[MD] Ham thinks the MOQ is a form of phenomenology

[Squonkonguitar at aol.com]

Hi Mark -- 

<snip>

Mark said:
The MoQ says there is one Substance and this is DQ.
All patterns of sq are aspects of DQ if you like.

Ham: I have given  this ontology a lot of thought, Mark.  Over several years, 
 in
fact.  My conclusion is that the division of Quality into DQ and sq  is a
duality in itself, replacing the subject/object duality that Prisig  claims
to have done away with.
 
Mark: One substance, infinite aspects.
If there is a duality, it is that of The One and the many.
The dual nature of reality is between the Dynamic and the static.
Now may i ask you Ham: where is the Subject and the Object?
 
Ham: Your over-simplified analysis of the phenomenalist
view that there  are two types of substances, material and mental, is not
quite what Runes was  saying.
 
Mark: Please show us why this is so?
 
Ham: Nor is it how Pirsig outlined the problem
faced by Bohr and  Heisenberg at their first quantum physics meeting with
Einstein.
 
Mark: This is not mentioned in your Runes quote, and it was your Runes  quote 
i was dealing with.

Ham quotes SODV: "Since the phenomena from the  measurements are not about to 
change, Bohr
concluded that the logic of  science must change to accommodate them.
...This view, known as  phenomenalism, says that what we really observe is
not the object. What we  really observe is only data.  ...Bohr's
Complementarity was accused of  being subjectivistic.  If the world is
composed of subjects and objects,  and if Bohr says the properties of the
atom are not in the objects, then Bohr  is saying that the properties of the
atom are in the subject.  But if  there is one thing science cannot be it is
subjective."  -- [Pirsig:  SODV presentation paper]
 
Mark: The MoQ eloquently solves the Subject/Object dilemma already under  
threat from quantum mechanics.

Ham: Heisenberg, in the tradition of Kant  and Spencer, took the position that
"the reality of things-in-themselves was  unknowable".  That doesn't
necessarily mean they  are
"material".
 
Mark: 'Things-in-themselves' is an intellectual postulation. That intellect  
cannot know, 'Things-in-themselves' is a bit like intellect stating: 'My SOM  
epistemology is a cul de sac.' An expanded format is required, and the  MoQ 
performs this.
 
Ham: His colleague Bohr argued for "Complementarity", the view that
we  do not observe objects at all, but only (statistical) data.   His
inference was that we "objectify" the data values to create an image of  the
phenomenon.  This doesn't necessarily mean that phenomena are  "mental".
 
Mark: Statistical data are intellectual postulations. That intellect limits  
its epistemology to data is a bit like the intellect saying, 'My SOM  
epistemology is in a cul de sac.' An expanded format is required, and the  MoQ 
performs this.

Ham: Pirsig went on to say: "Quality is not a  thing.  It is an event.  It is 
the
event at which the subject  becomes aware of the object."  While he has since
disavowed the  subject/object distinction, I think his SODV statement was
spot on.
 
Mark: You are presenting a misreading of SODV. Naughty Ham.
Your cherry picking appears to suggest Subjects and Objects are the primary  
ontological simples of reality from which Quality is deduced. This is not  so:
'Quality is not just the result of a collision between subject and object.  
The very existence of subject and object themselves is deduced from the Quality 
 event. The Quality event is the cause of the subjects and objects, which are 
 then mistakenly presumed to be the cause of the Quality!' (SODV p.  12)

Mark:
> Explanations are intellectual constructs. As such they  are
> intellectual patterns of sq.  As such they are aspects of  DQ.
> As such they cannot account for that which is greater than
>  themselves.  Objects are patterns of sq.

Ham: That does not explain what the patterns are; it only explains what  an
explanation is.  "Aspects of DQ" is meaningless.
 
Mark: The MoQ states that intellectual patterns are values. I've just said  
this: Mark: 'Explanations are intellectual constructs. As such they are  
intellectual patterns of sq.'
This does a bit more than explain an explanation; it says all explanations  
are intellectual values.
This expands the format of using intellectual patterns to explain  
intellectual patterns in ever more convoluted terms.
Re: "Aspects of DQ" is meaningless. If DQ is the One and sq patterns are  
infinite aspects of the One, then the One and sq are complimentary.
The MoQ states that life cannot exist without either aspect - DQ moves  
evolution onward and sq latches progress.
'The most striking similarity between the Metaphysics of Quality and  
Complementarity is that this Quality event corresponds to what Bohr means by  
"observation." When the Copenhagen Interpretation "holds that the unmeasured  atom is 
not real, that its attributes are created or realized in the act of  
measurement," (Herbert xiii) it is saying something very close to the  Metaphysics of 
Quality. The observation creates the reality.' (SODV p. 12)
Reality as sq patterns is created from the Dynamic flux of events.


