[MD] Food for Thought

[Joseph Maurer]

On Friday 05 January 2007 4:09 PM ARLO writes to DMB

Hi ARLO and DMB,

<Snip>

[Arlo]
In attempting to get at the distinction between symbolic activity on the 
social
and intellectual levels, it seems that "science", or "reason", is the 
primary
differentiation between intellectual patterns and social patterns. "There 
are
only old traditional social and religious meanings and these don't have any
real intellectual base. They're just traditions."


[Joe]

When I examine the levels from the sense of a moral evolution as Pirsig 
proposes, I conclude that one is the foundation for the other. I do not know 
the meaning of "science" or "reason" as the primary differentiation between 
intellectual patterns and social patterns. I want to say that if something 
is to be morally different it must exist differently on a higher or lower 
level. Value is a description of existence. To separate a moral orders by a 
boundary would require a dimension in existence to have a higher or lower 
value. The primary differentiation would be experience rather than "science" 
or "reason". What characteristics of existential dimensions can there be? 
IMO The MOQ proposes DQ as the movement between levels. Is DQ essential or 
existential? For me it is existential. Saying there are dimensions in 
existence lower to higher is easy. Now is it true?

In order to limit the associations connected with years of abstract 
thinking, I want to limit the intellectual level only to law. So many times 
when I read intellectual I immediately think mind, and all the theory of 
knowledge that has accompanied it, especially the division between the body 
and the soul.

What then is the determinant of the social level? I want to say the 
experience of proprietary awareness. I know I am different. This is 
different. Activities between individuals exist which the intellectual level 
interprets into laws. The law of gravity applies to all levels.

If a level is destroyed what happens? I agree with Pirsig that all levels 
are connected and if proprietary awareness is a level and in any way 
connected with breathing, and the oxygen level is depleted or polluted, then 
so is the proprietary level polluted. The intellectual level is weakened and 
laws are ignored.

[Arlo]

Pirsig goes on to describe the intellectual level as "logos", and the social
level as "mythos". In ZMM, he says this about the logos. "The term logos, 
the
root word of "logic," refers to the sum total of our rational understanding 
of
the world."

Now, my understanding of "reason" (or "logic" or "science") was precisely 
that
what "set it apart" was that it presented itself as "decultural" (meaning 
what
it professes is not culturally bound, but an "acultural", objective, to use
that word, description) and "decontextual" (meaning, for example, that the 
law
of gravity, an intellectual pattern, is not bound by context, but is
generalizable beyond specific contexts). These two things, I'd argue,
"decultural" and "decontextual", are the hallmarks of science.

But it is now clear to me that this, although an apt description of OUR
intellectual level, is not an inherent feature of intellect per se. The
problem, then, I encountered is specifically this. OUR intellectual level, 
OUR
logos IS SOMist. That was the message of ZMM. Reason, science, logic, the
specific things that DO differentiate intellectual from social 
symbolicactivity are the things that, because of our culture, do adhere to 
SOMist
views.

"The culture in which we live hands us a set of intellectual glasses to
interpret experience with, and the concept of the primacy of subjects and
objects is built right into these glasses." (LILA)

The same sentiment is expressed in ZMM. "Thus, in cultures whose ancestry
includes ancient Greece, one invariably finds a strong subject-object
differentiation because the grammar of the old Greek mythos presumed a sharp
natural division of subjects and predicates. In cultures such as the 
Chinese,
where subject-predicate relationships are not rigidly defined by grammar, 
one
finds a corresponding absence of rigid subject-object philosophy."

In LILA, Pirsig refutes this very "decultural"/"decontextual" view of 
intellect,
reminding us "Our intellectual description of nature is always culturally
derived." He goes on, "The intellectual level of patterns, in the historic
process of freeing itself from its parent social level, namely the church, 
has
tended to invent a myth of independence from the social level for its own
benefit. Science and reason, this myth goes, come only from the objective
world, never from the social world. The world of objects imposes itself upon
the mind with no social mediation whatsoever.It is easy to see the historic
reasons for this myth of independence. Science might never have survived
without it. But a close examination shows it isn't so." (I'll get to the
"decontextual" in a post referring to SA's question of "embodiement" in
"experience", and some things David Granger has said of Pirsig and Dewey).

