[MD] Altruism

[Ham Priday]

Hello Ben --


[Ham]:
> I'm not an advocate of morality systems per se.
> I believe in a meritocracy where people are rewarded for
> excellence and where "goodness" is not reduced to a
> nominal level of acceptance.

 [Ben]:
> I don't understand.  Doesn't excellence=quality=morality?
> How you can have a meritocracy without a morality system?
> You need to have some means by which to value things.

You can't.  And that's where I think the MoQ distorts the valuistic concept
of morality.  Your equation assumes that reality is
'excellence=quality=morality'.  If that were true, we wouldn't be concerning
ourselves with what goodness is or how we ought to behave.  Everything would
be hunky-dory and perfectly moral, including human beings.  Obviously, there
is something wrong with this scenario.

I realize I'm not being faithful to the doctrine here, but let me suggest
that striving for excellence comes from within.  It is not a paragon of
virtue that lies outside of us beckoning us to align with it.  Excellence is
relational -- it refers to specific goals, skills and practices.  Like all
values, it requires a referent.  We can't point to something called Quality
and say, "Ah, there it is!"  Quality and excellence are a measure of our
appreciation for the workmanship or beauty of something.  Without the
referent, Value is only an abstract esthetic concept.

This is also true of our affinity for God or the absolute source of our
existence.  We stand in awe of it because we are NOT it; we are detached
from it.  The Essence of our existence is our supreme or primary Value
referent.  But it is a fallacy to regard Essence as a benevolent deity -- 
the source of goodness and evil.  MoQers chastise me for introducing duality
where it is not wanted.  But the empirical fact that man's mode of
experience is a self/other, awareness/beingness dichotomy cannot be denied.

So I say that it is man who defines what is Good and what is Evil.  The
individual sets his standards by this assessment, and the moral code (or
system) of a society reflects the values of its individual constituents.
Instinctively, most intelligent people realize the value of meritocracy and,
unless an artificial standard has been imposed, will tend to reward
achievements on merit.

[Ben]:
> I read Edington's piece.  I think the debate between moral
> relativism and moral absolutism stems from subject-object
> metaphysics and can be explained away by MoQ.  Static
> social patterns of morality are somewhat relative; different
> cultures, different people hold different things to be moral.
> But these patterns are nonetheless derived in part from dynamic
> quality, which is absolute, even if not known or definable. This
> explains why cultures and individuals have differences but also
> have similarities in their moral codes.  The differences exist
> because static morality patterns develop in part randomly.
> The similarities exist because static morality patterns
> develop in part due to an absolute--dynamic quality.

I'll leave the patterns ontology to you and Mr. Pirsig.  But I disagree that
there is an "absolute goodness" in existence or in its source.  And I see no
reason why man's striving for excellence, or living by relative standards of
morality, should be impaired by its absence.

[Ham]:
> Helping make someone's life better is not altruism but compassion.
> Contributing to a charity of your choice is an act of generosity.
> But taxation to pay for the welfare of a class of people without your
> approval is forced altruism (otherwise known as extortion.)

[Ben]:
> By the definition of altruism I offered (maximize net utility), any time
> a person acts counter to their own personal interests so as to help
> those of someone else, they're acting altruistically.  Generosity and
> compassion are altruistic by definition.  Now if your objection is
> only to forced altruism, not to altruism itself, we're in pretty good
shape.

Since I side with Rand on questioning whether there is any such thing as
pure altruism, unless it can be demonstrated to me, I tend to believe that
all human altruism is forced.

 [Ben (trying again)]:
> Allow me to pose this scenario:
>
> 1.  John robs his neighbor's home.
> 2.  John is acting selfishly.
> 3.  John is acting immorally.
> 4.  Selfishness cannot be immoral.
>
> Is one of these statements incorrect?
> Are they logically consistent?

While robbery can be considered "selfish" behavior, it actually puts the
'self' in jeopardy and at great risk of punishment.  If the thief is seeking
sustenance because he's starving, stealing bread would be a selfish act,
although not immoral by most social standards.  I think the answer to your
question is that selfishness is only immoral when it involves harm or injury
to someone else.  I that case, however, it is most likely to be considered
criminal behavior rather than selfishness.

Regards,
Ham