[MD] Ham thinks the MOQ is a form of phenomenology

[Squonkonguitar at aol.com]

Hi Mark --

Although I've stated my major differences with the MoQ as  forthrightly as
possible, there are obviously still some  misunderstandings.  To wit:

<snip>

What is the equivalent of Infinity divided by Infinity?  My  mathematics did
not extend beyond Analytical Geometry, but in Newtonian math,  the answer is
still One.  I that is true, then an absolute source cannot  create a
differentiated universe by dividing itself infinitesimally.   Nor can any
single thing have "infinite attributes".
 
Mark: Hello Ham.
I think you have raised a number of superb points and i  appreciate your 
stimulating thought.
Plotinus went to great lengths to make clear that his, 'One,' that is to  
say, the 'One' he talked about, should, strictly speaking, not be spoken  about.
And yet he spoke about it all the time. The One underlies everything for  him.
I've just referred to my, Cambridge companion to Plotinus (ed. L. P.  Gerson. 
1999) and allot of conjecture in this volume is given to deriving things  
from the One. It's not easy. But Plotinus had a go, and philosophers continue to  
unravel what Plotinus was getting at.
(It should be noted that academic interest in Plotinus has taken off  in 
recent decades having been largely ignored for along time.)
The Quality spoken of in ZMM is like that. Strictly speaking, you can't  give 
it a name, for to do so is to introduce concepts where concepts are  
inadequate.
This is the equivalent of Plotinus the mystic and Pirsig the mystic. Both  
may be legitimately regarded as mystics.
Lila is a little different, because this is a metaphysics, and metaphysics  
needs definitions.
Plotinus did the same thing; he produced a metaphysics also.
We must keep these aspects in mind, the mystical view and the metaphysical  
view.
It is my personal view, and that of a number of others i believe, that  
Pirsig's metaphysics does a good job of attempting to incorporate a mystical  
centre. Plotinus does a good job also. Pirsig has stated that he feels Plotinus  is 
the closest western philosopher to his own ideas.
Now to address your technical points: I am not a mathematician, but it is  my 
sincere, if misguided belief from what i have experienced, that maths is a  
form of Human art to be pursued for the joy (DQ) of it by those who can  
appreciate it. Philosophy does not have to adhere to formal mathematical rules  and 
can, if it wishes, postulate One substance with many attributes.
An attribute is an aspect of something else.
A circle has one curve but an infinite number of tangents, and tangents may  
be regarded as attributes of the curve of a circle.
While these problems are fascinating in themselves, it is not my area (no  
pun intended) and i do not subscribe to the view that the ultimate source can be 
 rationalised.
 
<snip>
 
Mark:
> I don't know what Kant says about these matters.
> But  rationalists do insist that essence is defined by the
> intellect and is  therefore known.
> For some rationalists, the intellect is precisely that  which
> identifies and then defines substances and their essential  natures.

Ham: Kant questioned the assumption that reality can be  apprehended through
concepts alone, using Leibniz for support.  In  Kant's view the function of
reason is relating and/sor synthesizing the data  of sense.  Whatever
synthetic principles cannot be derived from sense  perception must be 'a
priori' -- i.e., logically prior to the materials they  create.  In "Critique
of Pure Reason" Kant undertsakes a complete  inventory and 'deduction' of all
synthetic, a priori, 'transcendental' forms  employed in the knowledge of
Nature.  He concudes that this knowledge is  always necessarily of something
in space and time, but that space/time cannot  be objective properties of
things-in-themselves but the formal demands of  reason.  Without thess forms,
however, there could be no knowledge, no  experience of Nature.  But Kant
also acknowledged will and feeling as  fundamental to cognizance, and he
based his 'transcendental idealism' on the  validity of Free Will rather than
reason.
 
Mark: OK. It would seem Kant was more interested in what today we would  call 
the philosophy of mind.
This is going to become a thread in it's own if we're not  careful.

Mark:
> Statistics is a branch of maths and maths is  intellectual.
> I think a concession may have been made to empiricism in  that stats
> implicitly acknowledge unknown variables.
> Are you  suggesting unknown variables are scientific facts?
> If unknown variables  are scientific facts then DQ qualifies.

What do you mean by  "stats"?  For the scientist, empirical knowledge
acquired from objective  investigation and confirmed by mathematical
principles are "facts".  Any  variables included in this knowledge are
treated and explained as such.   However, a theory such as DQ is not based on
objective knowledge or  methematical principles, therefore has nothing in
common with scientific  facts.
 
