[MD] Core problemS

[Ham Priday]

Hey, Ron --


> Some questions to ask ourselves:
>
> ARE the levels discrete or continuous
> are they both or neither,
>
> IS DQ/SQ a schism? of objective entities in source?
> or is DQ/SQ a set of glasses to interpret experience?
>
> are the levels also a function of that set of glasses to interpret
> experience?

Let me try this out on you, since you may be the last one here to take me 
seriously.

Suppose we forget about levels, whether they are discrete, continuous, or 
only allegorical.
Suppose we focus instead on the "reality experience", which Marsha's 
allegedly "Buddha-oriented" quotations seem to be pointing to.

Professor Wheeler suggests that "the universe [is] brought into being by the 
participation of those who participate".  Capra says, "we can never speak 
about nature without, at the same time, speaking about ourselves".  Lanza 
adds: "the observer in a significant sense creates reality and not the other 
way around."  If all these statements are true, isn't it at least 
conceivable that what we call experience is not passive observation of a 
world external to us but the act of creating that world?  When we 
intellectualize the sense data that make up our knowledge of reality, are we 
not defining the forms, order, and laws of the physical word we experience?

I'm not suggesting, as Donald Hoffman did, that Consciousness is the essence 
of reality.  But I am reinterpreting what Pirsig may have had in mind when 
he said "experience is the cutting edge of reality," that when we experience 
value as being, we delineate its dimensions and properties and project them 
as an organized relational system of finite components.  Furthermore, if we 
all start out with the same Quality (value), isn't it reasonable that the 
objective world we each construct as an individual represention of value 
will be a universally shared experience?  And, if that is true, such a 
concept is not solipsism; it's phenomenalism.

I won't elaborate on the dynamics of this concept or their source, lest I be 
accused of logical errors.  However, I would be interested in your 
evaluation of such an ontology, particularly as it relates to the statements 
of Stapp, Wheeler, Heisenberg, Schrodinger, et al.  Does it in any way help 
to clear up the "core problems" of the MoQ?   Or, does it only add more 
confusion
to Pirsig's levels?

Many thanks, Ron.

Essentially yours,
Ham