[MD] subject/object: pragmatism

[Ham Priday]

Hi Marsha --



> To your argument and my not being compelled by that argument:
>
> Framed as an informal proof, the first cause argument
> can be stated as follows:
>
> 1. Every finite and contingent being has a cause.
> 2. Nothing finite and dependent (contingent) can cause itself.
> 3. A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.
> 4. Therefore, there must be a first cause; or, there must be
>     something that is not an effect....

Marsha, this is a reasonable argument which would be more logical if the 
major premise (3) is stated as #1.  The entire argument for a first cause is 
predicated on the fact that "a causal chain cannot be of infinite length." 
This is true because if there is no beginning to the chain, we would have an 
infinite regression of prior causes.  Having stated that premise, however, 
your article goes on to say "...that an infinite regression of causes is in 
fact possible."  While one may of course believe that anything is possible, 
such a conclusion is a logical fallacy.

If you consider a causal effect as a "contingency", there is a point in time 
in which an event occurs that is not contingent upon a prior event.  Coming 
into being is such an event, whether it is defined as the beginning of 
existence, the beginning of individual awareness, or actualized existence.

The article also mentions the cosmology of Thomas Aquinas which is based on 
"contingency" rather than "cause".   (This concept was subsequently 
developed by Nicholas of Cusa as the "coincidence of opposites" which 
defines his First Principle.)   In my opinion, Aquinas presents a more 
persuasive argument by allowing for contradiction -- specifically, the 
difference between what exists in actuality and what has the potentiality to 
exist:

"Aquinas' argument from contingency is distinct from a first-cause argument 
(because it assumes the possibility of a universe that had no beginning in 
time), but is instead a form of argument from 'universal causation'.  He 
observed that in nature there are things whose existence is contingent, that 
is, possible for it to be or not to be.  Since it is possible for such 
things not to exist, there must be some time at which such things did not in 
fact exist.  Thus, according to Aquinas, there must have been a time when 
nothing existed.  If that is so, there would exist nothing that could bring 
anything into existence.  Thus contingent beings are insufficient to account 
for the existence of contingent beings, meaning there must exist a Necessary 
Being for which it is impossible not to exist, and from which the existence 
of all contingent beings is derived."

The only statement I find illogical about this argument is the concluding 
statement: "there must exist a Necessary Being for which it is impossible 
not to exist."  The primary source of existence is not itself an "existent" 
or a "being", since it necessarily transcends finite existence.  Instead, as 
Cusanus theorized, it represents the "coincidence of opposition", which is 
perhaps best expressed as the absolute potentiality of what is actualized as 
finite beingness.  It's what I call Essence.

Thanks for the Wikipedia reference, Marsha.  Does it make the concept of a 
primary source any more compelling?

Essentially yours,
Ham