[MD] Mystics and Brains

[Ham Priday]

Hi Platt --


> If you posit that the universe evolved in order to observe itself,
> then it has a lot to do with us. If you say the universe evolved
> for no reason at all, then you end up in a wasteland where
> "Each individual in his cell of isolation was told that no matter
> how hard he tried, no matter how hard he worked, his whole life
> is that of an animal that lives and thinks like any other animal.
> He could invent moral goals for himself, but they are just
> artificial inventions. Scientifically speaking he has no goals."
> (Lila, 22) I prefer the former scenario to the latter.

What you are describing is the Anthropic Principle I introduced here under a
Value heading.  It asserts that the universe is "fine-tuned" so as to permit
life to exist as we know it.  Were the universe not fine tuned in this
fashion, human beings would not exist, hence could not observe the universe.
When you tie this in with Value (DQ?), as Arthur Witherall did in his
seminal essay, you then have a workable teleology that supports your idea.

As Witherall stated it: "Since the question is why rather than how the world
came to be, it seems appropriate to say that it came to be in order to
realize goodness.  This would mean that existence has a purpose, which is
the realization of value."   This is compatible with the "moral thrust" of
the MoQ, except that it is man's realization of Value, rather than the
"experience" of rocks and things, that creates the objective world.  (I also
suspect this is what Micah is hinting at by insisting that everything is
objective -- that is, from the perspective of the subject.)

I've been in touch with the author, who apparently has since moved into the
Information Technology field, and he's suggested several additional
references to a value-based ontology.  I plan to run a substantial portion
of his essay on "The Fundamental Question" in my Values column next week.

Like Pirsig, Arthur claims he's "no longer an academic," but he clearly has
a firm grasp on contemporary metaphysics.  I'm hoping he'll be interested
enough in my thesis to offer some needed guidance.  If this works out, I
have reason to believe it may help resolve, or at least codify, some of the
controversial issues remaining in the MoQ.   I'm optimistic because I
understand what Witherall is saying and, considering that you find Leslie's
jargon unintelligible, seeking out another academic source at this time
would be an exercise in futility.  Although Witherall says "you will almost
certainly find Leslie a better resource than Rescher," neither Leslie nor
Rescher lay out the anthropic principle as a valuistic premise with the
clarity that he does.

If you're interested in how this dialogue transpires, I'll keep you
informed.

Best regards,
Ham