[MD] logic of Essentialism

[Ron Kulp]

Ham:
Your knack for reducing a metaphysical concept to a logical proposition
is 
fascinating.  I've been calling the ground of existence Difference, and
the 
power to negate Difference the potentiality of Essence.  But, except for

Cusa's first principle, I've never been able to formulate this in
strictly 
logical terms.

I must say, however, that I'm now wary of logic.  For if there's a logic
to 
make anything reasonable or valid, what's the point of logical analysis?

If  by the "principle of explosion" anything is possible--including the 
concurrent existence of A and Not A, why isn't this a violation of 
Aristotle's law of non-contradiction?  And which law takes precedence
here? 
It would appear that one can support equivocation simply by basing it on
the 
right logic.  What am I missing here?

Ron:
The fact that logic is used to communicate in understandable terms it is
not
a method of determining absolute truth. A true statement is one which
applies to experience, which is ultimately subjective, if there is a
consensus agreement to your statements of experience then for all intent
and purpose they are "true".

Ron prev:
> That's the beauty of the logic I propose, it describes this rather
well
> in terms of logical consistency. Most folks think analytically and
when
> they try to understand what you are saying they get confused by the
> apparent contrariety in your statements.

Ham:
Who, then, thinks synthetically, and how do average folks know the 
difference, even when stated by the author?  I tend to believe that most

intelligent people can recognize an illogical statement when they see it

without resorting to formal analysis.

Ron:
People understand synthetically, (art, poetry literature) but they
reason
analytically by virtue of our culture and language.

Ham:
For example, I doubt that Pirsig actually reduced his theory to the
equation 
Quality = Experience = Reality.  Yet, that's the way his concept has
been 
interpreted, and we see this equation frequently in these posts.  Would
you 
call that interpretation a "synthesis" or an "analysis"?

Ron:
I would call it a deductive inference validated synthetically. 

Ron prev:
> I think your best avenue is the assertion of synthetic argument
> through the destruction of analytic initially then re-assert it as an
> emergence of value awareness through the "complementarity"
> dichotomy. Then when you state "But inasmuch as it is the
> experience of this self that constructs the objectivized universe,"
> you can then use this as an explaination for analytics too.
> THEN when someone knocks you for circular contradictory
> logic you can say "not so" I am making a synthetic argument
> for analytical thought.

Ham:
Ron, if the truth be told, people typically reject an idea outright, 
irrespective of logic, if it is associated with an ideology they
despise. 
They'll dismiss it on the ground that it is "theistic" or "right wing"
or 
"made up".  You see this gut reaction all the time.  "It doesn't smell 
right", "he's hallucinating", "it's talk radio garbage".  I'm not an
analyst 
and may be naive, but I take the position that words and language are 
secondary to the concept presented.  Only a  person who is receptive to
a 
new concept will be discerning enough to critique it analytically.  I'm 
trying to reach that kind of person, one who is willing to consider the 
concept long enough to comprehend it.  If there are some flaws in my
logic, 
I can re-express the concept to correct or circumvent them.  However, I 
shall consider your advice and see how I can implement it in the future.

Ron:
Language is our window to our concepts if that window is dirty or
fragmented
it does not portray the concept accurately, all we deal with here is
language consequently our conceptions are formed by it. if it is not
expressed accurately how can it be interpreted accurately?
but as you state the receiver must be willing to understand.

Ham:
But, concerning Cusa's 'not-other', which you seem willing to discuss, 
here's how Clyde Miller of Stony Brook U. formalized this theory as a 
logical proposition:

"For any given non-divine X, X is not other than X, and X is other than
not 
X.  What is unique about the divine not other is precisely that it is
not 
other than either X or not X ('cannot be other than'-'is not opposed to 
anything').  The transcendent not-other thus undercuts both the
principles 
of non-contradiction and of the excluded middle."

Ron:
Exactly what the principle of explosion does for you and the meaning 
of the tetra lemma, the divine may not be described it may only be
experienced. Experience is not a logical proposition it simply 'is".

Ham:
I wrote to the professor, but he never kept his promise to get back to
me. 
I think this theory has profound implications for metaphysical
development. 
Inasmuch as I've based my ontology on this principle, I'm most
interested in 
hearing your take on it.

Ron:
I hope I haven't disappointed you.