[MD] Knowledge as MOQ's intellect

[Platt Holden]

Hi David M, 

[DM]
> It is correct that SOM stops us discussing and exploring our
> values because values are thrown out of an ungrounded
> objective approach to knowledge (ungrounded in human
> experience).

[Platt]
Bo will have his own answer, but I go by what Pirsig wrote:

[Pirsig]
"But having said this, the Metaphysics of Quality goes on to say that 
science, the intellectual pattern that bas been appointed to take over 
society, has a defect in it. The defect is that subject-object science has 
no provision for morals. Subject-object science is only concerned with 
facts. Morals have no objective reality. You can look through a microscope 
or telescope or oscilloscope for the rest of your life and you will never 
find a single moral. There aren't any there. They are all in your head. 
They exist only in your imagination.

"From the perspective of a subject-object science, the world is a 
completely purposeless, valueless place. There is no point in anything. 
Nothing is right and nothing is wrong. Everything just functions, like 
machinery. There is nothing morally wrong with being lazy, nothing morally 
wrong with lying, with theft, with suicide, with murder, with genocide. 
There is nothing morally wrong because there are no morals, just 
functions." (Lila, 22)

[DM] 
> Of course, SOM and secularism despite their attempt not
> to talk about values are full of values. Many very good values
> in fact such as individualism and freedom from over heavy
> social constraints.

[Platt]
In the U.S. these values came from the Founding Fathers who were influenced 
by the Enlightenment  and Christian protestantism. But yes, there's no 
escape from values. Science values its methods and, as Pirsig noted, would 
frown on someone who faked scientific data. 

[DM]
> Where I have a problem with SOM grounded
> science and secularism is that they dress up these values (many
> of which are good values) as valueless objective knowledge.
> People then make all kinds of truth claims against each other,
> where is reality their differences are due to different values.
> 
> Interestingly, Charles Taylor and Richard Rorty talk about these
> very issues regarding the value-ladenness of many so-called truth
> claims.

[Platt]
Can you give some examples of specific values that are dressed up as 
"objective knowledge?" I'm having a hard time imagining them.  Truth as 
defined by Rorty and others in the postmodernist camp is considered to be 
relative to culture or a power play, except, incoherently, the truth of 
their own privileged stance. Not many are buying their self-falsifying 
claims these days except a few humanities academics. Truth may have 
"objective value" in that truth as a general concept cannot be denied 
without asserting a truth, just as values cannot be denied without 
asserting a value.  But, I await your comments.

Platt