[MD] Food for Thought

[Ham Priday]

David --

DM:
> But it is hard to give any grounds for this belief,
> other than the lack of relevant behaviour demonstrated
> by the inorganic.  Interestingly Newton spent a lot of
> time looking for this sort of agentive behaviour in
> inorganic compounds, he thought he sometimes
> identiified some, where compounds seemed to reach
> out to organise other compounds. So I am more neutral.
> There may be something about non-equlibrium systems
> (mainly living) that creates the values that motivates animation.

"Behavior demonstrated by..." is not evidence of Value.  This is a mistake
which all of you are making: e.g., the apple falls from the tree because it
"values" gravity.  Let's be clear about this.  I define Value as proprietary
sensibility which cannot be substantiated by empirical evidence.  This is
not a "scientific" issue; the only evidence for subjective value is your
individual sensibility.  If you want to define value as "behavior" we are
talking at cross purposes.

DM:
> I guess you are calling this 'subjective' as you are recognising
> certain patterns as unaware. As Pirsig is seeing all behaviour as
> (animate and inanimate) as requiring values he is dropping the
> use of this subject-object distinction.  Like Heidegger I think
> we need to keep this neutrality because it enables us to
> consider what 'things' express, as we can only ever experience
> things in the context of what value they have this seems the
> more care-ful approach.

I most definitely am calling value subjective.  Value is not what a thing
"expresses" or how it behaves.  It is how we sense that there is something
beyond ourselves.  Value is our conscious representation of otherness.
Heidegger avoided the term value, because he regarded all values as
'thing-values', that is, for Heidegger, tools, utensils, the stuff all
around us (das Zeug), "disclose" Being.  His ontology was that Being
revealed Value, whereas mine is the reverse: in proprietary awareness, Value
reveals Being.

HP (previously):
> So, when I talk about proprietary awareness (PA), I mean
> the total subjective side of the S/O dichotomy.  When I
> speak of "consciousness" I include experiential, intuitive,
> homeostatic, and psycho-emotional response, except for
> sensibility.  I reserve human sensibility for "value-sense"
> -- pre-conscious awareness of the Value of otherness.

DM:
> But this takes all value away from the other, it makes the other
> an object, something that opposes the subject, it has banished
> the inter-subjective where the meaning is in relationship and is
> not concentrated on the human as some kind of transcendental ego.

It takes "particular" value away from the other, yes.  And this value
abstracted by the subject "reduces" otherness (finitely) to make the other
an object for the self.  So, you are right that the act of perception "has
banished the inter-subjective...relationship."  More precisely, it has
annulled the subject/object relationship to the extent of the object
perceived.  You have almost outlined my epistemology -- except that you
reject the concept!

DM:
> This is all too static, inter-subjectivity is possible only for that
> which is open to the other, your subject wants to categorise
> and not open up to the otherness of the other.

Please explain what you mean by "inter-subjectivity".  To me it suggests the
relationship between subjects.  Is this your intent?  Or are you referring
to the subject/object relationship?

HP (previously):
> I also maintain that for any living organism to possess
> sensibility, it must be derived from a sensible source.
> That source cannot be Nature, the physical world, or
> even the functioning brain, inasmuch as these entities
> are not sentient by their own power.

DM:
> ? I agree that in experience there is more than what is
> actualised, there is the context of what is possible but is
> not being actualised.  Surely this is the condition for
> being able to give meaning to any exchange?

The meaning of an "exchange" (of an experience) is an intellectual
determination by the experiencing subject.  "Meaning" itself is the idea or
sigificance that something conveys to the mind.  The sense of Value is
psycho-emotional and pre-intellectual, as Pirsig himself maintained.  Thus,
Value (Quality) does not reside in the subject or the object, but in the
"event" -- the differentiated sensibility of otherness.  By objectivizing
Value intellectually, we turn it into "things" and "events".  The essence of
Value is in the aggregate: the Absolute Source.

Regards,
Ham