Ham: All appearances are
aspects of something.  The question I had  asked was: What causes them, and
why do they take this particular form?
 
Mark: The term appearance implies an observer. But the observer is deduced  
from the Dynamic flux of events. The Primary reality is unconditioned and has 
no  differentiation's. Northrop calls this the Undifferentiated Aesthetic 
continuum,  and Pirsig calls this DQ.
As i have tried hard to inform you Ham, the MoQ replaces causation with  
value.
On a personal note, i have almost struck the word 'cause' out of my  
vocabulary. It's become redundant for me.
Not for you though Ham, and i can't hold it against you, but when you ask  me 
what causes something i only have recourse to a new metaphysical approach  
which places causation with empirical value.
Patterns are as they are because of your evolutionary history:
'Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance left one enormous metaphysical  
problem unanswered that became the central driving reason for the expansion of  
the Metaphysics of Quality into a second book called Lila. This problem was: 
if  Quality is a constant, why does it seem so variable? Why do people have  
different opinions about it? The answer became: The quality that was referred to 
 in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance can be subdivided into Dynamic  
Quality and static quality. Dynamic Quality is a stream of quality events 
going  on and on forever, always at the cutting edge of the present. But in the 
wake of  this cutting edge are static patterns of value. These are memories, 
customs and  patterns of nature. The reason there is a difference between 
individual  evaluations of quality is that although Dynamic Quality is a constant, 
these  static patterns are different for everyone because each person has a 
different  static pattern of life history. Both the Dynamic Quality and the 
static patterns  influence his final judgment. That is why there is some uniformity 
among  individual value judgments but not complete uniformity.' (SODV p.  
12/3)

Mark:
> At the intellectual level, patterns are more or less  beautiful.
> High level abstractions are deduced and aim toward  beauty
> as Human artistic creations.
> Examples of mathematicians'  and physicists' accounts of the
> aesthetic they experience are so common  as to be taken as
> the norm within the field.
> You may take this  to be the answer to your misunderstanding
> of MoQ epistemology: MoQ  epistemology is of values.

Ham: Not all values are aesthetic, Mark.   It may be poetic license to apply 
the
word "Beauty" to mathematical  equations, but it doesn't clarify the cause or
design of your assumed  patterns.  An original metaphysical theory must be
more than metaphors  and euphemisms.
 
Mark: Take that up with any mathematicians you know.
Recall Northrop's undifferentiated Aesthetic continuum and DQ: sq pattern  
emerge from this flux of events.

Ham said:
> Either the specific design of the universe is an  accident
> of unknown forces -- perhaps the Einsteinian energy,  mass,
> and velocity of light -- or it's the intent of a Creator.
>  Pirsig does not posit a creator or any primary source other
> than  Quality.

Mark:
> This is contradictory Ham.  To say, Pirsig  does not do x but
> does do x is a bit childish.

Ham: I didn't  accused Pirsig of contradicting himself.  My contention is 
simply
that  he didn't account for the source of his patterns.
 
Mark: See the last and lengthy SODV quote above.
The source of patterning is a relationship between what you are and DQ -  
what you are becoming.

Mark:
> At the inorganic level, values are  relatively unsophisticated,
> but at the intellectual level they are  exquisitely sophisticated.
> So, you can see that intellect is not equated  with consciousness
> in equal sense because intellect is exquisite in  sophistication
> while social and biological patterns are less so.
>  In other words, the intellect is high level consciousness.

Ham: Just  because it is "sophisticated?
 
Mark: The point is it's all the same stuff. When intellect contemplates  
matter it is highly evolved stuff contemplating lowly evolved stuff. It's all  the 
same.
All the same because it all shares the same Dynamic source.
But while the same, it is configured in ever more complex and coherent  
structures.

Mark continues:
> High level conscious patterns like  the intellect are embedded
> in lower level conscious patterns of the  social, which in turn,
> like a Russian Doll, are embedded in even lower  level conscious
> patterns like the biological, etc.
> Values, not  turtles, all the way down.
> Objects, when aligned with the inorganic and  biological do look
> like objects.

