[MD] Tit's

MarshaV marshalz at charter.net
Sat Aug 2 00:35:12 PDT 2008


Wow, Krimel, you are beautiful.


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Krimel" <Krimel at Krimel.com>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Saturday, August 02, 2008 12:29 AM
Subject: Re: [MD] Tit's


> dmb,
> What you offer up is an impressive bit of philosophology about which I 
> have
> very little to say other than I plan to listen to the Dreyfus lectures as
> soon as time allows. And I did seek them out based on the earlier
> discussions you mention.
>
> I will concentrate instead on what I take to be the critical aspects of 
> your
> commentary. As you say, I do indeed think that mind arises from matter. I
> regard life as an emergent property of matter. I regard "mind" as an
> emergent property of life. As I have stated so many times that I am
> perfectly willing to call my personal acceptance of this view a "skip of
> faith". It is a primary assumption; a starting point. It is, I would 
> argue,
> an assumption held tentatively and subject to change. It says nothing at 
> all
> really about the nature of matter or material substance. It is merely the
> conviction that some form of reality exists independent of my ideas about
> it. I believe that this independent reality is orderly. I believe that
> humans arise as a product of this reality prepared to detect that order, 
> to
> see patterns in that order and to use those patterns to reduce 
> uncertainty.
> That is, we create knowledge and meaning in such a way as to increase the
> likelihood of replicating ourselves. And by this I mean creating others 
> like
> us both physically and socially.
>
> I fully realize that there is a long history and present flurry of debate
> into the nuances of these assumptions. While this is all very stimulating,
> entertaining and amusing is does little to seriously challenge these
> assumption or to detract from the benefits of making them.
>
> If I were pressed to advance a rationalization for making these 
> assumptions
> I would say, because they stir in me an emotional and asthetic feeling of
> rightness. I see within them a coherence that is appealing both rationally
> and empirically. If I were pressed on why I would accept these assumption 
> of
> over some others I would say because the first argument in the MoQ is over
> monism versus dualism. The MoQ sides with monism.
>
> You suggest some implied dualism when you say, "The dualism exists here in
> the form of the source of the sense data and the physiological 
> transduction
> of the data. In other words, the objective reality and the reception of it
> by the subject." But what is happening is that energy from the 
> environment,
> (thermal energy, light, chemical energy, etc) is being transduced into
> electro-chemical energy. Energy changing form is not dualistic. Even 
> matter
> or the dreaded "material substance" is a form of energy.
>
> I would say that materialism, in a broad sense of the term, provides a
> monism that, as it is being pursued by science, offers a fairly
> comprehensive view of the life the universe and everything. Thousands of 
> the
> brightest and best in a wide variety of disciplines over the past 400 
> years
> have united in the task of providing explanations of how and why we are
> here. I see no serious flaws in either the approaches being used, the
> assumptions being made or the results that poor forth from them.
>
> Nor do I think the MoQ is in conflict with this view. In fact I would say
> the MoQ supports and enhances it. Consider even the secondary issue of
> levels in the MoQ. We begin as does science with the inorganic level. 
> Within
> science this level of physics and chemistry was the first to yield its
> secrets and the best understood. This is so in part because the
> relationships at this level, inorganic patterns are the most static.
> Inorganic patterns and the laws that govern them exist in simpler, more
> stable patterns than at any other level. The inorganic moral order as far 
> as
> we can tell is invariant. The forces and patterns of space/time and energy
> are fixed and/or predictable within a very narrow range of probability.
>
> At this particular space and time the arrangement of inorganic patterns is
> of the right mix of patterns and relationships to allow the existence of
> higher level patterns to emerge. Among these patterns would be the
> gravitational relationship of earth to the sun, moon and other planets, 
> the
> mix of chemical elements present on the surface and atmosphere of the 
> planet
> and a temperature that allows those elements to exist in the three of the
> different states of matter, solid, liquid and gas.
>
> Biological patterns depend upon stability at the inorganic level. While
> those inorganic patterns do not specify precisely the pattern of emergent
> biological organisms, they do establish a limit on the range of 
> possibility
> at the biological level. This is the value of reductionism. It is not that
> understanding the laws of physics predicts the rules of chess. But the 
> rules
> of chess are constrained by the laws of physics and biology. They set 
> limits
> on the kinds of rules that are possible the materials that piece and board
> can be made of the complexity of the rules etc., etc. Biological patterns
> are more fluid, subject to change and are able to adapt to change within
