[MD] Quantum computing

Magnus Berg McMagnus at home.se
Tue Mar 13 23:54:24 PDT 2007


Bo

> I see the human tribes as the start of the 3rd. level. There is a 
> fuzzy area of humanoid and/or primate "societies" (animals form 
> families and apes lives in colonies) but these are the fuzzy areas 
> at the lower end of all levels that Pirsig calls "in the service of the 
> parent level".  

In my view of the MoQ, there are no fuzzy borders. Fuzziness is bad. How can 
even the MoQ include fuzziness if all of reality is made of quality events? Each 
QE is between two patterns of the same type, right? So how on earth *can* 
fuzziness arise from that? I thought you understood (and perhaps even agreed 
with) the dimensional view of the levels? And that view removes fuzziness.

>> One good reason to acknowledge many scales of societies is that they
>> obey the same social "laws" on all scales. That means that you can
>> gain lots of understanding about seemingly different social events by
>> acknowledging that they are really the same events.
> 
> Almost any composite can be seen as a society from SOM's point 
> of view, because its "society" is just an assembly of lesser parts. 
> In the MOQ however the 3rd. level is a value realm different from 
> the biological level and one gets gains zero (MOQ at least) 
> understanding by treating an inorganic alloy as a "society" (even 
> if some chemical bonds are at work) Nor by treating a biological 
> organism as one, even if the cells of an organism are co-
> operating.   

I'm well aware that inorganic value hold atoms, alloys and many other stuff 
together. But the fact that you're repeating this to me over and over again just 
shows that you haven't understood my view (the dimensional view) of the levels.

>> For example, in nature, there are lots of examples of how to solve
>> logistics in an organism. The funny thing is that they all look the
>> same. Veins in an animal to transport blood, veins in a leaf to
>> transport water, neural pathways to transport signals in a brain, etc.
>> But it doesn't end here, logistic problems are present on all scales,
>> but on larger scales the solutions are called roads, train tracks,
>> telephone lines and optical information highways.
> 
> No problems with this. That the lower level's patterns are 
> transmuted/adapted by the next higher and all end up as the base 
> of highest level is no proof that "everything is social". Your 
> biology, society and intellect are no different from the SOM 
> categories.        

I was trying to show that social value works on all scales, that the same social 
pattern (i.e. the logistics solution) is used both in leaves, animals, cities 
and countries. I was trying to make the point that SIZE DOES NOT MATTER!

>> Why do all these logistic solutions look the same? Why do all have
>> larger/faster/fatter transportation lines between important nodes and
>> then smaller and smaller lines between less and less important nodes?
>> The answer is because it's better. And when a MoQ:er hears "better",
>> it means "has higher quality". The next question that comes to mind
>> is, "in what way is it better?" And the answer to that is "It's
>> socially better".
> 
> Distribution of commodities is better done by train than by 
> horseback, and information by this our meduium than by a 
> Marathon runner, but all this shows how completely you 
> misunderstand social value. Q-social value is not improved by 
> faster transportation and information flow, this is intellect's 
> rationality that has dominated for so long. Social value is not the 
> least concerned with technology, only of upholding the social 
> coherence by.      

You misunderstood me completely. The point was not that faster is better, the 
point was that the logistic solution look the same no matter what is being 
transported and no matter what size it is.

>> How would you use your MoQ to explain these similarities on different
>> scales? Perhaps you simply deny that they *are* similar? But if you
>> deny it, you also deny the MoQ a lot of explanatory power.
> 
> These similarities are not seen from the MOQ.

Please show that you understand my point first, then you may say what you think 
about it.

>> Bo, please, I have never denied the importance of each level being
>> "out of" the former level. What I *have* done is to extend the social
>> level, but only in scale, not in any other way.
> 
> Well the scale counts very much. If "social" is extended into the 
> biological realm and partly into the inorganic the MOQ's social 
> level has lost all meaning.

Ok, we disagree completely here. I say that scale doesn't matter at all. Why 
can't you see that a dimensional view of the levels means that we don't have to 
decide where level boundaries should be drawn based on scale? We can treat a 
collection of cells as a society *and* as a biological animal. We don't have to 
choose! And we don't have to get those fuzzy borders.

If scale counts all that much that you seem to imply, how can it be that the 
inorganic level works on all scales - atoms, rocks, planets, solar systems, 
galaxies and galaxy clusters - but the social level is confined to, what 
exactly, tribes, cities and countries?


