[MD] Science and Values

[ARLO J BENSINGER JR]

[Platt had said]
The brain reaches a certain level of complexity and "oops," you get
consciousness. 

[Arlo asked]
And how do you see the MOQ disputing this? Did "consciousness" exist before the
brain reached a certain level of complexity? If so, where? Where was
"consciousness" ten million years ago?

[Platt]
At last, very intelligent questions. Only you are a little late coming to the
party. I asked the same questions years ago -- and got Pirsig's answer in
Lila's Child:

[Arlo]
The quotations you provide answer neither of these questions. How does the MOQ
dispute Hofstadter's (here greatly simplified) theory that consciousness
emerges as neural complexity increased? And, how does it answer this question,
Did "consciousness" exist before the brain reached a certain level of
complexity? If so, where? 

(If you are not going to actually answer these questions, don't bother
replying.)

[Platt quotes Pirsig]
In turn, experience creates static patterns of value.

[Arlo]
Hofstadter agrees.

[Platt quotes Pirsig]
"I think the answer is that inorganic objects experience events but do not
react to them biologically socially or intellectually.  

[Arlo]
Hofstadter would agree here too.

[Platt quotes Pirsig]
They react to these experiences inorganically, according to the laws of
physics."

[Arlo]
Again, Hofstadter agrees. So where is the disagreement? How does the MOQ
dispute Hofstadter's ideas on an emergent self deriving from self-reflective
experience? (I'll also remind you that the "symbolic repertoire" Hofstadter
pairs with the 'simple neural ability' ties social language to self-emergence
in the same way the MOQ does).

So I ask again, where does the MOQ say consciousness comes from if NOT as an
emergent pattern occurring on top of biological-inorganic neural patterns as
those B/I patterns increased in complexity?

[Platt]
Guess you missed this (like you've missed a lot about the MOQ):

[Arlo]
The only thing is while you cite this, you also refute the "non-teleological"
side as "oops". "Purpose", the MOQ would say, is an intellectual pattern
deriving from social-cultural traditions. It exists, but it is not externally
mandated by some "greater consciousness". Hofstadter makes the same point. Thus
asking "does life have a purpose?" gives the only answer possible "if you want
it to" (an answer that echoes/derives (as do all intellectual patterns) from
the cultural language one assimilates). Thus "purpose" is emergent, as is
mathematics, as is "self". If you disagree, then where were these things ten
million years ago?

But again I ask, since you (no surprise) skirted the question. You've only
proposed so far "quasi-intelligent designer" and "oops". If you are now
proposing the answer of "mu", I'd agree. Other than this, is there any possible
valuistic "theory" science could offer other than "intelligent designer" that
is not "oops"? Again, the key hangs on "preconceived intent". 

Do you think the Quality of the MOQ had preconceived intent in making "us"? Or,
if there was no preconceived intent, does that mean we were "oops"? What other
options do you offer?