[MD] subject / object logic

[Dan Glover]

Hello everyone

>From: "Platt Holden" <pholden at davtv.com>
>Reply-To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
>To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
>Subject: Re: [MD] subject / object logic
>Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2007 09:37:09 -0500
>
>Hi Dan,
>
> > >Pirsig doesn't claim that the "universe of distinguishable things" is
> > >false.
> >Dan:
> > I suspect you might want to read the entire quote again. Mr. Pirsig is
> > clearly making a case for using static and Dynamic value as a starting 
>point
> > in his metaphysics and not subjects and objects (things). Static 
>patterns
> > become things in our cultural point of view. If it is not a false point 
>of
> > view then why does he spend so much time explaining this point?
>Platt:
>I'm thinking of the following passage where Pirsig says SOM isn't false,
>just that the MOQ is better:
>
>"Or, using another analogy, saying that a Metaphysics of Quality is false 
>and
>a subject-object metaphysics is true is like saying that rectangular
>coordinates are true and polar coordinates are false. A map with the North
>Pole at the center is confusing at first, but it's every bit as correct as
>a Mercator map. In the Arctic it's the only map to have. Both are simply
>intellectual patterns for interpreting reality and one can only say that in
>some circumstances rectangular coordinates provide a better, simpler
>interpretation." (Lila, 8)

Hi Platt

Yes I can appreciate this. I could have better phrased my statement.

>
>[Platt]
> > >His
> > >point is that instead of being collections of particles and atoms as
> > >science
> > >alleges, things are collections of moral values. "If one comes from a
> > >cultural tradition where an electronic assembly is primarily a moral 
>order
> > >rather than just a neutral pile of substance, it is easier to feel an
> > >ethical responsibility for doing good work on it." (Lila, 30)
>
>[Dan]
> > You seem to be using "thing" as a slang term to mean anything you like 
>it to
> > mean.
>Platt:
>Perhaps our difference is semantic. Using Merriam-Webster's definitions I
>go with "3 a: a separate and distinct individual quality, fact, idea, or
>usually entity." Maybe you think of a thing as " 3 d: an inanimate object
>distinguished from a living being."

Dan:
There are over 20 definitions of "thing" at dictionary.com. Perhaps we both 
have to be more specific at what we mean.

>
>[Platt}]
> > >Perhaps you think of a "thing" solely as a physical object that casts a
> > >shadow whereas I think of a "thing" as any phenomena of experience,
> > >including ideas, emotions, and Pirsig's patterns of value. Since my
> > >question failed to make that clear, I apologize.
>
>[Dan]
> > No apology necessary. But I think your use of the term "thing" has led 
>to
> > confusion, especially using it interchangeably with static patterns of
> > value. I am quite sure that Mr. Pirsig says Quality is not a thing.
>Platt:
>I agree. Quality is not a thing. It cannot be defined. But to me a pattern
>is a thing (like an electronic diagram of a radio) and a value is a thing
>(like this radio is better than that one.)  Anyway, can we agree that
>static patterns of inorganic and biological values can be called things,
>like atoms and aardvarks?

Dan:
We could but it might lead to more confusion than if we simply called atoms 
and aardvarks static quality patterns of value.

>
>(skip)
>
> > >[Dan]
> > > > People exist as a collection of static quality patterns of value, 
>not as
> > > > objects or things. We value people. That's why we care about what
> > >happens to
> > > > them.
>
>[Platt]
> > >People exist. They are real. They are not illusions. That's all I 
>wanted to
> > >hear.
>
>[Dan]
> > You want to hear that the self exists. You're changing the context here. 
>If
> > people are real then it means that the self is real. It means the 
>individual
> > is not an empty concept. Sorry. That is not what I said.
>Platt:
>I agree people hear what the want to hear. So to clarify you believe that
>1) people are not real, 2) the self is not real, 3) the individual is not
>real. They are all illusions, figments of our imagination. Is that your
>position?

Dan:
I think it is better to say people are a collection of static quality 
patterns of value. When we try to frame the question in terms of real or 
illusion we tend to think of objects as being solid and verifiable. Ask a 
physicist what an atom is made of and they will answer 99.99999999% empty 
space. There is virtually nothing there. An atom is an emtpy concept. Yet 
put a collection of atoms together and they give the notion of being solid 
and real.

I believe people are real in the sense that they are patterns of value. The 
self too is a collection of patterns of value. But if we try and find the 
self, there's nothing there to find. The self is an empty concept. Put all 
the patterns together though and the self gives the notion of being solid 
and real.

Illusion vs real seems to be a subject and object notion that is better 
defined in the MOQ like this:

"But if there is no substance, it must be asked, then why isn't everything 
chaotic? Why do our experiences act as if they inhere in something? If you 
pick up a glass of water why don't the properties of that glass go flying 
off in different directions? What is it that keeps these properties uniform 
if it is not something called substance? [...]
The answer provided by the Metaphysics of Quality is similar to that given 
for the "causation" platypus. Strike out the word "substance" wherever it 
appears and substitute the expression "stable inorganic pattern of value." 
Again the difference is linguistic. It doesn't make a whit of difference in 
the laboratory which term is used. No dials change their readings. The 
observed laboratory data an., exactly the same,
The greatest benefit of this substitution of "value" for "causation" and 
"substance" is that it allows an integration of physical science with other 
areas of experience that have been traditionally considered outside the 
scope of scientific thought. Phaedrus saw that the "value" which directed 
subatomic particles is not identical with the "value" a human being gives to 
a painting. But he saw that the two are cousins, and that the exact 
relationship between them can be defined with great precision. Once this 
definition is complete a huge integration of the humanities and sciences 
appears in which platypi fall by the hundreds. Thousands." (LILA)

Dan comments:

So instead of asking of people are real or figments of imagination, it seems 
better to ask: do we value people? The answer is yes. To think in terms of 
value instead of substance doesn't change people yet it changes our 
perception of people.

Thank you,

Dan