[MD] Value and the Anthropic Principle

[Platt Holden]

Hi Ham,

Glad you brought up the name of the Canadian philosopher John Leslie. I 
first read about him in a book by Paul Davies, "The Mind of God" where
Leslie is quoted, among other things, as writing, "The universe exists as 
a result of ethical requirement." I got in touch with Leslie by e-mail and
asked if he had read any of Pirsig's books. He kindly wrote back saying he 
hadn't. I also bought a book by Leslie but found it so replete with 
philosophical jargon as to be almost incomprehensible to me. In  any case,
Pirsig is not the only "values" philosopher out there, as evidenced by 
your post in case there were any doubters. Thanks for sharing.

Best regards,
Platt 

> Hello All --
> 
> In my continuing research for unusual ideas on fundamental metaphysics, I
> discovered a paper by Arthur Witherall titled "The Fundamental Question",
> referring of course to the one Heidegger made famous in his Introduction to
> Metaphysics: "Why are there essents rather than nothing?"
> 
> Witherall approaches the question from a new, anthropic direction which I
> think is hospitable to valuistic ontologies like the MoQ and Essentialism.
> His draft, soon to appear in The Journal of Philosophical Research, is
> developed in typical academic style and is non-conclusive.  If you're not
> put off by the author's skill at raising the right questions without
> seeming to take a personal position, you'll be rewarded with a germinal
> argument for the value of existence.  The assertions he makes are clear,
> logical, and free of the usual metaphoric analogies that annoy Case and
> Arlo.  This is a brilliant piece of work that makes me wish I'd majored in
> Philosophy!
> 
> As a teaser, I'll quote a couple of excerpts, including the introduction
> (outlining his strategy) and a philosophical analysis of two unfamiliar
> contemporaries named Nicholas Rescher and John Leslie who may be known to
> Matt, Anthony, or other scholars.
> 
> "In recent years, a number of philosophers have revitalized the fundamental
> question of metaphysics after a long period of neglect, and they have
> proposed fascinating and illuminating answers.  It is likely that the main
> reason for this renewed interest lies in the death of positivism, and the
> rebirth of metaphysics itself, but the appearance of certain cosmological
> ideas, such as the Big Bang theory and the Anthropic Principle, has also
> had an effect.  One of the first of the new reactions to the question was
> that of Nozick, and I will discuss some of the possibilities that he
> introduces with the aim of showing that they either fail to answer the
> question satisfactorily, or otherwise pose no threat to my central claim. 
> I shall also argue that one of his 'solutions' is itself an expression of
> awe rather than an explanation.  Thus his answers, whatever else may be
> true of them, do not provide counterexamples to my central claim, that a
> feeling of awe in contemplating the fundamental question is appropriate and
> desirable.
> 
> "I will then consider two variants of what might be called the 'value
> thesis',
> that the world exists because it is valuable.  Many of the recent responses
> to the fundamental question are partial endorsements of this thesis, and it
> could become one of the most popular metaphysical explanations.  For
> example, the Strong Anthropic Principle, as interpreted by Paul Davies,
> asserts that the laws of physics must be such as to give rise to conscious
> beings (the weak form says that they are contingently such as to give rise
> to conscious beings, because after all we do exist), is clearly connected
> to the value thesis in some way, since conscious beings are in some sense
> realizations of value.  I will examine the thesis as it appears in the work
> of Leslie and Rescher, each of whom have their own specific problems.  The
> general point that I will make is that in as much as we can offer an
> intelligible explanation of the world in terms of its value, it is
> appropriate to feel awe at the fact of its existence.
> 
> "This means that contemplating the fundamental question, which presupposes
> the fact of existence, also leads to appropriate and desirable feelings of
> awe, wonder and amazement.  In a way, contemplating this question is an act
> which forcefully brings us to acknowledge not only the fact of existence,
> but the fact that it is astonishing.  We can say this even if we are
> uncertain whether a version of the value thesis will ultimately succeed in
> explaining why there is something instead of nothing. ...
> 
> "3.3: Teleological Theories: Rescher and Leslie
> 
> "The idea that it is good to exist, or that being is better than nonbeing,
> is common enough outside of philosophy.  If most people did not hold on to
> some version of this thesis, suicide would be far more common than it is.
> However, while it seems plausible as a conclusion about life, it seems less
> tenable when applied to the existence of non-living things, or to the
> universe as a whole.  One of the problems with adopting this as a
> fundamental metaphysical principle is that it is difficult to interpret
> goodness or value as causally productive.  We know from bitter experience
> that just because something ought to happen does not always mean that it
> will happen. Normally, other conditions must obtain before a desirable
> outcome is realized: someone must have the will to bring it about, and the
> power to implement the right procedures.
> 
