[MD] Dawkins a Materialist (is watching?]

[Ham Priday]

Hello Arlo --

Tangling to the tango, eh?

 [Ham]:
> Consciousness and Quality are both part of man's
> experience, although I see no rational justification for
> considering them "natural processes."

[Arlo]:
> You propose that, although we experience them,
> they are supernatural in origin?

Is that a question or a statement?  I personally dislike the word
"supernatural" because it conjures up superstition, miracles, and
"unworldly" happenings.  However, I do believe all created things are
derived from an uncreated primary source.  As you know, I refer to this
source as Essence, and it is my thesis that Essence transcends all
differentiation.  If you want to call this ontology "supernatural", it's
fine by me, so long as you accept it as my "literal" view and not a
metaphor.

[Arlo]:
> The "crux" of the issue was the claim that
> "complexity begets a designer", to which I responded
> that certainly then such a sufficiently complex designer
> would also require a designer?  Platt then claimed the
> designer was pure simplicity and thus required no
> designer. I'm not sure how such a simple designer can
> contain all the preplanned forms for the Universe,
> but there it is.

I don't know where the notion "complexity begets a designer" comes from, but
it's an illogical paradigm.  In fact, the reverse is true: the designer
begets complexity (i.e., difference).  The Essence that I posit is uncreated
and absolute in its "Oneness"; therefore, complexity (as in the finite,
relational world) is anathema to this concept.  The question you raise,
however, is epistemologically most significant.

I maintain that what you call "pre-intellectual experience"
(pre-metaphoric?) is not experience at all, but "value-sensibility".  I
reserve the term "experience" for the cognizance of discrete objects which
is an intellectual process.  This is where the differentiation takes place.
What you're really asking is: Where does the template for universal
complexity come from?  I think you'll like my answer, because it's the
single place in my thesis where I can apply the Pirsigian term "pattern".
In simple terms, the "cosmic pattern" is the resultant of essential Value
differentiated by the sense organs in conjunction with the intellect to
"objectify" physical reality.  Don't ask me to account for the specific
design, but I suspect that it represents the relation of the single-point
perspective (proprietary awareness) to the absolute source.  The world that
we experience is subjective (proprietary) with respect to its perceived
values, but universal (objective) with respect to its defined properties in
time and space.

[Arlo]:
> Any attempt to symbolically represent or capture "reality"
> is a metaphor [of] that "reality". Our metaphors get more
> and more complex as we consider "philosophy", and we
> pragmatically make use of "cemented metaphor" (literalizing)
> when it comes to most practical, everyday activity.

It's true that words are symbolic.  But they needn't be metaphoric, any more
than an equation like 2 + 2 = 4 is a metaphor.  It stands for something -- a
proposition, an axiom.  The confusion arises when we try to apply relational
logic to non-relational concepts; for example, when I say that finitude is
actualized by the negation of Essence.  I have no way to prove this axiom,
since Essence is ineffable; still, I do not regard my hypothesis as a
metaphor.

[Arlo]:
> What we perceive to be the Universe emerges from
> the interaction of individual patterns of value, beginning
> at the inorganic level, and increasing in complexity as
> self-organizing collectives form.  These collectives
> form new "individuals" (at higher levels of complexity)
> whose interactions then constitute new self-organizing
> collectives in a spiral up to whereever we make our level of focus.

I can't say that I comprehend this theory -- particularly the part about
collectives forming new "individuals" -- but I can respect it as your
literal belief.  The criticism I raised was the use of this hypothesis to
answer Platt's question concerning the emergence of the universe -- not the
intellectual "concept" of a universe, but the physical universe that we all
experience.  I'm not sure how the term "emergence" doffers from  evolution,
but this explanation certainly doesn't address evolution in the Darwinian
context (which I assume Platt had in mind).

[Arlo]:
> You object to what you claim is avoidance of Platt's question,
> but his statement is really no different than "Does LILA have
> Quality?" or "Does a dog have a Buddha nature?"

I don't see the relevance of those questions to emergence or evolution.

[Arlo]:
> I consider "direct experience" to be "pre-intellectual"
> (and thus "pre-metaphoric").

The pre-intellectual "experience" is that of Value, which is why I prefer to
call it sensibility.  Once this value has been objectivized by the
intellect, it becomes experience.  Isn't that a clearer epistemology?  (Or,
do you not agree with it?)

> [Arlo]
> Perhaps you can tell me a way to understand philosophy
> that is not through the use of metaphorical symbols?
> Certainly "mystic experience" can do us Good, but once
> we start calling it "something", it is a metaphor. Our words
> can never capture it "literally". To think otherwise is a fool's quest.

Well, maybe I'm on a fool's quest.  I believe the assertions of philosophy
should be substantive, logically consistent, and meaningful, whether they
involve physical reality or abstract concepts.  Propositions that apply to
existence should be clearly distinguished from those that involve
abstractions such as Quality, Value, God, or Essence.  Since explaining the
transition from one to the other (e.g., creation, transcendence) usually
requires the philosopher to coin new terminology or redefine commonly
understood words, a glossary of specialized terms should be mandatory.

[Ham]:
> Iif the fundamental axioms are assumed to be metaphors,
> we're not discussing philosophy but analyzing linguistics
> (or romantic prose).

[Arlo]:
> Do not let this moment of Enlightenment pass, Ham!
> Embrace it!

As a literalist, I'm not especially enlightened by your allegation that
Philosophy is a collection of metaphors ranging from the simple to the
"cemented".  Major philosophies have traditionally been, and should be, much
more than philosophology, to borrow from Pirsig.  I also believe that a
philosopher who complains that metaphysical definitions will limit or
"destroy" his fundamental concept is shirking his obligation to the public.
In my opinion, there is too much symbolism and not enough reality in our
intellectual life today; and that goes for our fiscal, moral, cultural, and
national responsibilities, as well as our philosophical tenets.

Thanks for clarifying what you mean by pre-metaphoric experience.

Regards,
Ham