[MD] David M and DMB clearly disagree -what do others think?

[Squonkriff at aol.com]

Hi Mark

> Hello David M,
> Dynamic Quality has no  definition according to the moq.
> If this is true, then DQ cannot be  equated with anything, even 
> possibility.
> In fact, if DQ has no  definition, we can't talk about it at all.

DM: I understand why Pirsig  talks about the undefinable, the definable 
repeats
and is SQ. But SQ  emerges, and it can appear as possible SQ before it
becomes actual  SQ.



>
> However, we do talk about DQ and there is much  said in Lila regarding DQ
> which rather gives the impression that DQ is  being defined in very broad 
> terms.
> For example, it is stated in  Lila that DQ is always new.
> One may say that DQ is experience par  excellence.
>
> The possible is experienced
> Therefore, in  the sense that anything is, 'new' it may be equated with 
> DQ.
>  The, 'Possible' may be as new or immediate as anything else, so the 
>  possible
> can have an aspect of DQ.
>
> dmb cannot argue  against this without denying DQ, for to do so would be to
> argue that sq  has no DQ.


DM: Do you mean this error would be to say experience had  no DQ?
 
Mark: 07-03-07: Hi David M, yes.
Even sq may re-enter experience; imagine an old memory you had not  
experienced for years? The re-entering of this memory into immediate experience  
enfolds it into the present and changes it and new sq patterns in the  process.
Best,
Mark




> As DQ is the essence (Robert Pirsig) of sq  there can be no sq without  DQ.
> dmb's suggestion that the possible  is not part of experience is 
> problematic
> because we all  experience possibilities as dynamic static relationships:
> dreams   are possibilities. That many exotic dreams cannot be realised in 
>  inorganic,
> biological, social or intellectual patterns does not make  them unreal, and
> to do so is to assert SOM: All dreams are as real as  H2O molecules.

DM: Thanks for your views.