[MD] Ham thinks the MOQ is a form of phenomenology

[Ham Priday]

Hi Mark -- 

> Mark said:
> The MoQ says there is one Substance and this is DQ.
> All patterns of sq are aspects of DQ if you like.

Quality, whether defined as DQ or sq, is a strange term for Substance, which
usually infers physical matter.  This is a minor point, and I realize that
philosophers are at liberty to apply special meanings to common words.  I've
done this myself, of course, and provided a Glossary of special definitions.
My dictionary also lists Essence as a synonym for substance, and I chose
this term
specifically to avoid the connotation of material substance.

[Mark, is it OK by you if I omit or abridge my own comments?]

Ham, previously:
> My conclusion is that the division of Quality into DQ and sq
> is a duality in itself, replacing the subject/object duality that
> Prisig claims to have done away with.

> One substance, infinite aspects.
> If there is a duality, it is that of The One and the many.
> The dual nature of reality is between the Dynamic and the static.
> Now may i ask you Ham: where is the Subject and the Object?

The objection I raised did not specifically concern "subject and object",
but that Pirsig had not overcome duality as claimed.  "The One and the many"
is a duality.  So is the "dual nature of reality between Dynamic and
static."  In fact, I maintain that one cannot logically deny the duality
(i.e., dual nature) of existence

Ham said:
> Your over-simplified analysis of the phenomenalist
> view that there are two types of substances, material and
> mental, is not quite what Runes was saying.

 Mark:
> Please show us why this is so?

I tried to show you why by quoting a recognized philosophical historian's
definition of Phenomenalism: the "theory that knowledge is limited to
phenomena, including [a] physical phenomena or the totality of objects of
actual and possible  perception, and [b] mental phenomena, the totality of
objects of introspection.  Phenomenalism assumes two forms according as it:
[a] denies a reality behind the phenomena, or [b] expressly affirms the
reality of things-in-themselves but denies their knowability."  -- [Runes:
Dictionary of Philosophy]

As I understand the two forms of phenomenalism, neither [a] nor [b] defines
phenomena as "material substance" or "mental substance", and both deny
knowledge of their reality.

[I'll skip the first SODV quote, since you wish to restrict your question to
the Runes definition.]

 Mark:
> The MoQ eloquently solves the Subject/Object dilemma already under
> threat from quantum mechanics.

Ham said:
> Heisenberg, in the tradition of Kant and Spencer, took the
> position that "the reality of things-in-themselves was unknowable".
> That doesn't necessarily mean they are "material".

Mark:
> 'Things-in-themselves' is an intellectual postulation. That intellect
> cannot know, 'Things-in-themselves' is a bit like intellect stating:
> 'My SOM epistemology is a cul de sac.' An expanded format is
> required, and the MoQ performs this.

I don't know what "expanded MoQ format" you refer to, but aren't all
postulations intellectual?  If Kant had postulated an epistemology for the
"thing-in-itself", would it still be a cul de sac?

 Ham continued:
> His colleague Bohr argued for "Complementarity", the view that
> we  do not observe objects at all, but only (statistical) data.   His
> inference was that we "objectify" the data values to create an
> image of the phenomenon.  This doesn't necessarily mean that
> phenomena are "mental".

Mark:
> Statistical data are intellectual postulations. That intellect limits
> its epistemology to data is a bit like the intellect saying, 'My SOM
> epistemology is in a cul de sac.' An expanded format is required,
> and the MoQ performs this.

I beg to disagree.  Statistical data are empirical observations which are
considered "facts" in scientific methodology.  If a fact is an intellectual
postulation for you, then you are definitely not in my school of
"rationalism".

Ham quotes your favorite author:
> Pirsig went on to say: "Quality is not a  thing.  It is an event.
> It is the event at which the subject becomes aware of the object."
> While he has since disavowed the subject/object distinction,
> I think his SODV statement was spot on.

Mark:
> You are presenting a misreading of SODV.  Naughty Ham.
> Your cherry picking appears to suggest Subjects and Objects
> are the primary ontological simples[?] of reality from which
> Quality is deduced. This is not so: 'Quality is not just the
> result of a collision between subject and object.
> The very existence of subject and object themselves is
> deduced from the Quality event. The Quality event is the
> cause of the subjects and objects, which are then mistakenly
> presumed to be the cause of the Quality!' (SODV p.  12)

If by "simples" (above) you mean "fundamentals", your objection may be
valid.  However, the fact that Pirsig singles out "subject" and "object" in
any context is remarkable, considering his assertion that there are no such
entities.

Mark, previously:
> Explanations are intellectual constructs. As such they  are
> intellectual patterns of sq.  As such they are aspects of  DQ.
> As such they cannot account for that which is greater than
> themselves.  Objects are patterns of sq.
>
> Ham: That does not explain what the patterns are;
> it only explains what an explanation is.  "Aspects of DQ"
> is meaningless.
>
> Mark: The MoQ states that intellectual patterns are values.
> I've just said this [requoting himself above].
> This does a bit more than explain an explanation;
> it says all explanations are intellectual values.

