[Moq_Discuss] [MD] Aristotle & DQ

[Ham Priday]

Hi Ron --


In clarifying my comment on Pirsig to Jos, I defined "dynamic" as change or 
transition, and "static" as constant and unchanging.  Apparently, you have a 
different interpretation of SQ.


[Ron]:

> Interesting, I did not perceive Pirsig as stating this in his
> ontology.  I had the impression that Pirsig was stating that
> all existence is dynamic. What we perceive as  physical reality
> are the more static patterns of dynamic quality (that which
> changes slower and may be perceived) for there are no true
> constants and thus there is nothing which is immutable or
> absolute.
>
> I think you are interpreting MOQ. DQ and SQ dualistically.
> Your logic and your ontology seems of a dualistic nature
> for it rests on the tension of opposites.
> When MOQ is interpreted in this light it does not work logically
> by those standards.  My impression was that RMP was
> dropping opposites for patterns of value.

Yes, my ontology is dualistic, but not in the way your conception of the MOQ 
describes it.  Ontology concerns the nature of being, therefore applies only 
to existence.  The essentialist ontology is a dichotomy of two mutually 
exclusive but dependent contingents: proprietary sensibility (individual 
awareness) and otherness (being).  Neither of these contingents is integral 
to Essence, nor is Essence itself a duality.

Since there are very few definitive statements in Pirsig's philosophy, it is 
really inferences or implications that we are debating.  You are saying that 
a "static pattern" is NOT static but only "changes slower" than dynamic 
quality.  From that definition I gather that you understand DQ as a state or 
mode of high-velocity (perhaps ultra-high frequency?) transition.  I recall 
reading somewhere that movement (acceleration and velocity) is always 
measured against something else, which makes it relational.  Such an 
ontology would seem to be based on a duality of relatively slow versus 
relatively fast patterns.  How, then, could Pirsig be "dropping opposites 
for patterns of value"?  Where has he made such an assertion?

There are many energy patterns -- molecular motion, for example, or 
X-rays -- that are beyond our natural range of perception. Yet, they are 
phenomena of our physical world.  How do you distinguish such phenomena from 
DQ?  Or are they one and the same in your view?

Your statement that "there are no true constants and thus there is nothing 
which is immutable or
 absolute" confirms my contention that the MOQ does not acknowledge a 
primary source.  In fact, it never gets beyond the physical world.  And 
without that perspective, it is incapable of providing meaning or purpose to 
existence relative to an uncreated source.

Thanks for defining your conception of the MOQ ontology, Ron.  I found it 
quite interesting.

Regards,
Ham