[MD] What is SOM?

[David M]

Krim said: Of course culture sets parameters on our experience. But so
does biology. How are these incompatible?

DM: That's OK but I'd want to say more. Brains do not so much set
parameters for the next level up so much as they create a platform
that allows the emergence of new possibilities, in fact only some
of those possibilities do not emerge only a small fraction of them
do (just look at how some of the brains round here get used sometimes).
Obviously only certain possibilites could emerge based on brains
but brains do not so much constrain the next level up as unleash it.
Take genes as an example, the variation genes are capable of unfolding
is vast, and the known life on Earth is only a tiny fragment of the possible
combinations genes could actualise. Let alone genes based on different
organic bases. Genes are not so much a constraint as an unleashing.
And brains unleash incredible unpredictable behaviour and experiences.
Such is DQ: the actualising of the possible, an infinite resource barely
explored/expressed by our actual universe. Of course as soon as any
parameter is set, such as proton mass, 99.9999% of possible worlds
are made impossible for us, but that still leaves alot of possible worlds
to reduce by another 99.999999% when the next bit of contingency or
SQ is established. Even this email means that this universe will never enjoy
all the possible emails that I have just failed to create, collapsing 
another
99.99999% possible world wave functions. Thins is everytime you reduce
the infinite by 99.999999% you still have a very large finite universe.






----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Krimel" <Krimel at Krimel.com>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 7:39 PM
Subject: Re: [MD] What is SOM?