> "On the other hand, the question of why anything exists at all cannot be
> answered by using a causal explanation in any case, since the cause of the
> world (whether it be God or not) must itself be something, and is therefore
> part of what must be explained.  So it seems that we can invoke an
> evaluative principle to explain the existence of something rather than
> nothing, as long as we do not interpret this as being a causal explanation
> in itself.  We could say then that the reason that there is a world is that
> it is ethically (or otherwise) desirable, but that this is not the cause
> for the world's existence.  Since the question is why rather than how the
> world came to be, it seems appropriate to say that it came to be in order
> to realize goodness.  This would mean that existence has a purpose, which
> is the realization of value.  Leslie's theory follows this kind of course,
> or at least purports to do so.  Alternatively it could be argued that, even
> though value is not in general a causally productive factor, it can be seen
> as such for the unique case of the existence of the world itself, another
> tactic adopted by Leslie.  If this kind of claim is made, we must be
> careful not to confuse matters by claiming that value is itself something
> that requires a cause for its existence.  For then the question arises as
> to why it should be.  We ought to hold, then, that value is in some sense
> 'beyond being', as Plato said, even though it can somehow produce something
> that has real being.  We must also hold, as Rescher does, that value is in
> some sense self-explanatory or self-validating.
> 
> "Rescher's teleological explanation for the existence of the world does not
> make use of ethical values such as goodness, but it does make use of the
> idea of "cosmic values".  His theory is not strictly a naturalistic one,
> since it does not postulate a (strictly) causal explanation for the
> universe, although it does make use of natural laws.  It is really a
> programmatic solution which demonstrates how the world might have come to
> be rather than how it must have come to be.  He claims that there could be
> a set of laws which does not simply describe the way that nature works, but
> represent the conditions for existence itself, rather than conditions of
> existents.  These are what he calls 'proto-laws', and their realization
> would require the existence of things.  It would then be a matter of
> natural necessity, rather than chance, that there is something instead of
> nothing. When it comes to specifying what these proto-laws are, and how to
> recognize them, his suggestion is that the fundamental equations that
> govern the physical world may have viable solutions only when they entail
> that things exist.
> 
> > On such an approach, we would accordingly begin by looking to the
> > fundamental field equations that delineate the operation of forces in
> nature: > those which define the structures of the space-time continuum,
> say the > basic laws of quantum mechanics and general relativity, and some
> > fundamental structural principles of physical interaction.  Principles of
> this > sort characterizing the electromagnetic, gravitational, and metric
> fields > provide the basic protolaws under whose aegis the drama of natural
> events > will have to play itself out.  And the existence of things would
> then be > explained by noting that the fundamental equations themselves
> admit of no > empty solutions - that any solution that satisfies them must
> incorporate the > sorts of singularities we call "things" ... For such an
> approach to work, it > would have to transpire that the only ultimately
> viable solutions to those > cosmic equations are existential solutions.
> 
> "This is clearly no more than a suggestion as to what proto-laws might be.
> He does not state unequivocally that proto-laws will take the form of
> physical laws.  A more significant question, with respect to the details of
> Rescher's explanation, is that of the grounds for thinking that there are
> any laws, of any kind, which entail that things exist.  In response to
> this, Rescher claims that the protolaws that actually obtain are those
> which maximize certain 'cosmic' values, such as simplicity, harmony,
> systemic elegance, uniformity and economy.  Finally, if it is asked why
> proto-laws should maximize values, he claims that this is self-explanatory,
> and that in citing an axiological principle, we have reached the end of our
> understanding of why the world exists.
> 
> > It is the great advantage of a principle of axiology to be in the
> > position
> to
> > provide materials of its own explanation. Principles of economy,
> > simplicity, etc., are literally self-explanatory by virtue of being
> optimal on
> > their own footing ... A value principle ... must validate itself.
> 
> "Thus there need be no infinite regress of laws and necessities, for the
> ultimate explanation is axiological, and this validates itself.  Existence
> is explained by proto-nomicity, which is explained by proto-laws being
> value-maximizing, and value-maximization requires no further explanation.
> It may be simplistic to say that there is a world because the condition of
> there being a world is maximally valuable, but this is precisely what
> Rescher's theory says. ..."
> 
> The complete essay can be found at
> http://www.hedweb.com/witherall/existence.htm
> 
> Naturally I'll be interested to see what reactions, if any, this essay
> sparks from the regulars here.
> 
> Happy reading,
> Ham