[MD] Perhaps the One is impossible Mr Ham
Ham Priday
hampday1 at verizon.net
Tue Dec 18 23:02:41 PST 2007
Hello David --
> Hi Moqers & especially Mr Ham
>
> Take a look at this:
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org:80/wiki/Alain_Badiou
>
> Is the one impossible?
Perhaps. Then again, perhaps not. "Mr. Ham's" first axiom is that
subjective cognizance is a precariously balanced see-saw on either side of
which lies ultimate truth. The individual is free to lean in either
direction, but is restrained by the force of gravity from accessing absolute
truth. Neither relational logic nor, certainly, Alain Badiou's saying so is
going to prove what is absolute and unfathomable by the finite mind.
Leaving aside his leftist leanings as a member of the Socialist Party, and
(for the moment) his association with the French existentialist school
(Sartre, Beckett, etc.), here's how Wikipedia summarizes Badiou's argument
that "the one is not".
"He proposes as the solution to this impasse the following declaration: that
the one is not. This is why Badiou accords set theory (the axioms of which
he refers to as the Ideas of the multiple) such stature, and refers to
mathematics as the very place of ontology: Only set theory allows one to
conceive a 'pure doctrine of the multiple'. Set theory does not operate in
terms of definite individual elements in groupings but only functions
insofar as what belongs to a set is of the same relation as that set (that
is, another set too). What separates sets out therefore is not an
existential positive proposition, but other multiples whose properties
validate its presentation; which is to say their structural relation. The
structure of being thus secures the regime of the count-as-one. So if one
is to think of a set - for instance, the set of people, or humanity - as
counting as one the elements which belong to that set, it can then secure
the multiple (the multiplicities of humans) as one consistent concept
(humanity), but only in terms of what does not belong to that set.
"...(This axiom [of foundation] states that all sets contain an element for
which only the void [empty] set names what is common to both the set and its
element.) Badiou's philosophy draws two major implications from this
prohibition. Firstly, it secures the inexistence of the 'one': there cannot
be a grand overarching set, and thus it is fallacious to conceive of a grand
cosmos, a whole Nature, or a Being of God."
It is well to remember that Sartre's "Being and Nothingness" established the
metaphysics of existentialism, the primary tenet of which is that Being
precedes Essence. (This, of course, is directly opposed to my Essentialist
ontology.) Mathematics and formal logic (including 'set theory') are
capable of dealing only with relational systems, which means that statements
like "a set cannot contain or belong to itself" are invalid as applied to
what is absolute. So, for all his sophisticated analysis of forms and sets,
Badiou's conclusion is nothing but an elaborate smokescreen concealing the
fact that difference is the beginning of multiplicity, without which there
are no relations.
A much simpler theory was proposed by the Pre-Socratic philosopher
Parmenides 2500 years ago: Nothing comes from nothingness. Since it cannot
be denied that existence is something, it must have a primary cause or
source. And since nothingness does not exist, the nothingness that
differentiates things must be the insufficiency (or void) of subjective
experience which perceives in parts what is in reality whole and undivided.
To conclude that the source of existence is itself created is to pose the
paradox of an infinite regression of causes. Which is why I maintain that
the source is primary, absolute, immutable, and --yes, David--not only a
"possible" one but the "essential" One.
Thanks for the Wikipedia link. Badiou was new to me.
--Ham
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