[MD] Quantum computing

[Magnus Berg]

Hi Horse

> 1)
>> In my view of the MoQ, there are no fuzzy borders. Fuzziness is bad. How can 
>> even the MoQ include fuzziness if all of reality is made of quality events? Each 
>> QE is between two patterns of the same type, right? So how on earth *can* 
>> fuzziness arise from that? I thought you understood (and perhaps even agreed 
>> with) the dimensional view of the levels? And that view removes fuzziness.
> 
> If by fuzziness you mean a blurring of definitions or borders between 
> the levels then I would tend to agree as I also see the levels as 
> discrete and in opposition or, as you put it, orthogonal.
> However, if you mean fuzziness, in the technical sense, then I disagree 
> with you. I'm not sure if we may have had this conversation some years 
> back but I see the mathematical/logical sense of fuzziness as 
> fundamental to the MoQ as it removes the Either/Or distinction in favour 
> of the Also/And view. In other words it is the negation of the law of 
> the excluded middle.
> For me this gels perfectly with the MoQ view that any "thing" that you 
> care to mention is a conglomeration of static patterns of value with a 
> relationship with DQ. The degree to which each level inheres is a fuzzy 
> measure as opposed to a binary measure.

Not sure what you mean by "fuzziness in the technical sense", but your 
conclusion sounds right to me. If you look at a "thing", it's not always easy to 
see what level governs the general behavior of that thing. It may very well 
perform actions of many different levels, or rather, one thing can be involved 
in many different types of quality events. This is why I I don't find it very 
interesting to argue whether a "thing" belongs in this or that level.

> 2)
>> Ok, we disagree completely here. I say that scale doesn't matter at all. Why 
>> can't you see that a dimensional view of the levels means that we don't have to 
>> decide where level boundaries should be drawn based on scale? We can treat a 
>> collection of cells as a society *and* as a biological animal. We don't have to 
>> choose! And we don't have to get those fuzzy borders.
>> If scale counts all that much that you seem to imply, how can it be that the 
>> inorganic level works on all scales - atoms, rocks, planets, solar systems, 
>> galaxies and galaxy clusters - but the social level is confined to, what 
>> exactly, tribes, cities and countries?
> 
> 3)
>  > In my view, animals are societies of organs, but that doesn't mean
>  > they lose their biological value. If you use your level rule above, it
>  > would end up in the social level, but that might not be the best way
>  > to describe an animal. (In fact, I'd even raise it to the intellectual
>  > level. Please read back a few posts in this thread to see why.)
> 
> Your reference to "societies" of cells is the second point I'd like to 
> bring up.
> The way that you use the term in a MoQ context is, I think, inaccurate 
> as it tends to break the evolutionary and hierarchical structure of the MoQ.

It may *move* the evolutionary structure backwards in time, but it doesn't break 
it. Bo keeps telling me this as well but I haven't heard why it would break.

I did it to *fix* the MoQ, but nobody seems to understand/bother when I explain 
the problems I saw with the levels before.

> Something that I brought up a while back but which didn't seem to create 
> too much enthusiasm is a network view within the MoQ. As I know you have 
> a strong background in computing I though that I might run it past you 
> to see if it makes any sense to you.
> What you seem to be referring to when you talk about "societies" of 
> cells etc. could be better thought of as networks of cells. In fact from 
> the quantum level up the term network would appear to be a better used 
> term. A network at it's most basic level is a set of nodes and their 
> connections so think of an atom as a network of quantum particles, a 
> molecule as a network of atoms, a cell as a network of molecules (and a 
> lot of other stuff but basically a molecular network), a body as a 
> network of organs, a society as a network of bodies, beliefs etc. and so 
> on right up to the intellectual level.
> Using the computing analogy you can look at complex structures as 
> networks of (sub)networks with different interfacing methods and 
> protocols to bridge the MoQ level structure.
> Above you mention the idea of scaling and there are plenty of analogies 
> within the network view which would accommodate this. Think of wide area 
> networks, internetworks etc.
> I won't go into it any further at the moment as I thought I'd first see 
> if it strikes a chord with you.
> 
> Let me know if you have any thoughts about this

Sure, you can call it networks, but you don't have to as far as down to 
molecules. Those are bound by inorganic value, so there's no need to explain 
their "friendship" in some other way.

However, and here we arrive at what the core of a metaphysics is. A network 
combines into that network for a reason, right? And that reason is because it's 
better. Now, the MoQ stipulates that there are 4 (static) types of 
betterness/value, and you must simply choose which one does network fit in? If 
it doesn't fit in any category, you have found a new one.

I would put it in the social level any day. Just as gravity is an inorganic 
value, networks are bound by social value. And again, size does not matter. A 
network is social value no matter if it's a collection of cells or countries.

	Magnus