[MD] -elitist ideas

[Kevin Perez]

Hello Arlo.
 
> [Kevin]
> Good question.  Because the word _quality_ connotes value how can the
> source of all not be moral?
> 
> [Arlo]
> I don't know if its just the word "quality" that connotes "value". Pirsig's
> central premise is demonstrating how Quality/Value/Moral are the same thing. 
> 
> [Kevin]
> Consider a similarly deep question.  If the ultimate source connotes anything
> does it also connote the thing's opposite?  If not then what is the source of
> the opposite?
> 
> [Arlo]
> This is a restatement of the fundamental theist issue, how can "evil" derive
> from an "All Good" source? How can "immorality" derive from an all moral
> source?
 
"fundamental theist issue"???  Where did this come from???
 
I'm saying the ultimate source is amoral in the sense that it connotes both morality
and immorality.  The ultimate source makes available the knowledge of good and
evil.  Whether a thing is good or evil is a moral judgment requiring a moral
framework.  The Ten Commandments and the United States Code are examples
of moral frameworks.
 
> I'd caution here the same thing I said with Marsha, I am not a fan of
> the word "moral", it has too many social-political connotations, and is often
> enacted as a power-word in controlling others. Because of this, its difficult
> to use "moral" as Pirsig uses it without bringing along some of the hangups
> that have hampered the word for a long time.
 
"moral" connotes right and wrong, good and bad, responsible and irresponsible.
It's been my experience that the word is used more often and more comfortably
by those of the conservative persuasion.  Those of the liberal persuasion seem to
find its use troublesome.  Responsibility is another such word but one with far less
baggage.  Likewise, words like freedom and liberty find greater use by those of the
liberal persuasion.
 
> I am tempted to rephrase the question using "value". How can no-value derive
> from value. Pirsig may likely respond that a thing that has no-value does not
> exist, and as such no-value does not derive from value, for as soon as we point
> to something as an exemplar of no-value, it suddenly has value. 
 
Right.  Any your pointing to it is your moral framework in action.
 
> In the same sense, there is no amorality, or a thing that is amoral does not
> exist. Hence what we see around us are moral patterns, ranging from inorganic
> to intellectual.
 
Ok.  Moral patterns connoting both good and bad.
 
> The word "immorality" confuses the issue because it is, unlike "moral",
> specifically tied to social-intellectual patterns. Or, it is a "top-down"
> analytical word. We, coming from the social-intellectual perspective, would
> call it "immoral" when an asteroid destroys biological life (inorganic patterns
> destroying biological patterns), but the asteroid is doing nothing "immoral"
> from the inorganic perspective. It is just doing what asteroids do, following
> inorganic quality patterns (such as gravity, etc.). "Immorality", then, is a
> metaphysical word, not a experiential word (Jees, I hope that makes sense).
 
Yes it does.  I'm just not sure about restricing the metaphysical-experiential
different to "immorality."  But I can see why you don't say morality is a
metaphysical word.
 
> [Kevin]
> > I responded to Marsha's question the way I did because, for me, the ultimate
> > source is the source of all things; good, bad, life, death, loss, renewal, etc.
> > The judgement of moral or immoral is our doing.  I believe this is what Pirsig
> > meant when he said Quality is the source of all and man is the measure of all.
> 
> [Arlo]
> Here again I think the word "moral", and its connotations, is a detriment.
> Consider "value". If I said, "The judgment of value or no-value (avalue?) is
> our doing", how would we describe the amoeba's movement away from the acid?
> Certainly it is a value judgment (although lacking in the latter post-experiential
> symbolic representations). 
 
No, not the judgement of value or no-value.  The judgement of how much value.
Think good, better, best.  Or bad, worse, worst.  These are moral judgements.
 
> My understanding of Pirsig would say that "man" constructs value for himself
> through his inorganic, biological, social and intellectual engagements, but
> that this does not mean that only "man" perceives value. My dog constructs
> value for herself as well, but through an experiential frame that lacks the
> sophisticated symbolic repertoire of our social-intellectual experience.
 
I'm sure this is why I don't engage those kinds of conversations.  They make no
sense to me.
 

Kevin
 
 

 
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