> dmb says:
> Since I never claimed there was such a thing as brainless mysticism and
> since no sane person would say such a thing, your point is rather 
> pointless.
>
> [Krimel]
> My point is that you feel obligated to pay lip service to serious research
> but then seek to dismiss it as unworthy of attention from the lofty 
> heights
> of your fantasy world. I have made no claim that there are such things as
> brainless mystics but you seem hell bent on providing me with an example.
>
> All I keep asking you to do is state honestly what you think mystical
> experiences can tell us about our place in the world. Like Ham you instead
> of answering you run and hide.
>
> [dmb]
> Your counter-assertion (that mystical states or any other states are brain
> states). That's a nearly perfect example of reductionism. In the MOQ's
> terms, you have reduced DQ to static biological quality here. This is a
> category error that converts epistemological pluralism back into SOM's
> monological gaze. It uses observational techniques where the interpretive
> arts and methodologies are needed. There are many ways to say it. Take 
> your
> pick. But the basic idea is simply that mystical experience can't be
> investigated with the same tools and techniques that are used to 
> investigate
> these brain states. They can illuminate each other and obviously there is
> some kind of correlation, but my objection is that you want to define one 
> in
> terms of the other. Apparently, you want to define all states of
> consciousness in terms of brain states. That's pretty much the text book
> definition of reductionism - both now and fifty years ago.
>
> [Krimel]
> I was been talking about emergence not reductionism. As I have said in the
> past, I do think they are the flip sides of one another; but emergence is 
> in
> no way incompatible with the MoQ. Each level emerges from the one 
> underneath
> it. Emergence acknowledges that meaning and value, for example, can not be
> understood in purely biological terms. This is not at all what I have 
> said.
> What I have said is the meaning and values can not be fully understood if
> you ignore their biological roots.
>
> dmb says:
> Yes, and experience alters the brain too. Again, the problem is reducing 
> one
> to the other. Einstein certainly had a brain but his equations didn't 
> spring
> out of the soft tissue under his skull. You can't solve SOM's mind-body
> problem by reducing one to other. More, specifically, there is Pirsig's
> correction of Descartes. French language and culture exists, therefore I
> think, therefore I am. This is not a way to deny the brain's role in 
> thought
> but rather a way to assert the role of the social level. The eye glasses
> handed to us by our culture largely determines our way of being, of seeing
> the world.
>
> [Krimel]
> You are working under mistaken assumptions here that I don't know what you
> are talking about. Wow, Dave you mean my experiences in the world actually
> determines how I think and what I do. What a revelation. Thank you so 
> much.
> That would explain why people have been arguing about the whole nature
> versus nurture thing. What I have been saying is the two interact. Culture
> is a component of the overall environment. It is the accumulation of the
> experience of members of the culture. It is a big part of the learning
> environment and plays a major role in shaping our perceptions. OK, so 
> what?
> How does that impact the fact that without a brain not amount of 
> experience
> would allow Einstein to develop an explanation of Brownian motion? The 
> fact
> is Einstein was the product of the interaction of his physiology with his
> environment. Of course culture sets parameters on our experience. But so
> does biology. How are these incompatible?
>
> [dmb]
> Heidegger calls this being and language, he says, is the house of being. 
> In
> the Merleau-Ponty article I told you about, this is called the lifeworld.
> (In German, I think, the word is "Lebenswelt") And then there was the da
> Vinci story, where he drew what he knew rather than what he saw. Again,
> there are many ways to say it. But the basic idea is that objectivity is a
> myth, one you seem to be relying on in making your case. You're 
> reductionism
> is predicated on the natural attitude, the myth of the given, as if all
> experience can be reduced to biological processes, as if those processes
> were the simple fact of the matter. But all these philosophers are saying,
> no, that's not how it works. In the case of the MOQ, there is no direct
> connection between mind and matter. There is a third thing between them.
> Like I said, this is where the pluralism comes in. The various levels each
> make their own epistemological demands. One simply cannot observe a 
> mystical
> experience they way one can observe a physical process.
>
> [Krimel]
> All I have said is that static patterns at a lower level give rise to
> conditions that allow emergence of a higher level. In the case of biology 
> it
> gives rise to the social level as a strategy for managing resources in the
> environment that ensure the survival of our young. If you ignore the long
> period of immaturity that each of us undergoes in childhood, you will not
> understand why all humans cultures evolve strategies for devoting adult
> resources to nurturing children. You will not see the importance of 
> nuclear
> and extended families. If you ignore the biologically determined need for
> food and water you will not understand the importance of working to gather
> food and water.
>
> dmb says:
> Traditional sensory empiricism includes the ability to think about and
> remember sensory experience and so your point is irrelevant with respect 
> to
> Radical Empiricism. What leads to believe that you understand Radical
> Empiricism? When I explain radical empiricism in my term papers at school
> they give me a big fat "A". But when I explain it to you there is deep
> confusion. What conclusion would you draw from these facts? That you 
> should
> believe some anonymous dude in cyberspace over the academic professionals
> who actually teach radical empiricism? C'mon Krimel, how is that even
> plausible?
>
> [Krimel]
> Wow you stuck in your thumb and pulled out a plum. What a good boy you 
> are.
> Since your grades certify you as a Jamesian scholar, perhaps you could
> explain to a lowly anonymous cyberdude what James could have meant when he
> say, in the third paragraph of "A World of Pure Experience":
>
> "My description of things, accordingly, starts with the parts and makes of
> the whole a being of the second order."
>
> Is James, like the Dalai Lama and the Maharishi, nothing more than another
> evil reductionist?
>
> dmb says:
> Again, this is text book reductionism. Studying the nervous system is 
> great
> if your aim is to learn about the nervous system, but saying that "ALL
> experience" is a biological process is like saying "ALL road trips" ARE a
> process of internal combustion.
>
> [Krimel]
> All I am asking here is for you to give and example of an experience that 
> is
> not rooted in the nervous system. I have never said that our perceptions 
> and
> action are solely determined by the nervous system. I have said that
> perception and consciousness are processes of and emerge from, the
> biological substrate. You can't dismiss the fact that our senses respond 
> to
> certain wave lengths of light and sound, or that our nervous systems 
> exploit
> certain evolutionary traits like emotions and this heavily influences what
> we value.
>
> Of course ignoring these things while paying lip service to them, lets you
> wander off into whatever nonsensical speculation suits you. You are 
> grounded
> neither in experience nor in logic. You feel free to just ignore whatever
> you like on bogus "metaphysical" grounds.
>
> dmb says:
> What I keep claiming is much more specific than that. It is your 
> particular
> version of science that I find so objectionable. My target is the
> reductionism and the scientism and the naive realism that I find in your
> posts. But it is also true that your brand is not unique to you. Not at 
> all.
> You're basically giving voice to educated common sense in these
> formulations.
>
> [Krimel]
> I don't think you have understood what I have said well enough to make 
> these
> kinds of claims. You are ranting against your "perception' of what I am
> saying. Until you actually say something relevant to my position I will
> ignore this kind of garbage. It is not as though we haven't been through
> this before.
>
> [dmb]
> Those scientists are working with the same perceptual model you are. 
> They're
> working with the same assumptions about brain states and the senses and 
> the
> processes by which we take in the external world. The result is failure. 
> So
> Dreyfus doesn't tell them to pay more attention to the stuff they already
> know but choose to disregard. They don't "ignore this stuff" in that 
> sense.
> But there are some crucial factors involved in perception of which they 
> were
> ignorant. This is where the cultural eye glasses come in, the lifeworld, 
> our
> house of being, the third level of static patterns are all ways to 
> reference
> this crucial factor. In the same way, you're not pretending its 
> unimportant
> or intentionally dismissing it so much as you are simply unaware.
>
> [Krimel]
> Assumptions about brain states and senses, at least the ones I have been
> pursuing, have been wildly successful. They have provided extraordinary
> insights into how we behave, how we think and feel, how we create value 
> and
> meaning in our lives and how we can make many those afflicted with mental
> disorders much more at home in their own skins.
>
> Even the world of artificial intelligence, which you are so obviously an
> expert in, has not turned its tail and given up because some philosopher
> doesn't like what they are doing. Far from it. The cognitive sciences are
> rich interdisciplinary fields combining the work of psychologist,
> neuroscientist, linguists and philosophers.
>
> Krimel said:
> What science says about mystical experience and spiritual beliefs is that
> they have great health benefits. They relieve stress. They result in 
> better
> health and longer life. Kinda like chicken soup for the soul. Was there
> something else you would like to add, Dave?
>
> dmb says:
> Health benefits like chicken soup for the soul. That's perfect. Emotional
> kitsch at its worst. Heidegger takes up these sorts of issues in "The
> Question Concerning Technology". There he makes a case, much like 
> Pirsig's,
> that SOM and the scientific world view have permeated the culture in such 
> a
> way that that all of reality is seen in terms of objects existing for the
> sake of subjects. The result is the commodification of everything, 
> including
> our spiritual lives. Millions literally pray for goods and services.
> Spiritual practices are assessed in terms of what benefits can accrue from
> them, etc, etc. Again, your view is far from unusual. But its 
> objectionable
> in this context because the MOQ is a critique of and an alternative to 
> that
> worldview. When I tell you that this is not a plausible alternative 
> because
> the MOQ is a reaction against it in the first place, you act like I'm the
> one who is confused. That's okay. I'm a condescending ignoramus too.
>
> [Krimel]
> I leave the extended drivel of this paragraph in token of the hypocrisy of
> your complaint against other's spewing drivel. The point I have repeatedly
> asked you to address is what does your "enlightened" view of mystical
> experience tell you? How does it build upon or supplant the insights 
> derived
> from a scientific understanding.
>
> It's ok, I have given up expecting a straight answer to a straight forward
> question. But your floundering and fuming are a continuing source of
> amusement.
>
>
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