[MD] David M and DMB clearly disagree -what do others think?

[David M]

Hi Mark

> Hello David M,
> Dynamic Quality has no definition according to the moq.
> If this is true, then DQ cannot be equated with anything, even 
> possibility.
> In fact, if DQ has no definition, we can't talk about it at all.

DM: I understand why Pirsig talks about the undefinable, the definable 
repeats
and is SQ. But SQ emerges, and it can appear as possible SQ before it
becomes actual SQ.



>
> However, we do talk about DQ and there is much said in Lila regarding DQ
> which rather gives the impression that DQ is being defined in very broad 
> terms.
> For example, it is stated in Lila that DQ is always new.
> One may say that DQ is experience par excellence.
>
> The possible is experienced
> Therefore, in the sense that anything is, 'new' it may be equated with 
> DQ.
> The, 'Possible' may be as new or immediate as anything else, so the 
> possible
> can have an aspect of DQ.
>
> dmb cannot argue against this without denying DQ, for to do so would be to
> argue that sq has no DQ.


DM: Do you mean this error would be to say experience had no DQ?




> As DQ is the essence (Robert Pirsig) of sq there can be no sq without  DQ.
> dmb's suggestion that the possible is not part of experience is 
> problematic
> because we all experience possibilities as dynamic static relationships:
> dreams  are possibilities. That many exotic dreams cannot be realised in 
> inorganic,
> biological, social or intellectual patterns does not make them unreal, and
> to do so is to assert SOM: All dreams are as real as H2O molecules.

DM: Thanks for your views.