[MD] Consciousness

[Steve Peterson]

Hi Platt,

On Dec 18, 2008, at 4:01 PM, Platt Holden wrote:
> The excerpts you cite from Pirsig say that experience and DQ are the 
> same
> whereas in other passages he says experience and Quality are the same:
>
> "Quality is a direct experience independent of and prior to 
> intellectual
> abstractions." (Lila, 5)

Steve:
He could have added, "and dynamic quality is the leading edge of 
experience that leaves static patterns in its wake."

> Platt:
> Does this mean atoms experience? Pirsig answers in Lila's Child, note 
> 30:
> "I think the answer is that inorganic objects experience events but do 
> not
> react to them biologically, socially or intellectually. They react to 
> these
> experiences inorganically , according to the laws of physics."

Steve:
Makes sense to me.

> Platt:
> If the levels can be identified by the reactions of their experiencing
> participants as Pirsig suggests in that answer, then the levels might 
> be
> better named as follows:
>
> Inanimate    (Inorganic)
> Instinctual   (Biological)
> Institutional (Social)
> Individual     (Intellectual)
> Ineffable      (Aesthetic)
>
> These names have a several of advantages. 1)The basic static nature of 
> the
> lower levels as being static (objective) is made clear. 2) The social 
> level
> is clearly identified as human (as Pirsig insists). 3) The importance 
> of
> the arts in putting us in touch with DQ is highlighted ("Beauty leads 
> the
> way forward" -- Gelernter)

Steve:
Plus they all start with I! Inanimate seems like an uneeded change 
then. Plus, inorganic patterns include motion.

I'm not sure what this has to do with clarifying "experiencing 
participants" for each level of evolution.

> PLatt:
> Well, one thing leads to another and I'm afraid I've gotten away from 
> the
> original point, namely, that the experience of animals and babies is
> limited to generalized Quality prior to the intellectual abstractions 
> of
> Dynamic and static.
>

Steve:
Except that Pirsig specifically used an infant to explain what he meant 
by dynamic quality. I have some sympathy with the view that patterns 
refer to intellectual abstractions like the building of analogues upon 
analogues of ZAMM. But he also says that we don't actually think our 
way through chains of deductions with these analogues, we just respond 
based on them, so I think these analogues are better thought of as 
patterns that are more like habits than intellectual activity. I think 
that animals, rocks, and trees can be thought of as having habits which 
can be changed or reinforced in response to dynamic quality, the 
leading edge of experience. If inorganic objects experience as Pirsig 
says, then that experience has a leading edge. Right?

Best,
Steve