> Bo before: 
>>> My (Bo's) undestanding differ regarding intellect, but I use the MOQ
>>> reasoing and Pirsig's argument that supports the SOL interpretation,
>>> but you don't bring any MOQ references or argument. An intellectual
>>> LEVEL bout Neanderthal times is just devastating for the MOQ.
> 
>> No, why would it be devastating? According to my reasoning that I have
>> explained a number of times now, it's saving the MoQ.
> 
> Phew, "Against stupidity .... (wish I knew the Latin version) ;-) 

Again, since you haven't said anything that even suggests that you have 
understood my view, I won't consider your opinions about it.

>> I understand your position, and I also agree with it if you only
>> consider the "socio-history" of the human race. But if you really want
>> to use the MoQ as a metaphysics, it must work on all scales, and the
>> only way I have found that works is my interpretation/extension.
> 
> Well, who am I to hinder you, but I agree with Pirsig's in the letter 
> 
>     There has been a tendency to extend the meaning of 
>     "social" down into the biological with the assertion that, for 
>     example, ants are social, but I have argued that this 
>     extends the meaning to a point where it is useless for 
>     classification. I said that even atoms can be called 
>     societies of electrons and protons. And since everything 
>     is thus social, why even have the word? I think the same 
>     happens to the term, "intellectual," when one extends it 
>     much before the Ancient Greeks.*  
> 
> As he says , why have the social level at all?  

As I said in a previous post, he makes the same mistake you do. He doesn't 
acknowledge the dimensional view of the levels and therefore thinks that size 
matters. We can say the exact same thing about inorganic patterns. That level 
*really* extends all the way from atoms (or even sub-atoms) to the entire 
universe. Why do we have *that* level? Please Bo, think about that for a minute 
and try to come up with an answer.

This problem with the social level and size that you and Pirsig seems to think 
is sooo hard to overcome, is *not* a problem! You just have to learn how to 
distinguish social, inorganic and biological value at those scales.

1. The first thing you need to think about is the dimensional view of the 
levels, a *thing* can be manifestation of many different types of patterns, not 
just one as you seem to think.

2. You must use a have better definitions of the levels, and those definitions 
*must not* be based on examples of *things*, because that will just make it 
impossible to do 1 above.

If you follow these two steps, the problem goes away. Give me some hard nuts 
that seem fuzzy to you and I'll show how to do it.


>> And I say there's no reason to exclude any of his intellectual levels
>> because "they" are one and the same, just born out of different scales
>> of social patterns.
> 
> So there are several "intellects"? One "out of" each of your 
> societies. I understand that this has become a prestige thing for 
> you. 

As I said before, the MoQ is pretty important to me but I think it's incomplete 
as described in Lila. But my main problem seems to be my inability to explain 
the problems or my solution to anybody else. I have not yet received any 
relevant criticism of my view, only mute arguments that only proves that you 
haven't understood what I'm saying. So I just have to explain it over and over 
again until someone gets it.

BTW, if someone else understands what I mean, feel free to rephrase it in other 
terms so that maybe more can understand. I seem to lack the finer nuances of the 
English language to make myself understood.


>> On the other hand, I got an idea about the intelligent/intellectual
>> distinction. 
>>   If you really understand my view of the MoQ, then you could say that
>    
>> intelligence is the ability to handle intellectual patterns, whereas
>> intellect also requires a human-social context. So, one kind of
>> intellect is "street-smart", another is the kind required by bushmen
>> and yet another is the kind that gives you nobel prizes. If you look
>> closer at these types, you see that intelligence is the most general
>> of them, since it does *not* require a human-social context.
> 
> I see your point, but why complicate things beyond recognition? 
> It's a MOQ tenet that each level is a rung on the Q ladder and 
> that DQ exploits the most "ambiguous" pattern of the lower rung 
> to obtain the next one, but that the whole lower level forms its 
> base. INTELLIGENCE (the ability to store and retrieve 
> experience to anticipate new outcomes) emanated from neural 
> complexity. This may be the biological pattern that helped DQ 
> establish the social level and what that level regarded own value. 
> When intellect was established INTELLIGENCE followed and 
> became regarded as intellectual value. And here is the reason for 
> the thinking-as-intellect fallacy. After language, intelligence 
> became "thinking" and like that it continued at the social level - 
> and eventually into intellect - and because no level know any 
> level the 4th level regards thinking as its foremost characteristic.          

I don't think I complicated things, I think I was making it easier by using less 
number of terms to explain it. Your explanation is more based on how they 
evolved, even though I don't agree much with making that distinction between 
intellect/intelligence you do. I don't think it's important to the MoQ, but I 
understand it's pretty crucial to your MoQ. But your hard dependence on these 
terms comes from not solving the problem with the social level and scales, they 
are not inherent in the MoQ.

	Magnus





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