[MD] Pirsig, James and Peirce

[Ron Kulp]

[matt]
>From little to no understanding of what Peirce, or you, exactly mean by
"theory of meaning," I would probably agree that Pirsig's system yields
just that--insofar as we agree with Donald Davidson that a theory of
meaning is also a theory of truth which are two ways of saying a theory
about the way the world works, which is to say whatever suggestions that
_work_ about the way the world works--which is to say, whatever ways we
find ourselves successfully making our way about the world counts as a
theory of meaning.  
I think saying it's a "theory" sounds a little pretentious (and
Platonic), but that's just me.

Matt

Matt,
I used the term "theory of meaning" to come close to what I think Peirce
was getting at like "philosophology" I guess
A "study" of meaning might be more like it. Peirce was a polymath and
damn hard to read because he wrote using mathmatical
Terms and was more on the wittenstien side of the coin , what your last
comment said to me is almost exactly how I took james work
And more than likely I did misinterpret his meaning. It just seemed
Peirce was on the same trail as Pirsig in questioning
The edifice of scientific method and knowledge. 

Thanks, I'm going to go digging on this and get back to you in a few
days with something more concrete to discuss.
Then I can argue a relavent point a little better.
-x

 

-----Original Message-----
From: moq_discuss-bounces at moqtalk.org
[mailto:moq_discuss-bounces at moqtalk.org] On Behalf Of Matt Kundert
Sent: Tuesday, February 13, 2007 8:59 PM
To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
Subject: Re: [MD] Pirsig, James and Peirce

x,

I'm not sure I understand your reading of Pirsig/Peirce, but I think one
thing that would help in our appreciation of James (and Rorty's
appropriation) is reading the full line from which people attribute
"truth is whatever works" to James, usually because Rorty I think did
write such a shocking sentence as a gloss on pragmatism.

"The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of
belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons."

If we suspend our disbelief at Rorty's audacity, I think it is readily
apparent that Rorty is glossing, and accepting fully, James's version,
which isn't as unseemly as it might at first appear.  The thing we need
to see is that what "works" does so, not willy-nilly, but "for definite,
assignable reasons."  That's where the argument occurs, that's where
people have to fight and enter into the community of inquirers that
marks the border between flighty opinion and rational knowledge.
Definite, assignable reasons.  Not _any_ reason will do, but reasons
that convince people, reasons that have arguments, evidence, etc., etc.
An assertion that "works" 
is, therefore, not such an easy thing to get.  You have to really _work_
for it, like scientific theories: some live, some die--they are worked
for to see if they are true.

>From little to no understanding of what Peirce, or you, exactly mean by
"theory of meaning," I would probably agree that Pirsig's system yields
just that--insofar as we agree with Donald Davidson that a theory of
meaning is also a theory of truth which are two ways of saying a theory
about the way the world works, which is to say whatever suggestions that
_work_ about the way the world works--which is to say, whatever ways we
find ourselves successfully making our way about the world counts as a
theory of meaning.  
I think saying it's a "theory" sounds a little pretentious (and
Platonic), but that's just me.

Matt

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