An explanation may be an intellectual "construction", "description" or
"theory".  I hardly think it qualifies as a value.  Not by my philosophy
anyway.

> This expands the format of using intellectual patterns to
> explain intellectual patterns in ever more convoluted terms.
> Re: "Aspects of DQ" is meaningless. If DQ is the One and
> sq patterns are infinite aspects of the One, then the One and
> sq are complimentary.

We do not have "infinite aspects" of the One.  We have a systemized,
ordered, self-sustaining universe whose finite components are identifiable
by form and structure.  If the One [essential source] were infinitely
divided, we have nothing more than a plasma cloud.

> The MoQ states that life cannot exist without either aspect

"Either aspect" implies a twosome -- that's not an "infinite aspect", it's
that duality again!

> - DQ moves evolution onward and sq latches progress.
> 'The most striking similarity between the Metaphysics of
> Quality and Complementarity is that this Quality event
> corresponds to what Bohr means by "observation."
> When the Copenhagen Interpretation "holds that the
> unmeasured atom is not real, that its attributes are created
> or realized in the act of measurement," (Herbert xiii) it is
> saying something very close to the Metaphysics of
> Quality. The observation creates the reality.' (SODV p. 12)
> Reality as sq patterns is created from the Dynamic flux of events.

Right.  Bohr's Complementary was Runes' [b] form of phenomenalism: "denies a
reality behind the phenomena."  By admitting that Complementarity is "very
close to the MoQ", Pirsig is in effect saying that (the observer's)
experience "creates reality".  Or, if you still like the word, that all
phenomena are "mental".

Ham:
> The question I had asked was: What causes [patterns], and
> why do they take this particular form?

 Mark:
> The term appearance implies an observer.  But the observer
> is deduced from the Dynamic flux of events. The Primary reality is
> unconditioned and has no differentiation's.  Northrop calls this the
> Undifferentiated Aesthetic continuum, and Pirsig calls this DQ.
> As i have tried hard to inform you Ham, the MoQ replaces
> causation with value.

Value can't be a cause; it is a psycho-somatic response to something
experienced.

> On a personal note, i have almost struck the word 'cause'
> out of my vocabulary. It's become redundant for me.
> Not for you though Ham, and i can't hold it against you,
> but when you ask me what causes something i only have
> recourse to a new metaphysical approach which places
> causation with empirical value.

If you do not see the need for cause, I assume you also do not acknowledge a
"beginning" of anything.  For you, then, the Big Bang is a myth and
evolutionary process is perpetual.

> Patterns are as they are because of your evolutionary history:
> 'Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance left one
> enormous metaphysical problem unanswered that became
> the central driving reason for the expansion of the Metaphysics
> of Quality into a second book called Lila. This problem was:
> if Quality is a constant, why does it seem so variable?
> Why do people have different opinions about it?
> The answer became: The quality that was referred to
> in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance can be
> subdivided into Dynamic Quality and static quality.
> Dynamic Quality is a stream of quality events going on
> and on forever, always at the cutting edge of the present.
> But in the wake of this cutting edge are static patterns of value.
> These are memories, customs and patterns of nature.
> The reason there is a difference between individual evaluations
> of quality is that although Dynamic Quality is a constant,
> these static patterns are different for everyone because each
> person has a different static pattern of life history. Both the
> Dynamic Quality and the static patterns influence his final
> judgment. That is why there is some uniformity among
> individual value judgments but not complete uniformity.'
 (SODV p. 12/3)

Ham:
> Not all values are aesthetic, Mark. It may be poetic license
> to apply the word "Beauty" to mathematical equations,
> but it doesn't clarify the cause or design of your assumed
> patterns.  An original metaphysical theory must be more
> than metaphors and euphemisms.

 Mark:
> Take that up with any mathematicians you know.
> Recall Northrop's undifferentiated Aesthetic continuum and
> DQ: sq pattern emerge from this flux of events.

 Ham said:
> Either the specific design of the universe is an accident
> of unknown forces -- perhaps the Einsteinian energy,  mass,
> and velocity of light -- or it's the intent of a Creator.
> Pirsig does not posit a creator or any primary source other
> than Quality.

Mark:
> This is contradictory Ham.  To say, Pirsig  does not do x but
> does do x is a bit childish.

Ham:
> I didn't accuse Pirsig of contradicting himself.  My contention is
> simply that he didn't account for the source of his patterns.

Mark:
> See the last and lengthy SODV quote above.
> The source of patterning is a relationship between what you are
> and DQ - what you are becoming.

I won't say I understand this uncreated patterning ontology, but "what you
are and what you are becoming" sounds suspiciously like existentialism.