Hope this clarifies some things. More soon.


[Joe]
Thanks Arlo and DMB


> Hi DMB,
>
> You make some points I do want to return to. First, however, let me 
> clarify that
> most of this was just "thinking outloud", and was never intended to 
> articulate
> a position. That said, let me answer this.
>
> [Arlo previously]
> Why is "science" an intellectual pattern but "theology" a social pattern, 
> if NOT
> for the very SOMist things (deculturizing and decontextualizing) the MOQ 
> argues
> against? What I think is that Bodvar's SOLAQI has accurately describes 
> what
> Pirsig "wrote", but I don't think its what he "meant".  I'm just unsure as 
> how
> to resolve it.
>
> [DMB]
> I don't get you here. In what sense does the MOQ argue against 
> deculturizing and
> decontextualizing? What do you mean by those terms? In what sense are 
> these
> SOMist things? And I really don't understand how anyone can see SOLAQI as
> something that "accurately describes what Pirsig wrote".
>
> [Arlo]
> In attempting to get at the distinction between symbolic activity on the 
> social
> and intellectual levels, it seems that "science", or "reason", is the 
> primary
> differentiation between intellectual patterns and social patterns. "There 
> are
> only old traditional social and religious meanings and these don't have 
> any
> real intellectual base. They're just traditions."
>
> Pirsig goes on to describe the intellectual level as "logos", and the 
> social
> level as "mythos". In ZMM, he says this about the logos. "The term logos, 
> the
> root word of "logic," refers to the sum total of our rational 
> understanding of
> the world."
>
> Now, my understanding of "reason" (or "logic" or "science") was precisely 
> that
> what "set it apart" was that it presented itself as "decultural" (meaning 
> what
> it professes is not culturally bound, but an "acultural", objective, to 
> use
> that word, description) and "decontextual" (meaning, for example, that the 
> law
> of gravity, an intellectual pattern, is not bound by context, but is
> generalizable beyond specific contexts). These two things, I'd argue,
> "decultural" and "decontextual", are the hallmarks of science.
>
> But it is now clear to me that this, although an apt description of OUR
> intellectual level, is not an inherent feature of intellect per se. The
> problem, then, I encountered is specifically this. OUR intellectual level, 
> OUR
> logos IS SOMist. That was the message of ZMM. Reason, science, logic, the
> specific things that DO differentiate intellectual from social symbolic
> activity are the things that, because of our culture, do adhere to SOMist
> views.
>
> "The culture in which we live hands us a set of intellectual glasses to
> interpret experience with, and the concept of the primacy of subjects and
> objects is built right into these glasses." (LILA)
>
> The same sentiment is expressed in ZMM. "Thus, in cultures whose ancestry
> includes ancient Greece, one invariably finds a strong subject-object
> differentiation because the grammar of the old Greek mythos presumed a 
> sharp
> natural division of subjects and predicates. In cultures such as the 
> Chinese,
> where subject-predicate relationships are not rigidly defined by grammar, 
> one
> finds a corresponding absence of rigid subject-object philosophy."
>
> In LILA, Pirsig refutes this very "decultural"/"decontextual" view of 
> intellect,
> reminding us "Our intellectual description of nature is always culturally
> derived." He goes on, "The intellectual level of patterns, in the historic
> process of freeing itself from its parent social level, namely the church, 
> has
> tended to invent a myth of independence from the social level for its own
> benefit. Science and reason, this myth goes, come only from the objective
> world, never from the social world. The world of objects imposes itself 
> upon
> the mind with no social mediation whatsoever.It is easy to see the 
> historic
> reasons for this myth of independence. Science might never have survived
> without it. But a close examination shows it isn't so." (I'll get to the
> "decontextual" in a post referring to SA's question of "embodiement" in
> "experience", and some things David Granger has said of Pirsig and Dewey).
>
> Hope this clarifies some things. More soon.
>
>
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