[MD] subject / object logic

[Ham Priday]

Hi David --


> That makes sense to me now as long as you recognise a
> developmental/sense stage before differentiation. I can see
> why this makes you question the MOQ approach to SOM.

I'm not sure what you mean by "developmental/sense stage".  As I said 
before, existence is a Sensibility/Otherness (subject/object, self/other?) 
dichotomy which manifests itself experientially as being-aware.  Awareness 
is subjective and "incremental"; that is, otherness (objective reality) is 
experienced serially in time and dimensionally in space.  Perhaps this is 
what your "developmental/sense" refers to.

> Try this, MOQ recognises the differentiation of experience
> in the form of the identification of SQ but it rejects SOM
> which is an essentialist metaphysics of that experience.
> And I take your essentialist metaphysics as different in form
> to that of SOM. You have expressed your difference to
> MOQ, what are your differences to SOM would you say?

I must confess that the concept of "static quality" has always eluded me. 
So, "MOQ recognizes differentiation in the form of the identification of SQ" 
is meaningless to me.  Could you restate this more simply, without the 'SQ's 
and 'SOM's?

Metaphysics, for me, has to do with a theory of reality beyond physical 
existence but encompassing it.  Therefore, while I see SOM as part of the 
Metaphysics of Quality, you may be excluding it.  Since unrealized Value 
doesn't exist, I don't see how any philosophy can reject the subject and its 
objects and claim Value as the fundamental reality.

In a nutshell, the ontology of Essentialism is that existence is the 
separation of sensibility from its essential source.  This creates a 
polarized dichotomy in which (value-)sensibility becomes the individuated 
agent which seeks to reclaim its estranged essence in the experience of 
otherness.  In temporal terms, the negation which separates subject and 
object is ultimately overcome by the value which binds them. 
Metaphysically, the existential dichotomy is actualized potentiality 
(Essence) which in its primary state is undifferentiated and immutable. 
Since value can only be realized differentially, the "moral" purpose of the 
value-sensible agent is to make value aware, thus affording an external 
perspective of Essence.

I'm afraid you'll have to sort out the basic differences between my 
philosophy and Pirsig's.  Not to be fussy, but I have problems with 
statements attributed to anonymous subjects, such as "the MoQ recognizes, 
rejects, etc."  Either a person believes something or he doesn't.  I tell 
you what I believe.  The fact that I've called my philosophy Essentialism is 
inconsequential.

Thanks David,
Ham