> certain limits. In other words to biological level depends on stasis at 
> the
> inorganic. We can say all kinds of things about biology without reference 
> to
> physics or chemistry. But understand the laws of physics and chemistry
> greatly enhances our understanding of biology and the kinds organisms that
> can exist and the finds of relationships that can exist among them.
>
> I think the MoQ levels break down at this point because both social
> structure and intellect, even language appears in our species as 
> biological
> adaptations. Not to mention the inability to define what the intellectual
> level even is. But nevertheless within the MoQ inorganic patterns are
> fundamental.
>
> You spend a lot of time talking about language related issues from a
> philosophological perspective. I think much of that debate is misguided.
> Language, as I just said is a biological adaptation. It allows members of
> our species to communication complex ideas. It facilitates the formation 
> of
> complex ideas. But rather than limit the range of our perception, it 
> vastly
> enhances them. Nor does language as such fix our perceptions into some 
> rigid
> mold. Language changes and adapts to meet changes in our conception of the
> world. We add new words and phrases constantly. We change usages and the
> vary structure of the spoken word to accommodate new concepts.
>
> The spoken languages of the world are not so very dissimilar in structure
> from one another that translations can not be made and the concepts of one
> culture can be represented to members of another culture suggesting that
> structure of the spoken word is constrained not just by cultural factors 
> but
> because the function of all languages is to affect a correspondence 
> between
> individuals and their common experience of the external world.
>
> Much of the function of language centers on symbolic representation of 
> such
> purely private experiences as emotional responses, sensory impressions and
> private reflections on past experiences. But humans across space, time and
> culture have contributed to the construction of a universal mathematical
> language that is devoid of emotional ambiguity or the confusion of 
> disparate
> private experiences. It is a language that provides a rigorously thought 
> out
> and tested description of much of the world we share in common as well as
> imaginary worlds that are outside of our experience.
>
> In the case of science one of its tasks to construct a language that
> provides ever more precise descriptions of the patterns that make up our
> shared experiences. Rather than being the kind of blinders you present it 
> to
> be I think of it as the raw materials from which science and math are
> constructed.
>
> You seem to claim that somehow this view has crippling limitations that
> render it and those who advocate it blind to some larger truth. You seem 
> to
> think that the scientific study of the brain for example has nothing of
> value to tell philosophers about our perceptions and how they are formed.
> And yet all you seem to offer in return is some vague nattering about
> esthetics of solitary feelings of oneness based on purely private
> experience.
>
> With regards to the slamming door I think you are missing a critical 
> point.
> I suspect it is the same critical point that leads you to imagine that we
> can have experiences that do not depend on sense impressions. We can not.
> Whatever "perception" you have of the sound of slamming depends on the
> acoustic vibrations AND your history of past experiences. You can not
> imagine that anger or wind could be associated with similar sounds if you
> had not seen and heard those kinds of events paired with similar stimuli 
> in
> the past. Our perception and our behavior are based on three factors: our
> biology, our history and the stimuli present at the moment.
>
> While this is particularly true of the slamming door example, Pirsig's hot
> stove a bit different. The perception of the slamming door depends in 
> large
> measure of the history part of this equation. It depends upon our memory 
> or
> internal representation of past events. Sitting on a hot stove emphasizes
> the biological aspects of the situation. Our perception of low quality 
> does
> not depend so much on our personal memory but the genetic memory of 
> mammals
> exposed to heat encoded in our genes.
>
> Finally with regard to the strawmen you invite me to put in my pipe I will
> wait until I am down to seeds and stems. In the mean time I would point 
> out
> that none of those arguments were phrased in the over simplified language 
> of
> the SOM strawman. The fact that you over simplify the arguments to fit the
> strawman does tend to argue in favor of your contention that language is
> little more than a set of intellectual blinders. But Pirsig does not stay
> that we are forced to wear any particular pair of such glasses. We can 
> trade
> in one pair of specs for another. We can polish the lenses, wipe away the
> smudges. Even you with just a little effort can get a new pair.
>
> Krimel
>
>
>
>
> Moq_Discuss mailing list
> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
> Archives:
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
> http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ 




More information about the Moq_Discuss mailing list