Mark: The MoQ claims to be more empirical than science:
'Once this primary relationship is cleared up an awful lot of mysteries  get
solved.  The reason values seem so woolly-headed to empiricists is  that
empiricists keep trying to assign them to subjects or objects.  You  can't
do it.  You get all mixed up because values don't belong to either  group.
They are a separate category all their own.
What the Metaphysics of  Quality would do is take this separate category,
Quality, and show how it  contains within itself both subjects and objects.
The Metaphysics of Quality  would show how things become enormously more
coherent-fabulously more  coherent-when you start with an assumption that
Quality is the primary  empirical reality of the world. . . .' (Lila p. ch. 5)

<snip>

Ham: The concept of an infinite universe remains theoretical.  I  recently 
heard
an astrophysicist discussing the Big Bang theory.  He  noted that the theory
stipulates that the boundary of space at that time was  limited to
approximately the size of a football, but that it expanded -- and  continues
to expand -- as the intersteller components move apart from each  other.
This doesn't sound like an "infinite universe" to me.
 
Mark: Nor me! Look, i'm English, and after the last World Cup debacle, i  
don't wish to hear about footballs thank you very much!  ;-)

<snip>

Ham: Theoretically (metaphysically?) they are at opposite ends of the  
extremes of
finite numerality.  But they are only numerical expressions  of magnitude.
Neither Zero nor Infinity in itself is substantive or  essential.  That is,
they do not define a creator or primary  source.
 
Mark: I will take your word for it. As i said, maths is not my area, and i  
don't know anything about the philosophy of maths.

<snip>

Ham: I have no quarrel with that concept.  In fact, it is my own  view.  But 
why
does he only "suggest" it; why does he avoid naming it  the Source?
 
Mark: It's the Mystic/Metaphysics thing.
>From a mystical view words screw things up.
Metaphysics needs something to say.
That's why Quality and DQ are not quite the same thing - Quality is a  
mystical monism and DQ is a metaphysical monism.
Pirsig wrote two books and they present two views of Quality.
My personal interest here and elsewhere is in the metaphysics, which allows  
you and i to discuss matters.
I leave the mystical stuff out of it cos it is better that  way.

Mark:
> Then values are subjective for you Ham.

Ham:  Yes, exactly!
 
Mark: Fair enough.
The Lila quote above stresses that values are not in the subject or in the  
object:
Mark above quotes Lila: 'They [values] are a separate category all their  own.
What the Metaphysics of Quality would do is take this separate  category,
Quality, and show how it contains within itself both subjects and  objects.' 
(Lila. ch. 5)
This appears to be a source of friction in our conversation, but let's  
recognise it and be friends?
After all, my conversations with you have pushed me toward a new idea  which 
i had only this morning and discussed with a friend, David Boyce (who  
attended the first MoQ conference last year), this afternoon. The idea concerns  the 
problem of getting from the One to the many.
You have a mechanism for this, and i think i've got one now also.
Well, not quite, let's say i've thought of a metaphysical view.
It may be a pile of rubbish, but i'm thinking on it.
Thanks Ham!


Mark:
> You have no way of discriminating  between suicidal bombers
> and Beethoven.  The MoQ can.

Ham:  So can I.  I have the capacity of 'cognitive discrimination'.  Every  
human
being has it.  Thus, we can all make valuistic judgments about  our
experience, and are free to act accordingly.  This is our Freedom  as
autonomous agents of our creator.  Pirsig seems oblivious of  its
significance.
 
Mark: It may be a bold assertion, but the MoQ, having claimed to be more  
empirical than science, can go on to state that it can' 'scientifically'  
discriminate between suicidal bombers and Beethoven.
You appear to be suggesting that you have a subjective capacity to freely  
choose between one and the other: But so do suicidal bombers. Both are  
subjective, what basis is there for knowing the more moral?

<sniping  away quite a bit>

Ham: Thank you, Mark, for making it so enjoyable.  I've given a  cursory 
review of
your essay on "The edge of chaos" and noted that it's an  elaboration on the
definition of "sweet spots".  I'll have to give it  more careful study when I
have the time.

Mark:
I will still  continue to think about your essentialism Ham.

That's the most  encouraging statement in your whole post.  ;-)

Kindest  regards,
Ham

Mark: Thank you Ham for stimulating me into thought.
If you had not done this i may not have put the icing on my  little idea 
regarding the One and the many.
When i feel more sure of what it is i think i want to say, i'll place it  out 
there for others to ponder.
Love,
Mark