[MD] David M and DMB clearly disagree -what do others think?

[Matt Kundert]

DMB,

I had (have) actually no idea how the conversation began or how it 
progressed.  I just happened to see David's subject line and thought I might 
take a look.  And I hope you didn't take me to be construing you as saying 
that, since "the possible" has no material existence, it is therefore 
unreal.  That would be, as you say, something reminicent of a positivist 
standpoint, but I think SOM's provinence extends beyond debates about 
materialism.  As I said before, I don't think you neccessarily are 
regressing or looking at things like a SOMist.

What I was attempting to suggest, by cutting in at a different angle, was 
that the two of you, though using (possibly wildly) different vocabularies, 
are really not at odds on this point, on the reality of the possible.  David 
may have his particular way of putting the point, which sounds like nonsense 
to you, but a lot of poetry and physics sounds like nonsense to a lot of 
people, though some readers may be able to suggest different terms in which 
the poetry and physics can be seen to be expressing something good sensical. 
  Having not read most of the nonsense David's been throwing up at you, I 
can't be sure whether some if it isn't, in fact, nonsense.  I don't know.  
What I read from the two of you, though, suggested to me that the two of you 
were cutting each other at cross purposes.  I was hoping to suggest a way to 
mend that.

So, essentially what I'm saying is that when you say that "the possible" is 
not real, but that imagination is, I think you are right and that that is 
all David is (or very well should be) saying.  His angle, however, sounds 
the way it does to combat certain pernicious tendencies in SOMist 
philosophical formulation, for instance Enlightenment philosophical 
exaltations of the God known as "Reason," at the expense of the imagination, 
which is why the Romantics reacted the way they did by exalting the 
Imagination.  I see David's suggestions as an offshoot of Romanticism.  
David doesn't (or shouldn't) want to describe "the possible" as being 
outside of experience.  His intention, so far as I can see, is to redescribe 
experience in such a way as to include something he calls "experience of the 
possible."

Personally, I find talk about possibilities scurrying about, living and 
dying, cute and harmless.  However, at the same time, I can't imagine many 
situations in which I'd find it useful to pick up David's redescription and 
use it.  But I don't think they are running afoul of any of my own scruples.

Now--as far as defending his redescription with phenomenology (not a good 
idea, for one person's demon is another person's hallucination) or physics 
(very bad idea, I've never been able to imagine how scientific studies are 
supposed to support (as opposed to change) philosophy--which is why David 
says I have a blindspot or lack of respect for science) or--God help us--an 
inner/outer distinction--clearly these demand some sort of explanation and, 
as need be, cuffs around the ears.  I don't have much sympathy with such 
things, but then that's why David I and still have our own outstanding 
disagreements.

If I had one practical suggestion for you, it would be to stop suggesting 
that David is saying that "the possible" exists outside of experience (after 
all, he explicitly denies it).  If I had one practical suggestion for David, 
it would be to stop suggesting that you are denying that possibility exists 
(after all, you explicitly handle it).  I consider the existence of both 
accusations to be a prime indication of cross purposes.  When we encounter a 
formulation that seems to deny something obvious (some thing or some 
distinction we think we need), we should definitely ask for clarification on 
the score.  Most redescriptions should be able to handle such events.  If 
the resulting clarification still denies something needed, we should reject 
it (and, ya' know, criticize it).  If it seems to handle it fairly enough, 
though we still don't find the redescription useful, we should probably 
consider it harmless.

For instance, if Pirsig had asked for clarification about SOM's denial of 
the existence of values (from, say, a logical positivist like Ayer), the 
clarification would have been that they don't deny they exist, they just 
think they are cognitively meaningless.  Since this still seems ugly and 
disputable, we should refine our criticisms accordingly and pursue our hunch 
that there's something wrong with it.  What we shouldn't do, though, is 
continue with our pre-clarification accusations if they've been clarified 
away because that's what gives the appearance of the creation of a strawman 
(which is what Struan and Glenn used to say about Pirsig, and why you and 
David are spinning around in circles, with David suggesting that you need to 
get rid of your preconceptions--David's saying this like a good 
phenomenologist, but a Pirsigian, in my opinion, should have no truck with 
such a thing because without these "preconceptions," which are the static 
patterns being debated, there would be nothing to debate about; indeed, 
David's suggestion amounts to: "Just drop the way you think about it and 
think about it my way!"--that's not debate, that's replacement).

Which is to say:  both of you need to refine your terms of criticism so it 
doesn't look to people like me that the two of you are talking past each 
other.  There may yet be something wrong with either one of your views on 
"the possible."  I just can't see what it is because the water is still too 
muddy.  My hunch is that there isn't, but that's just my guess.  I'd be 
right if the two of you agreed with my intervention, but things like this 
usually aren't that easy.  I only hope that it helps in some way.

Matt

_________________________________________________________________
Get a FREE Web site, company branded e-mail and more from Microsoft Office 
Live! http://clk.atdmt.com/MRT/go/mcrssaub0050001411mrt/direct/01/