[MD] Ham thinks the MOQ is a form of phenomenology

[Squonkonguitar at aol.com]

Hi Mark -- 

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The objection I raised did not specifically concern "subject and  object",
but that Pirsig had not overcome duality as claimed.  "The One  and the many"
is a duality.  So is the "dual nature of reality between  Dynamic and
static."  In fact, I maintain that one cannot logically deny  the duality
(i.e., dual nature) of existence.
 
Mark: I said, 'If' there were a duality in the MoQ blar blar.
But if all sq patterns are aspects of DQ, then we technically have One  
Substance with infinite attributes.
The difference is subtle, but i am not convinced this is a duality.
One and Many certainly, but a duality?
Spinoza suggested a very similar view, but the MoQ places DQ as the One;  
Spinoza posited One Substance (nature) with infinite attributes.

Ham: As  I understand the two forms of phenomenalism, neither [a] nor [b]  
defines
phenomena as "material substance" or "mental substance", and both  deny
knowledge of their reality.
 
Mark: Runes: [a] physical phenomena... [b] mental phenomena...
Straight from the Horses mouth.

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I don't know what "expanded MoQ format" you refer to, but aren't  all
postulations intellectual?  If Kant had postulated an epistemology  for the
"thing-in-itself", would it still be a cul de sac?
 
Mark: I don't know what Kant says about these matters.
But rationalists do insist that essence is defined by the intellect and is  
therefore known.
For some rationalists, the intellect is precisely that which identifies and  
then defines substances and their essential natures.

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Ham: I beg to disagree.  Statistical data are empirical  observations which a
re
considered "facts" in scientific methodology.  If  a fact is an intellectual
postulation for you, then you are definitely not in  my school of
"rationalism".
 
Mark: Statistics is a branch of maths and maths is intellectual.
I think a concession may have been made to empiricism in that stats  
implicitly acknowledge unknown variables.
Are you suggesting unknown variables are scientific facts?
If unknown variables are scientific facts then DQ qualifies.

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Ham: If by "simples" (above) you mean "fundamentals", your objection  may be
valid.  However, the fact that Pirsig singles out "subject" and  "object" in
any context is remarkable, considering his assertion that there  are no such
entities.
 
Mark: Well, subjects and objects are now included in an expanded  format.
My own view is that subjects and objects can be dropped altogether but that  
may not be orthadox MoQ?
(See my 2005 MOQ conference paper)

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Ham: An explanation may be an intellectual "construction",  "description" or
"theory".  I hardly think it qualifies as a  value.  Not by my philosophy
anyway.
 
Mark: Fair enough.

Ham: We do not have "infinite aspects" of the  One.  We have a systemized,
ordered, self-sustaining universe whose  finite components are identifiable
by form and structure.  If the One  [essential source] were infinitely
divided, we have nothing more than a  plasma cloud.
 
Mark: Form and matter you may have meant to say? But i don't want to  put 
words in your mouth.
I thought cosmologists took the view that the Universe was infinite  Ham?
I may be wrong.

> The MoQ states that life cannot exist without  either aspect

Ham: "Either aspect" implies a twosome -- that's not an  "infinite aspect", 
it's
that duality again!
 
Mark: I'm not sure Ham? Zero and Infinity maybe two ways of saying the same  
thing?

Ham: Right.  Bohr's Complementary was Runes' [b] form of  phenomenalism: 
"denies a
reality behind the phenomena."  By admitting  that Complementarity is "very
close to the MoQ", Pirsig is in effect saying  that (the observer's)
experience "creates reality".  Or, if you still  like the word, that all
phenomena are "mental".
 
Mark: I think you are being a bit rapid here. You trot out, 'Pirsig is in  
effect saying...' without any argument.
Pirsig is saying nothing of the sort.
What he is suggesting is that the observer and the observed emerge from one  
source, a source Bohr calls 'Complimentary' and the MoQ calls  DQ.

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Ham: Value can't be a cause; it is a psycho-somatic response to  something
experienced.
 
Mark: Then values are subjective for you Ham. You have no way of  
discriminating between suicidal bombers and Beethoven.
The MoQ can.

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Ham: If you do not see the need for cause, I assume you also do not  
acknowledge a
"beginning" of anything.  For you, then, the Big Bang is a  myth and
evolutionary process is perpetual.
 
Mark: I've swapped 'value' for 'cause' because 'cause' carries too  much 
philosophical baggage with it.
I have no idea if there was a beginning, but i'm happy to note there does  
appear to have been an evolutionary progression.
Perhaps initially, the progression was so slow it lasted an infinite  time?
Perhaps the end will be so fast it will last zero time?
Perhaps there is no difference?
These questions are so tricky to formulate.

Ham: I won't say I understand this uncreated patterning ontology, but  "what 
you
are and what you are becoming" sounds suspiciously like  existentialism.
 
Mark: The process is Dynamic and the Dynamic is unknown.
This may be the essence of Human freedom you find so valuable Ham?
I've tried to show you i think it is. The MoQ does place freedom at the  
centre of Human life.

Ham: Indeed, those roots must go back infinitely in  time, inasmuch has
evolutionary history had no beginning.
 
Mark: I wasn't there so i can't say? But so what if it did and there  wasn't?
After all, it took billions of years for tiny microbes to condition the  
Earths atmosphere with Oxygen, but once that was complete biological life  di
versified at an incredible rate within a few hundred million years. And yet,  non 
of that was possible without that initial billions of years  conditioning.
Likewise, intellectual development has accelerated so fast in the last 400  
years compared with all Human culture before it.

Ham: I'm curious.   Why do you always type an apostrophe on "differentiation"?
 
Mark: The spell checker does it.

Ham: I'll review your essay, Mark,  and I appreciate your efforts to explain 
the
DQ ontology.
 
Mark: :-O
 
Ham: But, to be honest, you are speaking a language that is  still
foreign to me.
 
Mark: :-(
 
Ham: I can see that your are well-versed in the Pirsigian
perspective  and that it seems to work for you.  No offense, but it doesn't
for  me.  Perhaps I'm too immersed in my own philosophy to re-read Pirsig  for
a different slant.  That there are similarities we mostly  agree.  But I'm
really more interested in uncovering new sources that  parallel my concepts
and will help me articulate Essentialism more  simply.
 
Mark: Fair play to you Ham. Fair play. I am happy with that and thank you  
for the time you have taken.

Ham: Excuse me for skipping the dialogue on  why I'm an idealist, which I 
doubt
will be of interest to anyone  else.

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Ham: Well, what do you know, now I'm a rationalist mystic!  And  with 
definitions
yet!
 
Mark: Plato and Plotinus could be viewed as  Mystics.

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Oh, it's not so tragic, Mark.  After all, I recall that Pirsig  explored
mysticism at one point, but never quite made it to the primary  source.
(Philosophers are a pathetic lot, aren't they?)

Thanks for  your patience and all the instruction.  Sorry it didn't work  on
me.

Best regards,
Ham

Mark: I will still continue to think about your essentialism Ham.
Love,
Mark