[MD] What is SOM?

[Ham Priday]

Greetings Horse, Arlo, Joe, Ron, et al --


[Arlo]:
> You dismiss socialization theories as wrong, as you did with Joe,
> but offer nothing in alternative. If you truly have nothing to say on
> the matter, and are indeed unconcerned with an evolutionary
.> account of consciousness, then why so adamantly denounce
> social theories?  And if you do denounce then, Ham, then have
> something to offer as an alternative.

[Horse]:
> What you've described here really is an 'Oops' answer to a theory. Nice 
> one.  I'm just surprised that Platt hasn't noticed!

Gentlemen, it's not my style to be a 'hit and run' poster, and I don't think 
I have a reputation for "bypassing the issues" when it comes to philosophy. 
The reason I declined to provide a lengthy answer for Arlo was to avoid the 
animus and rancor that typically follows an idea which does not mesh with 
the MoQ.  In this instance, the question revisited a 3-month-old exchange 
which ended with Arlo saying he had "no desire to ponder 'solipsism'."

However, as Essentialism seems to be coming up more frequently in these 
discussions--although mostly in the Platonian sense--and a comparison with 
SOM is of more than passing interest in this forum, I'll again put myself in 
jeopardy and try to address the problematic issue which, as Arlo has stated 
it, is the (essentialist) "alternative to socialization theories of 
consciousness."

The major difficulty I'm having, not only with Arlo but with others here, is 
epistemological, rather than metaphysical.  Consciousness, as I see it, is 
not a social activity like conversing, dancing, or poker playing.  It is the 
immanent core of individual apprehension, as inseparable from the subjective 
observer as his physical body.  The existentialists Heidegger and Sartre 
referred to consciousness as "being-aware', a term I've borrowed to define 
the human existent.  The term is consistent with the sensibility/otherness 
dichotomy that defines existence in my ontogeny.  In fact, I view 
value-sensibility ('awareness' in the individual) as primary to the 
biological, inorganic and sociological factors of evolution (i.e., 
experienced reality).  I maintain that experience is "effective", rather 
than passive. To put it simply, the individual subject "creates" the world 
through its experience of value.

So far this "subjective" ontogeny resembles solipsism.  But keep in mind 
that what I've outlined above is only the "peripheral", relational mode of 
Essence.  Awareness is dependent on Being which is an "otherness" to the 
self.  The appearance of otherness is, in turn, a contingency of Sensibility 
We live in a differentiated world, and the reality we carry around in our 
minds is part psycho-sensory, part physical.  Our knowledge of actualized 
reality is dimensional; that is, we all experience events incrementally 
(historically) in time and localized in space.  Also, our awareness of 
experiential reality is valuistic, and the ultimate source of this value is 
Essence.  This commonality of individual experience accounts for the 
universality of knowledge.  In other words, we all experience the same 
universe, albeit from our own individuated (valuistic) perspective.  So, you 
see, my concept of consciousness is not really solipsism, inasmuch as it has 
an "external' referent; namely, Essence.  As a free agent of value, we each 
bring essential value into being from our own individual perspective, and 
that "being" is our common reality.

I do hope Arlo no longer feels slighted and, to the extent that this space 
permits, will be happy to answer any other questions that pertain to 
conscious awareness, creatiion, experience, or the self/other dichotomy, as 
defined in my philosophy.

And. thanks for the opportunity.

Regards,
Ham