Ham: Since as we can only  experience objects "aligned with the inorganic and
biological", in your  opinion, does that make them inorganic, biological, or
intellectual?
 
Mark: A Human being is all of them. A Dog is all of them minus intellectual  
patterns. An Amoeba is all of them minus social and intellectual patterns. A  
stone is all of them minus biological, social and intellectual  patterns.

> Subjects, when aligned with the social and intellect do  look like
> subjects. But this arrangement has its roots and  evolutionary
> history in ancient culture and is not written in  stone.

Ham: What do "subjects" look like?  I've never seen one, not  have I any 
reason to
believe that they underwent an evolutionary change in  history.
 
Mark: They copy behaviour patterns, perform rituals and strive to stand out  
in groups and achieve fame. The better ones appreciate the aesthetic nature of 
 reality as found in art, literature, science, philosophy.

Ham  said:
> It is my opinion that the MoQ and Essentialism are both
>  phenomenologies because they both theorize physical reality
> as  "appearance".

Mark:
> If you are stating that Ham Priday's  essentialism may be
> viewed as Idealism then i quite agree.
> This  accords nicely with my assertion that essentialism is
> part of the  rationalist tradition. I'm glad you agree Ham.
> Mark from above: The MoQ  says there is one Substance
> and this is DQ. All patterns of sq are  aspects of DQ.
> DQ - the essence of sq, is not an idea or material  substance.
> DQ is pure experience prior to differentiation's.

Ham:  I fail to see how there can be any experience prior to the 
differentiation
of  subject and object.  Are you saying that Quality "experiences"?  If  so,
what does it experience?
 
Mark: When you say, 'I,' you have already set up  differentiation's. You then 
you go on to state that your differentiation's  fail to, 'See,' which i take 
to mean, 'adequately analyse,' prior  undifferentiated experience. And yet, 
many Human activities are best performed  at this edge of immediate 
undifferentiated experience, when static  expectations and analysis are dropped.
I once wrote a paper called, 'The edge of chaos' which may be found on the  
MOQ.org essay page which explores this a bit more.
Quality, as Northrop put it, is the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.  
'You' are a series of events within the continuum.
Quality is pure experience; It is not that Quality experiences something  
else. The immediate here and now IS Quality, which  becomes differentiated upon 
reflection into fractured patterns of static  differentiation's.

Ham:
> For me, the design of the universe is a  metaphysical principle:
> it is the space/time appearance of reality that  occurs when
> awareness is negated from Essence.

Mark:
>  Jolly good. A nice idea. And as an idealist, we cannot expect
> any more  than that.

Ham: Well, you've placed me in the "rationalist tradition",  and defined me 
as an
idealist.
 
Mark: You did this Ham. Look:
Ham from previous post: 'It is my opinion that the MoQ and Essentialism are  
both phenomenologies because they both theorize physical  reality as  
"appearance".'
Ham from previous post: 'Yes, Platt; in either sense defined above,  
Phenomenalism may be considered a form of Idealism.'
I presented an argument which attempted to show that you are correct  
regarding essentialism but incorrect regarding the MoQ.
It is interesting to note that this has been removed from your current  
response Ham.
And this has been a feature of many of your previous responses:
Instead of tackling everything step by step, you edit your responses to  
remove problematic arguments and then carry on (the above is an example in  point) 
as if they had not been presented in the first place.

Ham: I don't know why this gives you the jollies, or why these  labels
lower your expectations of what you can expect of me.  I suppose  Plato and
Plotinus, as idealists, didn't live up to your expectations  either.
 
Mark: Let us call a spade a spade Ham?
If you are an idealist then so be it; i'm not knocking you for it. And as  
you have just indicated, you are in good company.
I may have misread you? It may be that you are not an idealist at  all?
>From what i have read, i have a suspicion you are more of an idealist than  
you realise.

Ham: I wonder what label you would affix to  Mr.Pirsig.

Regards,
Ham
 
Mark: Those who promote an undefined primary source are mystics.
You would be a mystic if you kept definitions out of your essence, but your  
essence is loaded with definitions as far as i can tell.
I may be wrong.
So, if you commit yourself to a defined primary source you  are teetering on 
the edge of some sort of pigeon hole already there waiting  for you to fall 
into.
I think that is tragedy?
Love,
Mark