the real good is the
> primary object of rational wish. But desire is consequent on opinion
> rather than opinion on desire; for the thinking is the starting-
point.
> And thought is moved by the object of thought, and one of the two
> columns of opposites is in itself the object of thought; . . ."
> 
> "Aristotle had not made the distinction between conceptual 
> feelings and the
> intellectual feelings which alone involve consciousness.  But if 
> "conceptualfeeling," with its subjective form of valuation, be 
> substituted for
> "thought," "thinking," and "opinion," in the above quotation, the 
> agreementis exact."
> 
> I suggest that Whitehead's concept of "conceptual feeling" equates 
> to what
> I've called "undifferentiated sensibility," leaving "its 
> subjective form of
> valuation" to the creature.  In fact, Whitehead goes on to say:
> 
> "One side of God's nature is constituted by his conceptual 
> experience. This
> experience is the primordial fact in the world, limited by no 
> actualitywhich it presupposes.  It is therefore infinite, devoid 
> of all negative
> prehensions.  This side of his nature is free, complete, primordial,
> eternal, actually deficient, and unconscious.  The other side 
> originateswith physical experience derived from the temporal 
> world, and then acquires
> integration with the primordial side.  It is determined, incomplete,
> consequent, 'everlasting,' fully actual, and conscious.  His 
necessary
> goodness expresses the determination of his consequent nature.
> 
> "Conceptual experience can be infinite, but it belongs to the 
> nature of
> physical experience that is finite.  An actual entity in the 
> temporal world
> is to be conceived as originated by physical experience with its 
> process of
> completion motivated by consequent, conceptual experience 
> initially derived
> from God.  God is to be conceived as originated by conceptual 
> experiencewith his process of completion motivated by consequent, 
> physical experience,
> initially derived from the temporal world."
>        --[Chapter II of Part V, "Final Interpretation," of 
> Process and
> Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, New York, Macmillan, 1929]
> 
> Whitehead wants to justify the "goodness" of God for the same 
> reason that
> Pirsig wants to justify the "universality of goodness".  The 
> statement "His
> necessary goodness expresses the determination of his consequent 
> nature"seems to prove my point.  What "necessary goodness"?  What 
> is the
> metaphysical basis for Whitehead's premise that goodness is a 
> necessaryattribute of the creation, or Pirsig's premise that 
> morality is innate in
> the universe?  God [Essence] knows no distinctions.  Goodness is 
> for MAN to
> discover, along with Badness.  I submit that such evaluations are 
only
> possible in an amoral universe in which man is the autonomous 
subject.
> 
> Think on that, Laramie, and tell me why it doesn't make sense.
> 
> Happy Thanksgiving!
> Ham
> 
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