[MD] What is SOM?

[Magnus Berg]

Hi Bo

>> If you by "Quality context" mean the DQ/SQ split, then I agree that no
>> static level has any clue about that. But that's not self-reference.
>> Self-reference is when something refers to *itself*, not when it refers
>> to something it doesn't even know about. That would be called
>> "impossibility". 
> 
> Can you be a bit more MOQ-specific?

About what? Self-reference? Yes, I can, and I *have* said multiple times what 
self-reference is in MoQ terms. It's when an intellectual pattern refers to 
itself. For example, if a TOC (Table Of Contents) in a book lists the TOC 
itself, then the TOC refers to itself.

>> As dmb pointed out, your MoQ falls outside reality. I thought you had
>> called it a 5th level once, but even if you don't, it still falls
>> outside reality. That's a big problem. Way much bigger than the one
>> you thought you saw before "fixing" it.
> 
> DMB is the one who makes the MOQ fall outside reality by 
> insisting that it is an INTELLECTUAL description of REALITY, 
> meaning a subjective, secondhand, abstract (Platonic) shadowy 
> version of the real world. While I insist that the MOQ is the 
> QUALITY REALITY. How "off" can you be?      

The problem here is that you don't see the difference between the MoQ and the 
reality it describes, nor gravity vs. the law of gravity.

The MoQ *isn't* reality, nor is it some "quality reality" (which, BTW, is 
different from reality exactly how?). It is a *description* that describes how 
reality (may or may not) work, and as such an intellectual pattern.

This *description* describes that the reality includes intellectual patterns. In 
other words, it allows itself to exist, which is the least it must do, otherwise 
it would prove its own non-existence and vanish in a puff of logic.


>> The original text was "No, intellectual patterns are...", not "no
>> intellectual patterns are...". Gödel's Theorem doesn't apply.
> 
> Your paragraph read:
> 
>     No, intellectual patterns are simply able to reference (or 
>     mean) "any* pattern, both lower levels, other intellectual 
>     patterns and also itself. This is called recursion and is 
>     widely used in computer science. And if a metaphysics 
>     doesn't take that into account, it simply breaks.  
> 
> ("Recursion" isn't in my dictionary only "recurrence")
> 
> In my interpretation you say that intellect is a symbol level (a 
> subjective, secondhand, abstract, shadowy) version of the real 
> article). where the lower levels are reflected, i.e. that science's 
> "logies" correspond to  the first, second and third levels. Is that so? 

Something like that. It's a level with which you can use symbols to symbolize 
something else. But you can remove "subjective" from your list, there are 
subjects and objects in every level, not just the intellectual. When two ideas 
meet, such as when I'm trying to convey my version of the MoQ to you, then the 
MoQ you read from my text is the subject and your own internal version is the 
object. When you read the text, the subject and object meet and you have an 
intellectual quality event, which is your intellectual reality *right now*.

When an intellectual pattern is used to represent something else, it is in a 
sense secondhand, abstract and shadowy. But it is only in a SOM mind it becomes 
subjective.

> No value pattern really fits the scientific counterpart, Pirsig spends 
> much time to show that inorganic value doesn't fit the physical 
> matter matrix (wish he had spent as much time showing that 
> intellectual value don't fit the mental mind matrix) 

Not sure what you mean by that. Exactly what do you mean he showed? That the 
inorganic level is not just about matter?

> It fails particularly regarding the third level because "sociology" has 
> nothing to do with social VALUE. According to science individuals 
> cooperate when forced to, principally they are free, while MOQ's 
> social value is in itself a freedom... from biology's dog eats dog 
> existence.  

Don't get me started on the social level. You know we have very little in common 
there.

>> I don't see that we have much choice in the matter. As our definition
>> of "universe" stands, it *is* totally closed. I would say that the MoQ
>> agrees with both Gödel's incompleteness theorem *and* Heisenberg's
>> uncertainty principle. They are simply the philosophical, mathematical
>> and physical sides of the same coin.
> 
> I don't know whether we agree or disagree here 

Actually, I'm not too sure about that anymore myself. As Ron pointed out, 
Gödel's theorem only concerns formal systems of logic, so it's pretty 
far-fetched (even if I can't rule it out completely) that it would have anything 
to do with Heisenberg's principle.

But that was perhaps not what you asked about?

	Magnus