[MD] The SOM/MOQ discrepancy.

[Platt Holden]

Andre:

> > Andre:
> > The Intellectual level is not individual. The Intellectual level
> should
> > reflect/ and be aware, of all.

[Platt] 
> Aren't you personifying the intellectual level as an individual who is
> "aware?"
> I don't see how a abstract level can be aware. Bessie the cow is aware,
> but
> not property.
> 
> Hi Platt, this is a stimulating discussion and I do not pretend to have
> all
> the answers but am eager to explore:
> I agree that the individual brings to his/her intellectual level
> analogues
> that are a reflection of the individual.

Yes. The individual is intimately involved with the intellectual level. In 
fact,
the level wouldn't exist without the individual because only in individuals 
do
intellectual patterns exist. Further, only from individuals do new 
intellectual patterns
arise in response to DQ.

Now it has been argued by our materialist friends that the laws of nature 
which are intellectual patterns exist independently of individuals. If so, 
the question arrises what intellect created those patterns? Or are we 
humans the sole creators of nature's laws? Do you have any thoughts about 
these questions?.   

> What I was trying to say was that all the 'levels' of the MoQ should
> reflect/be aware of all 'individual' static PoV's. This of course
> includes
> the Intellectual level (as part of a Metaphysics).

Again, I'm don't see how an abstract level, a category created by thought, 
can be aware. 

[Andre]
> > I have tried in my previous posts to make this clear in terms of the
> > intellectual level being ( as Bodvar argues) the S/O distinction. In
> the
> > spirit of Pirsig's  MoQ it is not. Ham has difficulties with this, SOL
> > maintains this but I am getting used to the idea that Pirsig did not
> > intend
> > this.

[Platt]
> Can you cite a passage or two from Pirsig as evidence for your view of
> his
> intent?
 
 [Andre:]
> Pirsig has argued vehemently against the notion of subjec/object
> divisions.
> He prefers to use the term static quality (Lila p119). Also on p158,
> when
> talking about 'man', 'mankind', 'I', 'he' etc, and goes on to say:' Like
> 'substance' they can be used as long as it is remembered that they're
> terms
> for collections of patterns and not some independent primary reality of
> their own'.
> 
> These are just some examples I can pick out Platt. I mean, Pirsig has
> gone
> to great lenghts to 'do away' with S/O distinctions, why (or how) then
> postulate an intellectual level as being the S/O distinction??

Agree that Pirsig wants to replace SOM with the MOQ. But, his critique of
today's SOM-bound intellectuals and their detrimental effect on socity 
doesn't
make sense unless the S/O distinction dominates the intellectual level and,
as Bo points out, are attributed high value by today's movers and shakers 
in
politics, the media and the academy, i.e., the power elites.

> I must reiterate that I do not have all the answers but find it very
> strange
> if this was Pirsig's intent.

None of us have all the answers. It's in exchanges such as this that we 
hopefully come closer to the answers we all seek but will, I fear, be 
forever out of reach. My personal conclusion after years of pondering the 
questions we struggle with on this site is simply, "Something else is going 
on, I know not what." I get closest to that "something else" in fleeting 
moments when in the presence of great art -- a painting, a sculpture, a 
symphony. In addition, there are moments here when a phrase or two 
engenders a flash of celestial light. 

Best,
Platt