[MD] Reet and the Weakest Link

[skutvik at online.no]

Mati and DMB

1 Aug. DMB said :

> Mati said:
> ...Bodvar's SOL captures the essence of intellect from the western
> metaphysical perspective.  Both Bo and I are of the opinion that there
> is no rival to SOL in the eastern metaphysical tradition that
> dominated the social level and propelled intellect to what it is. 
> Marsha, before you pounce on this, I will also concede that at this
> point nobody has been able to approach this question of eastern
> metaphysical understanding as a context for intellect.  Therefore
> because it hasn't been thoroughly approached in this manner doesn't
> mean it is automatically disqualified as intellect, it just means that
> it hasn't met the muster that Bo has given to SOL as the heavyweight
> contender.  I would also share that in Pirsig's letter to Paul that he
> has fallen short of giving us much to move forward on this issue.  My
> belief that Pirsig has retired on the tremendous accomplishment of MOQ
> and will let us the next generation to figure out the details.  So we
> will continue to debate this issue.
> Let us hope that a small group like minded individuals (about MOQ)
> are up to the task and can the whole chain as strong as the
> strongest of links.

SOL is the interpretation of MOQ that says that the 4th. level= S/O 
and Mati means that there is no rival to the MOQ in the Eastern 
Tradition. If we read this part of Pirsig's letter to Paul Turner.  

    The argument that Oriental cultures would not be classified 
    as intellectual is avoided by pointing out that the Oriental 
    cultures developed an intellectual level independently of 
    the Greeks during the Upanishadic period of India at about 
    1000 to 600 B.C. (These dates may be off.)

Pirsig points to the Upanishads period. Later Paul told about these 
times as an intense philosophical search for the final ground of 
reality (they did not see the god's realm as "rock bottom") This 
corresponds to the Greek search for eternal principles that ended 
in the SOM. This could have happened in the Orient too, but 
according to Marsha there arrived a thinker (Prasagika) with the a 
Quality-like insight (that there is no ground) so the Oriental SOM 
(or intellectual level) was aborted - stunted at least -  and without a 
full-fledged 4th level the ensuing Buddhism does not have the 
explanatory power of the MOQ.  

> dmb says:
> Hmmm. I'd have to learn tons before I could even try to come up with
> an Eastern rival to "SOL". But if you're looking for a rival to SOM
> here in the West, Pirsig tells us exactly where to find it. I've
> mentioned the Radical Empiricism of William James before, about a
> hundred times. 

You have mentioned James and Dewey and you aren't directly 
wrong it's just that all theirs is merely the first stage of Phaedrus' 
insight in ZAMM, they found a deeper reality that the S/O but did 
not develop anything like the MOQ, i.e. that the S/O is the last 
stage of the deeper reality's static aspect. So it's misleading  to 
compare them with Pirsig. 

> This, along with the pragmatic theory of truth, is what
> you need. I mean, these alternatives would be laid down first so that
> intellect or the fourth level is defined and described in terms of
> explaining experience and guiding experience rather that trying
> present intellect as an objective fact. This groundwork effectively
> changes the criteria by which the definitions and descriptions are
> judged. I mean, intellect is "real" in terms of what we know from
> experience rather than an ontological reality or whatever. I mean, we
> don't have to go East to find a rival for SOM. As I keep saying
> repeatedly, support for this alternative can be found right here in
> American Philosophy and its extremely readable.
>   For the last twenty years or so there has been a huge revival of
>   American pragmatism, especially when it comes to James and Dewey. 

> I can see how Dewey might actually be better for somebody who was
> looking at education issues. He was also a radical empiricist and he
> used that basis to go in several different directions. Its the basis
> of his thinking on Art, on Politics, on Education and of course his
> thoughts about philosophy in general. By setting down a pragmatic
> theory of truth and Radical Empiricism, you don't even have to try to
> prove that intellect is "real". You only have to make a case that the
> distinction is useful, that it works to explain the past and guide the
> future. We only have to say its what we'll use until something better
> comes along, not THEE truth about anything.

Of course the intellectual level isn't the final reality - that was the 
role it played as SOM - it's a static level, a sub-set of the MOQ. 
The final reality is the DQ/SQ configuration.

> At one point Pirsig says that the classifications he uses for the
> level is not at all original. These categories can be found elsewhere
> and in fact the present scientific worldview is just about the only
> one that ever been that doesn't have a hierarchy of being. The social
> level religions are chock full of that stuff. You know, the great
> chain of being, Dante's Inferno, the basic arrangement of hell, earth
> and heaven, etc., etc.. But he also says that he makes a move that is
> unusual. The levels are not continuous, he says, they're discrete,
> they have different goals and purposes. This, it seems to me, has to
> be the central idea, the basis on which we distinguish them. That
> should be the basis of the first and most basic question we ask about
> any given expression of value; what does it serve? Does it serve to
> hold society together or does it work to maintain the integrity of
> intellect? 

The names of the levels may not be original, but by being levels of 
value they mean a total break with the traditional scientific 
interpretations. Inorganic patterns aren't matter, biology - well - 
maybe the most "ordinary" one, social patterns aren't merely 
groups of individual, and intellectual patterns ... phew we know 
what trouble the ordinary interpretation has brought.

> Another thing that seems very important is to work closely with
> Pirsig's examples and explanations. Along with that re-focusing, there
> should be a weeding out of all the stuff that's been added by various
> MOQers here in the forum. The most conspicuous of the monkey wrenches,
> in my view, would be Bo's view. I think that one has created a lot of
> unnecessary problems, particularly for you. 

Nonsense, thee is just as much in LILA that supports the SOL 
interpretation as contradicts it (it's water on geese to start on it 
here) and without the S/O-intellect the MOQ has no explanatory 
power ... how does the manipulation of symbol thwart social value? 
That's just one of the impossible ramifications of the "ordinary" 4th. 
level. Maybe it's a must (to get an academy degree) to make the 
MOQ a SOM subsidiary, so for that purpose ... good luck.  

> Pirsig has never said such
> a thing and he does not endorse it when others say so. 

Are you blind or deaf? In the PT letter Pirsig realises how much 
trouble the - first - mind or thinking  interpretation of the intellectual 
level has brought and he came a hair's breadth from endorsing the 
SOL. This letter is his last communication. 

> The is also the ever-present assertion that the social level is
> inherently "collectivist" while the intellectual level is about
> "individuality". Pirsig never said that either. There were a few who
> took up the idea that the social level is a matter of "unconscious
> copying of behavior" or that science is social. Pirsig never said that
> either and I don't think any of the things make sense at all. In fact,
> I'm a little angry at how much time has been spent on things with so
> little merit. They've actually been very de structive in terms of trying
> to have a fruitful conversation about the levels. Such confusions are a
> tragic waste of time. I see it as pouring dirt into clear waters. It
> just makes mud where we want transparency. 

Agree about this.

Bo