[MD] Quantum computing

[Magnus Berg]

Yo Bo! :)

skutvik at online.no wrote:
> Hi Magnus!
> 
> 4 Mar. you wrote:
> 
>> I agree that from each level's point of view, everything it sees is
>> only of its own level. It follows from the quality event being an
>> event between two patterns of the same level. Why would the
>> intellectual level be any different?
> 
> I take this to be an agreement. Intellect is as blind to the overall 
> Q-context as the rest of the static range, and refuses that 
> anything can be non-intellect or non-S/O. The MOQ included.  

You're stretching the "agreement". Since I think the MoQ is an intellectual 
pattern, I don't think that intellect is blind to it.

>> Claiming that the MoQ is something else than an intellectual pattern
>> seems pretty far fetched to me. In doing that, I think you're
>> weakening the other definitions of the MoQ. However, I'm beginning to
>> understand that my definitions of the MoQ are far more formal than any
>> other's, so perhaps that's not a problem to you, but it is to me.
> 
> I take this too to be agreement.

Rather an agreement that we disagree.

> Bo before: 
>>> If so the pre-historic and early historic myths were intellectual
>>> patterns? Is that so?
> 
> Magnus:
>> Yes, I've never understood this talk about old myths/stories/sayings
>> *not* being intellectual patterns.
> 
> As we agree about, from intellect seen all is intellect, and we may 
> cast our imagination back to a pre-intellect LEVEL time when all 
> was social. And that age's various world views can consequently 
> NOT be called "intellectual". Get it?  

Yes, I understand what you're saying. You mean that all actions made by any 
human being before the advent of the intellectual level (whenever that was), was 
made for social reasons, right?

But I simply disagree, because I think the intellectual level was already 
present in their brains. They had memory, therefore they were able to store 
intellectual patterns. It's as simple as that in my book.

> How could myths have intellectual roots if the social level had 
> not yet been transcended? 

You're using arguments that doesn't apply to my understanding of the MoQ. I 
claim that the social level was transcended.

> Can you imagine some stone age 
> skeptic lurking in the cave murmuring "All this nonsense about 
> gods and goddesses must have an objective explanation"?

First of all, I *can* imagine such a caveman, especially if we're talking Homo 
Sapiens. Second, it doesn't matter in the first place since I don't think such 
thoughts are a requirement for the intellectual level.

> I think 
> yours is the intelligence= intellect fallacy that haunts this site.   

On the contrary, my version of the intellectual level doesn't require much 
"intellect" at all.

>> To base a level definition on such a loose hunch has very low value to
>> me and makes it impossible to actually *use* that level definition for
>> anything useful. It seems to me that the sole purpose of such a loose
>> definition of the intellectual level is for humans to stay well clear
>> of "animals", which makes it look like anthropism.
> 
> What loose hunch do I base intellect on and what purpose is it to 
> keep "humans clear of animals"?

The loose hunch was to argue that the intellectual level didn't appear until 
well after humans started writing books, that no caveman ever thought any 
"abstract" thoughts. It seems to me that this assumption is made to avoid the 
risk of having to argue whether any humans/apes before Homo Sapiens supports 
intellectual patterns.

> The human body is a mammal 
> organism- no better no worse - but according to the MOQ the 
> humans - as intellect-bearers - are two levels above biology. If 
> you don't buy THAT part of the the MOQ why bother? 

That's a very good, and crucial question to me. And it's why I started thinking 
about the levels and made an attempt to define them more precisely than Lila does.

The answer is that I bother because I can imagine a future where non-biological 
computers are as intelligent as biological humans. And I want the MoQ to survive 
that.

>> "If something represents something else via a language, then it is an
>> intellectual pattern."
> 
> Well, if so language=intellectual level and it rushes back to 
> around the Neanderthal and the social level becomes some tiny 
> sliver between biology and intellect. Good Grief!   

No, language is social. I'd say it's the most basic social value. It's the glue 
that keeps the organs of a society together. Didn't I write that? Perhaps below?

>> But here, I think he makes the same mistake most do when trying to map
>> *things* to the MoQ levels. For example, in: "I said that even atoms
>> can be called societies of electrons and protons. And since everything
>> is thus social, why even have the word?" he assumes that the social
>> bond that holds electrons and protons together implies that a Martian
>> rock is social. Just because a thing is made out of other smaller
>> things, it doesn't mean the new thing can be a part of quality events
>> of all the types of the smaller things it's made of.
> 
> You misunderstand. Pirsig mocks the notion that atoms are 
> "societies" and does NOT claim that what holds rocks together 
> are social bonds. If I remember correctly it was YOU who saw 
> societies everywhere.  

Of course I understand that he mocks that notion. I was trying to explain why 
his deduction isn't valid.

But yes, I tend to see more societies than most people. But an atom is held 
together by inorganic value, not language. Pretty simple actually.

	Magnus