[MD] Flying Spaghetti Monsters

[Ham Priday]

Hi again, Platt -- 


> OK.- "possess" bad choice of word.  Each of us is
> sensitive to values in a unique way.  Is that better?

I think that about says it.

> As I said before, I don't believe in idealism.
> I'll go with Lorenz's organisms whose perceptions
> and values are as "real" as ours, only different.
> (Does it concern you that some on this site consider
> values to be real but not thoughts?)

I checked out Konrad Lorenz "On the Virtue of Scientific Humility", where he
mentions values.  (Interestingly, the source for this article turned out to
be the 'Encyclopedia of Marxism'.)   Like other behaviorists, Lorenz does
not subscribe to the view that man is free but, as a zoologist, likes to
describe apes and chimpanzees as man's evolutionary predecessors.  I
selected the following quotes as particularly revealing of the author's
distaste for philosophical idealism.

"The reluctance of many people to recognise the causal determination of all
natural phenomena, human behaviour included, undoubtedly comes from the
justifiable wish to possess a free will and to feel that our actions are
determined not by fortuitous causes but by higher aims."

"A third great obstacle to human self-knowledge is--at least in our Western
cultures--a heritage of idealistic philosophy.  It stems from the dichotomy
of the world into the external world of things, which to idealistic thought
is devoid of values, and the inner world of human thought and reason to
which alone values are attributed.  This division appeals to man's spiritual
pride.  It supports him in his reluctance to accept the determination of his
own behaviour by natural laws. ...We must realize how common it has become
in Western, particularly German, thought to consider that whatever can be
explained by the laws of nature is automatically devoid of higher values."

Since conscious awareness cannot be explained by the laws of nature, on what
authority does a naturalist like Lorenz presume to speak of "higher values"?

> As I run into the man on the street I see very little evidence
> of his "search for meaning." Nor do I think intellect is necessarily
> the path to finding such meaning, if indeed any exists.

Unfortunately, that appears to be the case.  Despite his creation as an
autonomous entity in a richly choreographed world for some fourscore years,
the average man regards this miracle a waste of his time to ponder,
suppresses his innate urge "to know", and simply takes existence for
granted.  Such blasé reckoning typically leads to a life of unrealized
values, including the possibility of a transcendent source.  Like so many
seeds cast on fallow ground, those who subsist in this fashion represent
"The Hollow Men" of T.S. Eliot's poem.  They gain little from their own
experience and contribute even less to their fellow man.  It disturbs me
that you cite "intellect" as the path to meaning and are dubious about its
existence.

> Let not your heart be troubled.  I do not demean awareness
> nor does Pirsig. His entire metaphysics begins with pure awareness.
> It's just that for some reason you find it better to confine awareness
> to human beings ...

I don't mean to sound ungrateful for your words of comfort, Platt, but "pure
awareness" equates to nothingness.  I doubt that Pirsig would have needed to
speak of awareness in its primordial form, since this would involve a
metaphysical concept which he shunned.  (To be aware presupposes a referent
object -- something to be aware of.)  Perhaps you can quote me the source of
that assertion.  Because of its relative connotation, I don't even use the
term "pure awareness" as an assumed attribute of Essence, although I have
used  "absolute sensibility" in this context.

> I find it somewhat ironic that you cite proprietary awareness
> as the essential criterion for a meaningful philosophy but can
> only find a couple of others who understand it. That in itself
> tells me something's missing from Essentialism.
> But, I could be wrong.

It should tell you that the 'valuistic premise and ontology of my philosophy
represent a departure from traditional idealism.  The perspective requires a
totally "subjective" approach to reality, which few people find readily
conceivable.  What do you think is "missing"?   A theory that would extend
proprietary awareness to "all creatures great and small" -- plus atoms,
rocks, and trees?

Regards,
Ham