[MD] subject / object logic

[Platt Holden]

Hi Ham, -

> [Ham said]:
> > So perhaps, instead of asking "Does time exist?" we should start
> > by asking "Do WE exist?"
> 
> [Platt asks]:
> > Could you ask the question if you didn't exist?
> 
> I could not ask the question without a body, if "asking" means writing or
> verbalizing it.  However, pondering the question requires only my
> intellectual awareness.  The intellectual function requires a working
> central nervous system which is my organic counterpart but not my awareness
> itself.

You could not ask the question without the existence of a functioning 
intellect. Asking meaningful questions presupposes the existence of not 
just a central nervous system, but a human mind. (Robots need not apply 
being creatures of mind.)   
 
> The question then is: What is meant by "the real me"?
> 
> If the real me is that biological object by whose physical identity and
> behavior you identify Ham Priday, it exists.  On the other hand, if the
> real me is my subjective awareness -- my self-consciousness -- it is known
> only to me and has no objective existence.

I would say the real you is both your body and your mind. Your thoughts
exist, if only to you. Otherwise, you couldn't express them as you have
here.  
 
> Cognizant awareness is a unique phenomenon in that it "borrows from being"
> to exist, yet is fundamentally not an existent.  Man may be the only
> creature that straddles the S/O fence dividing subject from object, being
> from non-being.  As a self-conscious entity, he is endowed with the
> capacity to realize the duality of existence.  As for breaking down this
> duality into differentiated objects in space/time, I side with Micah in
> explaining this as "affective experience".  In other words, man creates the
> objects of his experience.

I agree the nervous systems of all organisms, not just man,  differentiates
a continuum in order to survive, separating the good from the bad, friends 
from enemies. But this is basically a differentiation of quality rather 
than objects.  

But, I could be wrong.

Best regards,
Platt