[MD] Ham thinks the MOQ is a form of phenomenology
Ham Priday
hampday1 at verizon.net
Mon Sep 4 12:35:13 PDT 2006
Hi Mark --
Although I've stated my major differences with the MoQ as forthrightly as
possible, there are obviously still some misunderstandings. To wit:
Mark:
> I said, 'If' there were a duality in the MoQ blar blar.
> But if all sq patterns are aspects of DQ, then we technically
> have One Substance with infinite attributes.
> The difference is subtle, but i am not convinced this is a duality.
> One and Many certainly, but a duality?
> Spinoza suggested a very similar view, but the MoQ places
> DQ as the One; Spinoza posited One Substance (nature) with
> infinite attributes.
What is the equivalent of Infinity divided by Infinity? My mathematics did
not extend beyond Analytical Geometry, but in Newtonian math, the answer is
still One. I that is true, then an absolute source cannot create a
differentiated universe by dividing itself infinitesimally. Nor can any
single thing have "infinite attributes".
[I'll skip the phenomenalism vs. phenomenology comments because I think
they're essentially the same concept (with minor variations), and applying
labels to a concept falls into the area that Pirsig acerbically called
"philosophilology".]
Mark:
> I don't know what Kant says about these matters.
> But rationalists do insist that essence is defined by the
> intellect and is therefore known.
> For some rationalists, the intellect is precisely that which
> identifies and then defines substances and their essential natures.
Kant questioned the assumption that reality can be apprehended through
concepts alone, using Leibniz for support. In Kant's view the function of
reason is relating and/sor synthesizing the data of sense. Whatever
synthetic principles cannot be derived from sense perception must be 'a
priori' -- i.e., logically prior to the materials they create. In "Critique
of Pure Reason" Kant undertsakes a complete inventory and 'deduction' of all
synthetic, a priori, 'transcendental' forms employed in the knowledge of
Nature. He concudes that this knowledge is always necessarily of something
in space and time, but that space/time cannot be objective properties of
things-in-themselves but the formal demands of reason. Without thess forms,
however, there could be no knowledge, no experience of Nature. But Kant
also acknowledged will and feeling as fundamental to cognizance, and he
based his 'transcendental idealism' on the validity of Free Will rather than
reason.
Mark:
> Statistics is a branch of maths and maths is intellectual.
> I think a concession may have been made to empiricism in that stats
> implicitly acknowledge unknown variables.
> Are you suggesting unknown variables are scientific facts?
> If unknown variables are scientific facts then DQ qualifies.
What do you mean by "stats"? For the scientist, empirical knowledge
acquired from objective investigation and confirmed by mathematical
principles are "facts". Any variables included in this knowledge are
treated and explained as such. However, a theory such as DQ is not based on
objective knowledge or methematical principles, therefore has nothing in
common with scientific facts.
<snip>
<snip>
Ham said:
> We do not have "infinite aspects" of the One.
> We have a systemized, ordered, self-sustaining universe
> whose finite components are identifiable by form and
> structure. If the One [essential source] were infinitely
> divided, we have nothing more than a plasma cloud.
Mark:
> I thought cosmologists took the view that the Universe
> was infinite Ham? I may be wrong.
The concept of an infinite universe remains theoretical. I recently heard
an astrophysicist discussing the Big Bang theory. He noted that the theory
stipulates that the boundary of space at that time was limited to
approximately the size of a football, but that it expanded -- and continues
to expand -- as the intersteller components move apart from each other.
This doesn't sound like an "infinite universe" to me.
Mark, previously:
> The MoQ states that life cannot exist without
> either aspect [form and matter].
Ham:
> "Either aspect" implies a twosome -- that's not an "infinite aspect",
> it's that duality again!
Mark:
> I'm not sure Ham? Zero and Infinity may be two ways
> of saying the same thing?
Theoretically (metaphysically?) they are at opposite ends of the extremes of
finite numerality. But they are only numerical expressions of magnitude.
Neither Zero nor Infinity in itself is substantive or essential. That is,
they do not define a creator or primary source.
<snip>
Ham, previously:
> By admitting that Complementarity is "very
> close to the MoQ", Pirsig is in effect saying that
> (the observer's) experience "creates reality".
> Or, if you still like the word, that all
> phenomena are "mental".
Mark:
> I think you are being a bit rapid here. You trot out,
>'Pirsig is in effect saying...' without any argument.
> Pirsig is saying nothing of the sort.
> What he is suggesting is that the observer and the observed
> emerge from one source, a source Bohr calls 'Complementary'
> and the MoQ calls DQ.
I have no quarrel with that concept. In fact, it is my own view. But why
does he only "suggest" it; why does he avoid naming it the Source?
<snip>
Ham said:
> Value can't be a cause; it is a psycho-somatic response
> to something experienced.
Mark:
> Then values are subjective for you Ham.
Yes, exactly!
Mark:
> You have no way of discriminating between suicidal bombers
> and Beethoven. The MoQ can.
So can I. I have the capacity of 'cognitive discrimination'. Every human
being has it. Thus, we can all make valuistic judgments about our
experience, and are free to act accordingly. This is our Freedom as
autonomous agents of our creator. Pirsig seems oblivious of its
significance.
<snip>
Ham:
> If you do not see the need for cause, I assume you also do not
> acknowledge a "beginning" of anything. For you, then, the
> Big Bang is a myth and evolutionary process is perpetual.
Mark:
> I've swapped 'value' for 'cause' because 'cause' carries too much
> philosophical baggage with it.
> I have no idea if there was a beginning, but i'm happy to note
> there does appear to have been an evolutionary progression.
> Perhaps initially, the progression was so slow it lasted an infinite
> time? Perhaps the end will be so fast it will last zero time?
> Perhaps there is no difference?
> These questions are so tricky to formulate.
<snip>
> The process is Dynamic and the Dynamic is unknown.
> This may be the essence of Human freedom you find so valuable Ham?
> I've tried to show you i think it is. The MoQ does place freedom at the
> centre of Human life.
>
> I wasn't there so i can't say? But so what if it did and
> there wasn't?
> After all, it took billions of years for tiny microbes to
> condition the Earths atmosphere with Oxygen, but once
> that was complete biological life diversified at an incredible
> rate within a few hundred million years. And yet, none
> of that was possible without that initial billions of years
> conditioning. Likewise, intellectual development has
> accelerated so fast in the last 400 years compared with
> all Human culture before it.
Ham:
> ... I'm really more interested in uncovering new sources
> that parallel my concepts and will help me articulate
> Essentialism more simply.
Mark:
> Fair play to you Ham. Fair play. I am happy with that and
> thank you for the time you have taken.
Thank you, Mark, for making it so enjoyable. I've given a cursory review of
your essay on "The edge of chaos" and noted that it's an elaboration on the
definition of "sweet spots". I'll have to give it more careful study when I
have the time.
Mark:
I will still continue to think about your essentialism Ham.
That's the most encouraging statement in your whole post. ;-)
Kindest regards,
Ham
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