[MD] Flying Spaghetti Monsters

[Platt Holden]

Hi Ham, 

[Ham]
> It wasn't my intention to strike up an argument with you, Platt.  But now
> that I have, it has elicited a clearer description of your position on the
> MoQ than I've heard before.  So perhaps we're demonstrating a new
> dialectical principle: A misunderstanding can lead to greater
> understanding. Whether that's valid or not, I think you may have
> misunderstood ME.
> 
> By proprietary awareness, I don't mean the "capability" of awareness, which
> of course IS shared by all human beings, among other species.  Some degree
> of sensibility is universal to all creatures, and in that sense it is a
> property of living organisms. But 'being aware' is not a general property
> or capability: it is the conscious perception of specific values relative
> to the individual and perceived only by the individual.  The perception of
> value, for example, is unique to each of us and is not shared by any other
> individual.  But you already know this; it's why you prefer Rachmaninoff to
> Tchaikovsky and I don't.

Many thanks for the correcting my misunderstanding. If I get it right, 
proprietary awareness means each of us possesses a unique set of values.

> Animals don't have values or make moral decisions; they exhibit behavioral
> preferences.  Animals don't plant gardens, design automobiles, admire art,
> or ponder their fate.  Whatever "planning" they do is instinctual and based
> on their genetic makeup.  All knowledge of reality is human.  All values
> experienced are human.  All the decisions, theories, and principles we live
> by are human, and they originate with the individual.  Man is the
> choice-maker of his world, and the physical universe is an anthropocentric
> reality.

We part company on the belief that animals don't possess or experience
values. Their choices are not as wide as ours, but choices exist for them
nevertheless -- or so we can assume from their behavior. As the great 
zoologist and Nobel prize winner Konrad Lorenz said, "What the organism 
leans about its environment can be expressed in the simple phrase, "Its 
better here" or "Its not so good here." -- and then act accordingly. 

> You said:
> > As for the idealism that you, Micah and Pirsig seem to share,
> > I don't buy it. I didn't make the universe; I wasn't even there
> > at the time. Nor does a chicken depend on my seeing her lay an
> > egg for me to enjoy eating it for breakfast. That when we turn
> > around what's in back of us disappears is fun for freshman in
> > high school to argue, but hardly a worthy conjecture for serious
> > philosophy. The days of Bishop Berkeley and his "esse is percipi"
> > are long gone.
> 
> That just isn't true, Platt.  Idealists are just as determined to establish
> logical proof for Berkeley's axiom as they ever were, because the quest to
> know the "unknowable" still goes on.  It is true that there has been a
> falling away from idealism in the last two centuries, and we've observed
> many "hybrid" philosophies which attempt to universalize (collectivize) the
> fundamentals.  Your Panexperientialism, for one; also Vitalism, Semiotics,
> Transcendental Consciousness, and Social Constructivism, of which the MoQ
> is an example.

To me "logical proof" is ultimately a chimera. We've learned from Godel 
that logic is incomplete. It makes assumptions it cannot prove.
As for the MOQ being an example of "Social Constructivism," we disagree.
At the MOQ highest static level is intellect, the proprietary capability 
of individuals, not societies. Societies don't think.  
 
> > But, despite reservations about idealism, I consider myself a Pirsigian
> > because what counts in his metaphysics is that the world is a moral
> > order. The underlying premise that some things are better than others
> > fits nicely with my honoring the individual. And, the MOQ's explanatory
> > power is second to none, answering, for example, such imponderables as,
> > "Why survive?"
> 
> It's clear that you've taken comfort in Pirsig's idea of a moral universe.
> You've more or less accepted it because it makes you feel good, and because
> it somehow supports your interest in art and "fits nicely" with your
> position on individualism.  Lots of people cling to religion for the same
> reasons.

Same rationale can be used for your adherence to Essentialism.

> Concerning your praise of the MoQ for its "explanatory power",
> just how does it answer the question, "Why survive?"  I must have missed
> that chapter.  Incidentally, I don't consider "It's better than the
> alternative" an explanation.

You missed Chapter 11 in Lila. Anyway, what is it about "it's better here" 
that you find lacking as an explanation? I sure you consider Essentialism 
a better metaphysics than the alternative. Otherwise, why have you spent 
so much of you limited time on this earth on developing and explaining it?
I can't think of any better explanation for your efforts. (There, I've 
said it again.) 

Regards,
Platt