[MD] Flying Spaghetti Monsters

[Platt Holden]

Hi Ham -

> Okay, Pirsig is equating value with "pure experience."  That's definiting
> an abstract concept, since what we experience is never pure, that is,
> devoid of objects.  I would call it "undifferentiated sensibility", which
> we don't experience either, because our experience is differentiated. 
> However, semantics is not the real problem here.  It's the concept that
> experience isn't physical or "psychical".  Well, what is it, then?

It comes before any conception of "it."

> In order to experience something -- even value -- we must have a sentient
> organism.  The last time I looked, my body was physical.  Also, we must be
> psychically aware of the experience, which requires cognition -- a function
> of the cerebro-neural gray cells.  So, from a scientific point of view,
> experience involves both psychic and physical elements.

Experience doesn't require cognition.. And, Pirsig is a critic of the 
"scientific point of view," a view that doesn't morals are real. A 
scientist couldn't measure a moral if his life depended on it. 

> To justify this epistemology, Pirsig's "metaphysics" assumes that the
> division of my being from the undifferentiated source (Quality) occurs with
> every experience.  As someone here said, we have to "deduce" our selfness
> as part of having an experience.  This doesn't make sense scientifically,
> and it strains one's credibility philosophically, but it's Pirsig's way of
> "overcoming" SOM.  He must posit the individual subject as a direct
> creation of Quality.  That's also why he equivocates on the issue of a
> primary source: for Pirsig it's got to be DQ.

I don't see a problem.

> For Value to be "pre-intellectual" doesn't mean that it occurs in the
> absence of an intellect; it means that in the time sequence of man's
> experience, Value is sensed before the intellect converts it to objective
> experience.
> 
> My epistemology is actually much simpler and more plausible, because it
> assumes a Creator (Essence) which establishes the primary division of
> awareness from beingness.  Quality (or Value), then, is not the source but
> the "ground" of physical existence.  Thus, I don't have to create myself
> anew with each experience.  I exist as a "being aware" for the duration of
> my life, attaching to the relative values that represent Essence to me.

I too exist as a "being aware" including when I was in my crib and unable 
to "cogitate." Awareness is independent of differentiation or cogitation.

> Ham, previously:
>  > What do you think is "missing" [in my philosophy of Essence]?
> > A theory that would extend proprietary awareness to "all creatures
> > great and small" -- plus atoms, rocks, and trees?
> 
> Platt:
> > Yes, to all creatures great and small, plus atoms and trees, but not
> > rocks.  Rocks are heaps, not holons.
> 
> What's a "holon"?  It isn't in my dictionary, so I suspect you're borrowing
> someone else's invented vernacular.

A holon is simultaneously a whole and a part. 

> > As I've said many times, I'm a panexperientialist. I look at my cat,
> > UTOE, and see awareness, experience, valuation and purpose. Just how
> > self-conscious he is I haven't a clue, except he seems to know the
> > difference between his front paws and his tail, and keeps his distance
> > from the bulldog next door.
> 
> As Micah suggested, you are anthropomorphizing.  You don't "see awareness,
> valuation, or purpose"; you see behavior that appears to be based on
> cognitive interpolation and valuistic judgment, when all that UTOE is doing
> is following his survival instincts.

Similarly, I presume you aware by your behavior. Am I athropomorphizing 
you and Micah? 

> Sure he distinguishes his paw from
> his tail, and you'll also see him tongue-washing his tail when it's
> perfectly clean -- because that behavior is built into his behavior too. 
> You didn't learn Micah's lesson, Platt.  Little UTOE, despite his cuteness
> and independent behavior, knows only what he senses at a given moment --
> fear of the bulldog, hunger, movement, comfort.  Micah's point was that he
> does not "know that he knows" because he has no self to be aware of.

How do you know what my UTOE senses or what he is aware of? (By the way, 
you can't be serious about admiring Micah's solipsism are you?)

> I'm fond of cats, too, Platt; but only Walt Disney and his heirs can impart
> human attributes to them.  (Personally, I think you're just having a little
> fun with us.)

Personally I think you are pulling our collective legs. :-)

Regards,
Platt