[MD] Ham thinks the MOQ is a form of phenomenalism

[Ham Priday]

Hello Mark --


> My main criticism is that, prior to Human experience
> you postulate a realm we do not have access to.
> The realm in question is described in your thesis in some
> detail using the language of Aristotle and related thinkers.
> In short, this realm is conceptual; it is constructed from
> rational axioms.  But, many of these axioms have an
> evolutionary history within the Western philosophical
> tradition and are derived from Aristotle's systematisation
> of logical causes and categories whether you like it,
> recognise it, agree with it or not.

Since I do not wish to stand accused of either "blocking intellectual
progress" or failing to tackle alleged problems, allow me to address what
you state is your "main criticism" of my thesis.

Mr. Pirsig postulated Quality as a realm that he characterized as
"pre-intellectual", which to me means "prior to human experience."  Why is
my concept of Essence any less valid as a realm that we do not have [direct]
access to?  Is Pirsig's DQ
not a "rationalized" construction?  Is it not, therefore, placeable within
the evolutionary history of Western philosophical tradition?  It seems to me
that Aristotle has not figured in either of our philosophies, so I really
don't see the problem as you've defined it.

The problem I do see is that Pirsig has assiduously avoided naming DQ as the
Primary Source.  It is posited as a background or "ground of reality", if
you will,  but not as the causative 'first principle'.  I say this is a
problem because he cannot account for its origin or its segmentation.  In
other words, there is no cosmogony for Creation in the MoQ -- a deficiency
which you yourself are currently trying to rectify with your Chaos theory.

Another deficiency that follows from this is his dismissal of proprietary
awareness.  This leads to a logical fallacy, in that there can be no Value
without awareness.  Rather than acknowledge awareness as proprietary to the
individual, Pirsig marginalizes human sensibility and distributes awareness
throughout the experienced universe, describing its affects on atoms, rocks,
trees, and evolution itself.  He is essentially "forced" to do this in order
to account for sensibility or cognizance, which would (traditionally) be
seen as derivative of the Primary Source missing in his ontology.  Indeed,
this universalization of Quality (Value) is the very hallmark of the MoQ; it
is what distinguishes Pirsig's philosophy from all others in the esteemed
"Western tradition".

Why is my philosophy of Essence free of these deficiencies?  I believe I can
explain that quite simply.

First, Essence is the "uncreated" source.  It does not depend on evolution
as its cause like existing "things" do.  As the Primary Oneness, Essence is
the causal source of differentiated sensibility in creatures, as well as the
cosmic design of the experienced universe.  It doesn't "begin" as Chaos: it
doesn't begin at all.  It simply IS.  As Plotinus put it: "The One is the
first existent.  But the intelligence, the Ideas, and Being are not the
first.  Every form is multiple and composite, and consequently, something
derived because parts precede the composite they constitute.  ...As the One
begets all things, it cannot be any of them -- neither thing, nor quality,
nor quantity, nor intelligence, nor soul.  Not in motion, nor at rest, not
in space, nor in time."

Since everything in the (experiential) universe is Being, and all Being is
divided, mankind and Intelligence are divided.  But man's awareness is
unique in that it is divided from Being, thus has no existence except as it
perceives Being as its object.  This perception is an intellectual construct
derived from its affinity for Essence, which we call Value.  The poet muses
that 'Love is what makes the world go 'round,' but Value is what makes the
world.  And Value would not exist were there no awareness of it.  It is the
individual, therefore, who by sensing the Value of the Source makes
being-aware.  And that which is of value to the individual is the Essence of
his Being.

I hope this little dissertation sheds enough light on my ontology to
resolve, or at least address, your criticism.  (Incidentally, since I do not
share Plato's theory of "universals", a horse is just a horse, and the only
"horseness" I recognize is the irritation I feel in my throat at this late
hour.)

Cheers, and have a great day,
Ham