[MD] Food for Thought

[David M]

Hi Ham


See comments/questions below.

> I realize the trap you've set for me: Sensibility must have a referent
> object.  Of course, that's true by the logic of subject/object dualism. 
> And
> since we can't extrapolate to "pure" Sensibility in an absolute sense, I
> won't jump into your trap by trying to define it.

DM: Which pretty much demonstrates why I find the concept of the absolute
not a lot of use.

>
> As for sensibility in the organic world -- I do not subscribe to the 
> notion
> of inorganic sensibility

DM: But it is hard to give any grounds for this belief, other than the lack
of relevant behaviour demonstarted by the inorganic. Interestingly Newton
spent alot of time looking for this sort of agentive behaviour in inorganic
compounds, he thought he sometimes identiified some, where compounds seemed
to reach out to organise other compounds. So I am more neutral. There may be
something about non-equlibrium systems (mainly living) that creates the 
values
that motivates animation.


> To avoid confusion, I've defined proprietary (i.e., subjective) awareness 
> as
> the 'umbrella term' covering primary sensibility, self-consciousness,
> intellectual and recollected cognizance, and intra-relational (external)
> experience.

DM: I guess you are calling this 'subjective' as you are recognising
certain patterns as unaware. As Pirsig is seeing all behaviour as
(animate and inanimate) as requiring values he is dropping the use
of this subject-object distinction. Like Heidegger I think we need
to keep this neutrality because it enables us to consider what
'things' express, as we can only ever experience things in the context
of what value they have this seems the more care-ful approach.
Otherwise you just drop presumptuously into SOM and treat
all being as something that is just there, alien to us, opposing us,
and needing to be brought under our control.

 So, when I talk about proprietary awareness (PA, as coined by
> Laramie), I mean the total subjective side of the S/O dichotomy.  When I
> speak of "consciousness" I include experiential, intuitive, homeostatic, 
> and
> psycho-emotional knowledge, except for sensibility.  I reserve human
> sensibility for "value-sense" -- pre-conscious awareness of the Value of
> other.

DM: But this takes all value away from the other, it makes the other
an object, something that opposes the subject, it has banished the
inter-subjective where the meaning is in relationship and is not
concentrated on the human as some kind of trascendental ego.

>
> Although I will not define "pure" sensibility, except to identify it with
> the absolute Essence, in my epistemology "pure" awareness is empty of
> content -- nothingness.  Thus, to "be aware" presupposes "beingness" -- a
> thing or event objectivized by one's value-sense.  That referent is either
> the subject's body or an externalized object or person.

DM: This is all too static, inter-subjectivity is possible only for that 
which
is open to the other, your subject wants to categorise and not open
up to the otherness of the other.

>
> I also maintain that for any living organism to possess sensibility, it 
> must
> be derived from a sensible source.  That source cannot be Nature, the
> physical world, or even the functioning brain, inasmuch as these are
> entities are not sentient by their own power.  I've concluded, therefore,
> that Sensibility is the non-contradictory identity of Essence, and that it
> is reduced to its differentiated or "actualized" state by the negation of
> Essence.  Again, as for a metaphysical description or definition of 
> Absolute
> Sensibility, it is beyond the reach of human reason.
>

DM: ? I agree that in experience there is more than what is actualised,
there is the context of what is possible but is not being actualised. Surely
this is the condition for being able to give meaning to any exchange?