Mark:
> At the inorganic level, values are relatively unsophisticated,
> but at the intellectual level they are exquisitely sophisticated.
> So, you can see that intellect is not equated with consciousness
> in equal sense because intellect is exquisite in  sophistication
> while social and biological patterns are less so.
> In other words, the intellect is high level consciousness.

 Ham:
> Just  because it is "sophisticated?

 Mark:
> The point is it's all the same stuff. When intellect contemplates
> matter it is highly evolved stuff contemplating lowly evolved
>stuff.  It's all the same. All the same because it all shares the
> same Dynamic source. But while the same, it is configured
> in ever more complex and coherent structures.
>
 > High level conscious patterns like the intellect are embedded
> in lower level conscious patterns of the  social, which in turn,
> like a Russian Doll, are embedded in even lower  level conscious
> patterns like the biological, etc.
> Values, not turtles, all the way down.
> Objects, when aligned with the inorganic and biological do look
> like objects.

 Ham:
> Since we can only experience objects "aligned with the inorganic
> and biological", in your opinion, does that make them inorganic,
> biological, or intellectual?

Mark:
> A Human being is all of them. A Dog is all of them minus
> intellectual patterns. An Amoeba is all of them minus social
> and intellectual patterns. A stone is all of them minus
> biological, social and intellectual patterns.
>
> Subjects, when aligned with the social and intellect do look
> like subjects. But this arrangement has its roots and evolutionary
> history in ancient culture and is not written in stone.

Indeed, those roots must go back infinitely in time, inasmuch has
evolutionary history had no beginning.

Ham:
> What do "subjects" look like?  I've never seen one, nor
> have I any reason to believe that they underwent an
> evolutionary change in history.

 Mark:
> They copy behaviour patterns, perform rituals and strive to
> stand out in groups and achieve fame. The better ones
> appreciate the aesthetic nature of reality as found in art,
> literature, science, philosophy.

> Ham said:
> It is my opinion that the MoQ and Essentialism are both
> phenomenologies because they both theorize physical reality
> as "appearance".

Mark:
> If you are stating that Ham Priday's  essentialism may be
> viewed as Idealism then i quite agree.
> This accords nicely with my assertion that essentialism is
> part of the  rationalist tradition. I'm glad you agree Ham.
> Mark from above: The MoQ  says there is one Substance
> and this is DQ. All patterns of sq are  aspects of DQ.
> DQ - the essence of sq, is not an idea or material  substance.
> DQ is pure experience prior to differentiation's.

 Ham:
> I fail to see how there can be any experience prior to the
> differentiation of subject and object.  Are you saying that Quality
> "experiences"?  If  so, what does it experience?

Mark:
> When you say, 'I,' you have already set up differentiation's.

I'm curious.  Why do you always type an apostrophe on "differentiation"?

> You then you go on to state that your differentiation's
> fail to, 'See,' which i take to mean, 'adequately analyse,' prior
> undifferentiated experience.  And yet, many Human activities
> are best performed at this edge of immediate undifferentiated
> experience, when static expectations and analysis are dropped.
> I once wrote a paper called, 'The edge of chaos' which may be
> found on the MOQ.org essay page which explores this a bit more.
> Quality, as Northrop put it, is the undifferentiated aesthetic
> continuum.  'You' are a series of events within the continuum.
> Quality is pure experience; It is not that Quality experiences
> something else. The immediate here and now IS Quality,
> which becomes differentiated upon reflection into fractured
> patterns of static differentiation's.

I'll review your essay, Mark, and I appreciate your efforts to explain the
DQ ontology.  But, to be honest, you are speaking a language that is still
foreign to me.  I can see that your are well-versed in the Pirsigian
perspective and that it seems to work for you.  No offense, but it doesn't
for me.  Perhaps I'm too immersed in my own philosophy to re-read Pirsig for
a different slant.  That there are similarities we mostly agree.  But I'm
really more interested in uncovering new sources that parallel my concepts
and will help me articulate Essentialism more simply.

Excuse me for skipping the dialogue on why I'm an idealist, which I doubt
will be of interest to anyone else.

 Mark:
> Those who promote an undefined primary source are mystics.
> You would be a mystic if you kept definitions out of your
> essence, but your essence is loaded with definitions as far as
> i can tell. I may be wrong.

Well, what do you know, now I'm a rationalist mystic!  And with definitions
yet!

> So, if you commit yourself to a defined primary source you
> are teetering on the edge of some sort of pigeon hole already
> there waiting for you to fall into.  I think that is tragedy?

Oh, it's not so tragic, Mark.  After all, I recall that Pirsig explored
mysticism at one point, but never quite made it to the primary source.
(Philosophers are a pathetic lot, aren't they?)

Thanks for your patience and all the instruction.  Sorry it didn't work on
me.

Best regards,
Ham